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Abstract 
This project seeks to examine the miscommunications that arise in 
discussions concerning electricity deregulation and its environmental 
impact due to the participants’ opposing discourses of environmental 
reality.  Discourses dominant in the debate are analyzed, and interviews 
conducted with participants in the deregulation and environmental debate.  
The interview data is analyzed, with special emphasis on the different 
associational loads the concepts being debated must bear within each 
discourse.  Recommendations are made on ways for participants to reach a 
mutually satisfactory consensus. 
 Electric Power and Social Attitudes III Naiman, Bollinger, Waldron 
 
Authorship 
We, as a group, created a written report on how certain discourses are seen in the 
electric power industry and how they can relate to creating a more environmentally stable 
system. We all worked together on creating a background, however, the actual initial 
discussion and analysis of the discourses was created by Alex. The method in which we 
were to go about our collection of data was again worked on by all of us, but the majority 
of the work was done by Phil. Jared generated the first list of interview questions, then 
discussed them with the group and went back to create two more drafts before we all 
agreed on a good set. We all analyzed the data collected from 7 participants and created 
our conclusions from that. 
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1 Introduction 
The generation of electric power is currently the single greatest source of climate 
change inducing carbon emissions in the United States, accounting for 41% of all carbon 
emissions in 1999 (Energy Information Administration, 1999).  This problem is largely 
due to the fact that the capacity of modern technology to reduce such emissions remains 
severely underutilized.  Up to 50% of electric power in 2002 was generated by the 
burning of coal, which is the worst fossil fuel in terms of toxic emissions per joule of 
usable energy (ibid, 2002).  The reason for this lag behind the development of carbon-
efficient technology and its penetration into the United States’ energy sector has been the 
subject of numerous debates and recently has been one of the major topics of the 
argument over electric power sector deregulation.  Deregulation’s proponents argue that 
power producers competing in a free market would naturally install the most efficient 
technology as fast as they can acquire it, if only to maintain an edge over competition.  
Opponents argue that the energy market has a natural tendency towards regional 
monopolies, which will reduce the beneficial effects of competition, while the negative 
externalities of power generation would, they argue, remain unchecked without a 
regulating government authority.  The situation is further exacerbated by recent 
developments such as the California energy crisis of 2001, which raises the level of 
acrimony on both sides. 
The recent deregulatory reforms, which took place over the late 1990s and early 
2000’s in most of the United States in general, and in the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts in particular, have set in motion a heated debate concerning the electric 
power companies’ impact on the environment, particularly the rate and amount of carbon 
emissions produced by the fossil fuel fired generating plants.  The controversy 
surrounding the environmental impact of the change was further compounded by the 
intrinsic connection of this question to larger questions of social ideology and macro-
policy, and the lack of consensus, even among experts, on what conclusions should be 
drawn from the subsequent disaster of the electric generation market in California as 
opposed to the more positive restructuring of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland 
tri-state markets.  The constant bickering between opposing lobby groups has made 
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market reform a great deal less efficient than it could be otherwise. 
In particular, the opportunity afforded by the reform to make full use of the 
distributed generation model, which entails using many small generating facilities to 
“distribute” the generation load rather than a few large companies taking care of it all. 
The model also allows for the shift of more market power from the large power 
companies to the small businesses that have been left largely unmet.  This is a significant 
concern because the distributed generation model provides the market with a more 
efficient flow of electricity to consumers, resulting in fewer losses.1  In addition, when 
the generation of electricity shifts away from a few very large installations towards many 
smaller ones, some argue that the competition provides a greater impetus to the 
development of new generating technologies, and is particularly suited to assist the 
penetration of zero-emissions technologies, such as photovoltaic power, wind farming, 
small hydro, and tidal generation, into the electric power market. 
We believe that the reason constructive dialogue that results in the adoption of 
environmentally sustainable generation does not occur more often has little to do with the 
technical, scientific, or economic complexities inherent in the problem of transforming 
the United States’ electric power sector.  Great though these problems are, they are not 
beyond the powers of the multitude of intelligent men and women working on them.  Nor 
does the problem lie in the apathy of the consumers.  The United States probably has the 
best-informed consumer base on Earth, and companies selling natural gas and coal have 
found it worth their while to advertise the alleged cleanliness of their product.  The 
problem rather lies in the social roles individuals play, their lack of consensus on 
sustainable actions, and the discourses they impose on their pattern of thought as a way to 
reduce their alienation from these roles.   
It is our hypothesis that this lack of consensus towards sustainability, which 
hampers any sort of large-scale commitment of policymakers to reform and holds back 
                                               
 
1
 This is due to the electricity not having to travel as far, therefore reducing the amount of power 
loss caused by traveling, directly leading to an increase in efficiency, and a reduction of losses. The system 
also becomes more resilient, thereby lessening the requirement of more capacity. 
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the new, market-powered, growth burst of zero-emission generating technologies that has 
been waiting to happen for over a decade2, is caused by a disparity of meanings that 
commonly used terms, such as “deregulation,” “investment,” “technology,” “policy,” 
“consumer protection,” and so forth hold for the different participants in the discussion.  
Because of the different discourses each participant participates in, the terms don’t mean 
the same thing to the adherent of one discourse as they do to the other, hampering 
communication. The idea of the discourse is that every person has certain beliefs and 
ideas about different parts of society. These beliefs can usually be put into generalized 
categories that define the way people think and (sometimes) act. The categories are called 
discourses and they can range over anything people can have an opinion about. We used 
John S. Dryzek’s book, The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses, as the 
source for describing the discourses used to characterize actors in the electric power 
industry. 
As long as the different discourses keep debating unproductively, reform of the 
energy sector will, at best, be limited to ineffectual half measures.  In the meantime, the 
market for electric power keeps on expanding, and the saturation of the electric 
generation sector with the most modern and efficient technology possible grows ever 
more vital to the continued well-being of the planet.  The solution is not merely more 
dialogue, but a meaningful dialogue, where the participants will be able to arrive at a new 
conception of the situation that addresses concerns raised by each participant and allows 
them to envision an outcome that benefits all sides. 
We addressed this problem by drawing attention to it and charting the ways in 
which professional in particular social roles (transmission engineers, university 
professors, electric power policy directors and managers, green energy advocates) shapes 
the assumptions of its participants.  To do this, we conducted a series of interviews with 
persons playing different roles in the electric generation market, and examined the 
discourse to that each of them adheres to.  We analyzed our data for commonalities in the 
ways of thinking which characterize each group.  Then it was possible for us to suggest a 
                                               
 
2
 http://www.aqmd.gov/monthly/maycov.html 
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way through which the opposing groups can “translate” each other’s propositions and 
concerns into a common language, and can meet on a conceptually neutral territory, 
resolving the debate to their mutual satisfaction.  We hope that such a resolution will 
reflect reality better, and encourage the development of “green” generation demand and 
technologies. 
In the first section following you will find the methods we used in order to collect 
our data. You will see the types of interview structure, questions, and analysis methods 
that were used when conducting our interviews. In the section following the 
methodology, the background and analysis chapter, you will find the background 
research we conducted in order to do this project and the analysis of the interviews and 
policies. The definition of the five different discourses used is there, as are examples of 
how they are put into practice. After the discourses we talk about the history of the 
electric power industry, focusing mostly on the recent past in order to give you an 
overview of what has happened so far in the industry. Finally we analyze the policy and 
the interviews that were conducted and discuss discourses that each one represents. Since 
we know most people can have varied opinions, we gave their most pronounced 
discourse and the discourses they also bled into. Finally, the last section of the paper 
concludes what we have found and how we propose the different discourses can 
communicate with one another. 
2 Methodology 
In order to create a coherent report on the discourses in Massachusetts’ electric 
generation industry and policies, we needed to first create a method by which we will 
conduct interviews, analyze them, and analyze the policy currently in Massachusetts. In 
this section we discuss all of these different requirements in detail. We discuss what 
methods were used in getting the interviews. We discuss the structure of the interviews. 
Finally we discuss the ethics of our interviews and how we protected our interviewees. 
After, we discuss the analysis of the interviews and provide a list of the different 
responses that we hypothesized that would be consistent with each discourse. After that, 
we review some of the literature that has also been printed concerning the electric power 
industry in order to expand the scope of this report to include not only Massachusetts, but 
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also other states that have deregulated. In this literature, we looked for ways the different 
discourses represented themselves and we explored how different discourse combinations 
view deregulation through the eyes of these different viewpoints. 
2.1 The Interview 
For this project, our group decided to conduct a semi-structured interview. The 
semi-structured interview format allowed us to get a better idea of people’s opinions. The 
interviews were conducted orally, asking each subject questions specific to current 
information about electric power restructuring.   We interviewed people who have 
opposing views. The individuals came from many different walks of life, and have 
unique viewpoints of the electric power sector. 
In regard to opinionated responses, a semi structured interview has major 
advantages over a survey.  In a survey there isn’t any place for people to discuss their 
personal thoughts on the subject because the answers are preformatted.  Our project 
focused on how miscommunication between groups is the major obstacle in developing 
cleaner, sustainable energy.  If we used a survey then we would lose the valuable 
information that open-ended questions provide.  We needed opinionated responses so that 
we could map the areas that different groups disagree.  It was important that we didn’t 
offer our personal thoughts about electric power generation, because we wanted to get the 
most information we can out of the subject within the time allotted.  If we provided our 
own opinions, they would only have diluted the interview, taking up valuable time and 
possibly influencing the quality of the subject’s responses, whereas we needed the 
subject’s opinions in the most unaltered state possible. 
We wanted to show the interviewee that we are competent, organized, and 
professional.  We gained more competence everyday by studying the subject of electric 
power generation.  Proper organization is dependent on well thought out questions, an 
organized methodology, and adequately coaching before every interview.  This is why we 
decided to interview people we have a closer connection to first.  By conducting pre-
interviews with people we already knew, and people from the WPI community, we were 
able to find out what needed to be changed in our techniques.  Professionalism is 
obtained by having competence on the issue, and having a well organized methodology.  
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Also, we needed to act professionally, a task as simple as not asking unrelated questions 
and as complex as naturally following the flow of a particular interview.  While most will 
be common sense, others will be learned only after trial and error, and talking about what 
went wrong.   
We used an interview format rather than a survey, or questionnaire.  An interview 
served us better because we did an explorative study, rather than proved a point before 
the study.  If we did then we would tailor a survey to check if a hypothesis was correct.  
Instead we discovered where different people’s opinions fall.  Although we have a 
general hypothesis – namely that social roles shape people’s discourses of reality, and 
that the miscommunication between persons holding opposing discourses is the reason 
for the slow progress in zero-emissions technologies’ penetration of the electric power 
generation sector – we did not wish this hypothesis to color the very results we need to 
obtain to test it.  Rather we preferred to use the data we collected in an open interview 
context to determine whether or not the respondent provided facts to support our 
hypotheses independent of a hypothetical survey’s design. 
In any case, an interview will provide more expansive data, because people’s 
personal opinions about a dynamic subject like power regulation can’t be confined to yes 
and no questions alone.  By allowing people to talk, we were able to find common themes 
and categories that developed organically within each interview. 
Then there is the question of anonymity and if it produces opinionated enough 
responses. In some instances of interviewing about sensitive subjects, anonymity allows 
the interviewee to better express their opinion since no name is associated with that 
opinion. At first thought the answer would be yes, but this leads to the questions of how 
and why.  Also, would it be an accurate portrayal of the respondents’ beliefs, or would an 
anonymous interview become too argumentative?  This is a question that another study 
would look into.  We gave the person the choice and trust that they will decide what is 
best for them. 
In the following sections, the interview technique is outlined as well as the 
questions used in the interviews. After that we discuss the purpose of the interviews and 
how we began to analyze them. Finally, we discuss the analysis of the different literary 
works read and how they also fit into our analysis of the electric power sector in 
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Massachusetts. 
2.1.1 Getting the interview 
Listed below are the guidelines we used in gathering interviews for our project. 
1. We started making possible contacts since the start of this project.  We went 
to the Annual Meeting of the Regional Environmental Council and have 
gotten contacts for latter use.  We’ve talked to a professor with expertise in 
the field and also made a trip to a natural gas power plant.  We are learning 
networking skills as we progress. 
2. After getting the names of possible interviewees the next challenge is to get 
them to grant us an interview.  We will use a contact email to break the ice 
and show them that we are taking this project seriously. 
3. We first will tell them our names, the project name, and the purpose of our 
paper.   
4. At this stage we will ask them about their preferences.  This includes how 
much time they can put aside, if they mind being tape recorded, and if they 
want anonymity in the report.  We will also ask them if they want a copy of 
our notes after we organize them, and a copy of the final report.                                  
5. If we don’t get a response to our initial email, or if the person prefers to 
communicate by phone, then we will call them.  We might suggest a time and 
a place to conduce the interview, but most likely the interviewee will tell us.   
This way they will be able to relax during the interview, which is exactly what 
we want. 
6. It is the responsibility of the group to find people of different backgrounds to 
give the project diverse options. To diversify our interview pool, we attempted 
to use the snowball technique. This technique involves asking for additional 
recommended people to interview from the interviewees themselves. By using 
the contacts they had, we hoped to increase our interview pool. 
Some of the simple things need to be covered.  We need to make sure that the tape 
recorder we are using is operational  and we have extra batteries on hand just in case.  
There will be extra pens on hand.  We will have backup transportation to each site.  
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Hopefully we will have the time to ask all of our questions.  If we don’t then we 
are going to ask the interviewee if it if would be possible to arrange another meeting.  If 
additional time is not possible, then we will ask if we can finish the questions by phone.  
Hopefully they will pick one of these two options, or ideally they will allow us to extend 
the interview beyond the allotted time.   
Immediately following the interview we will check our notes with each other to 
make sure we are in agreement.    The tape recording will be listened to by the group at 
the same time.  We can then revise our notes by adding anything that we missed.  Then 
copies will be made and given to the advisors to review. 
We will decide which of us will be interviewing and which will be taking notes.  
Everyone has different strengths and weaknesses which will become clear during the pre-
interviews.  Before each interview we will decide who is doing what.  We will take turns 
asking question but this doesn’t mean that the two who are talking notes can’t pipe in if 
they have something they feel is important to ask.   
 
2.1.2 The Interview Structure 
Since we used the semi-structured interview format, the actual interviews 
themselves were kept rather loose to allow the subject to talk more freely about what 
came to their mind when we asked them the questions. The questions were used mostly 
as a guideline as to where we wanted the conversation to go, however we did ask all of 
the questions to ensure that we had the subject discuss all of the topics we wanted to 
discuss. 
This set of questions was created in order to allow the subject to talk about what 
he or she thinks about different areas of the electric power industry. In order to analyze 
each subject, all of the questions were asked, in one form or the other. Some were 
directly asked if the conversation led off topic, while others were fitted into other 
questions based on the topics being discussed in the interview at the given time. These 
questions were also designed in order to allow each subject to be compared to the 
different discourses, and to rate their answers with answers believed to be common for 
the discourse in question. 
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1. What kind of background have you had in the electric power generation 
sector? 
2. What kind of responsibilities do you have working here? 
3. What was your view prior to the restructuring of the grid? 
4. Were you hoping to get something out of the restructuring, if so, then what? 
5. How is the new system working for you and others? 
6. Could you characterize some of the things that you disagree with about the 
restructuring? 
7. In your opinion, what caused the California energy crisis? 
8. Do you know of other states that have de-regulated?  In your opinion, how do 
the differences between those states’ and California’s deregulation plans 
influenced the subsequent fate of the energy markets in those states? 
9. Do you think that something like the California crisis could happen here? 
10. If so, do you think there are any ways to prevent this from happening? 
11. What do you think drives companies to be more or less resourceful in 
achieving efficiency, environmental or otherwise? 
12. What do you think the role of energy prices are with respect to achieving a 
better state of sustainability? 
13. Do you think the government’s role should change with respect to the power 
generation sector, and why? 
14. What is your take on government programs that aid in research and 
development of more efficient energy sources, or programs that give 
incentives to people who have ideas about better energy sources? 
15. How do you feel about the service benefit surcharge included into every 
electric bill? 
16. Do you think that educating people and changing their ideas about electric 
power generation will better lead to sustainability, or do you think that 
companies will only alter their production methods and consumers – their 
buying patterns, when supply problems begin to materialize? 
17. In your opinion, what drives companies to be more or less responsible with 
natural resources and the environment? 
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18. Do you know of anyone that we should also talk to about this subject? 
The techniques that are going to be used will be developed before and after the 
pre-interviews.  There will be an introduction.  Then the interviewee will be given the 
space to talk about their profession, and group affiliations.  After the get-to-know-you 
stage we will get into the questions.  The interviewee’s will be aloud to elaborate on their 
answers to the questions, but if they get too far off subject then we will bring them back 
to the original question.  After the interview is finished they will be thanked.  They we 
will contact them about our notes at a latter date.  
2.1.3 Ethics 
Ethics is an important part of the project. Each person was asked whether or not 
they will allow the conversation to be recorded, only for the benefit of the interviewees 
and ourselves. Each name was kept confidential in order to allow the subject to speak 
more freely about how they feel in regards to the deregulated industry. This anonymity is 
not a problem as we used a varied group in the interview and there is no accreditation 
taken from any interview. Each participant was sent a final copy of this document in 
order for them to see how their information was used, and more importantly as a thank 
you for taking the time to participate. 
2.2 Analyzing the Interviews 
 Analysis of the interviews was accomplished by examining the 
conversations we had with each interviewee and we examined key points to each other 
based on what we heard. After the interviews we placed each interviewee into the 
different discourses we felt that they were part of. This allowed us to later examine each 
interview individually, discuss what we felt, and ultimately categorize each interviewee 
into a main discourse and then what other discourses their beliefs bled into. Initially, we 
looked at each interview and noted the comments that each person made in order to give 
us a better understanding of where they fell onto the discourse wheel. Upon determining 
where everyone fell into discourse theory, we used their comments and what we have 
learned from Dryzek’s book to confirm our initial ideas and thoughts.  
 In addition to discerning the discourses that each person fit into, we also 
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learned the affect deregulation has had on the Massachusetts electricity generation sector. 
We gained knowledge in how people felt about the policies in Massachusetts and how 
they thought things should be different. We learned first hand what was going on in 
Massachusetts with respect to the different companies, both distribution-oriented and 
generation-oriented. We learned that some feel policies should be placed to increase the 
amount of environmentally, and economically, sustainable technologies that are in 
development. Our analyzing the interviews to determine what people believe is going on 
also allowed us to see how they responded to deregulation so far. 
 The table below was used as our guideline in analyzing the answers 
received from interviewees. We noted each question and compared it to the table in order 
to identify our interviewee’s discourse.
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Table 1: The hypothesized response of the 5 discourses 
Question Administrative Rationalist Democratic Pragmatist Economic Rationalist Ecological Modernizer Green Romanticist 
What kind of background 
have you had in the electric 
power generation sector? 
 
Regulator, Scientist, Engineer 
Lobbyist, Educator 
Activist, Politician, Lawyer Business owner,  Economist, 
Engineer, Educator, Scientist 
Engineer, Politician, 
Administrator, Scientist, 
Activist, Lobbyist 
Educator, Activist, Scientist 
What kind of responsibilities 
do you have working here? 
Examined policy, proposed 
regulation schemes, 
scrutinized various firms and 
organizations for compliance 
w/regulations 
Some job involving 
consensus-building and 
public opinion; perhaps law 
Running a start-up, a 
consulting firm, working on a 
policy panel 
Consulting expert, policy 
analyst, elected or appointed 
official 
Either scientific work or 
organizing a grassroots 
campaign 
What was your view prior to 
the restructuring of the grid? 
 
The inefficiencies of the 
system can be fixed through 
further refinement of policy 
and gathering of information 
The system is broken: the 
decisions are being made by 
bureaucrats out of touch with 
the people and not 
accountable to the ordinary 
citizens 
The system is bogged down 
in a morass of unnecessary 
constraints, making necessary 
reforms needlessly expensive 
The system does not reflect 
the interests of all the people 
the real goal should be a 
complete redesign 
The laws do nothing.  The 
key is to change people’s idea 
of the world they inhabit. 
Were you hoping to get 
something out of the 
restructuring, if so, then 
what? 
 
The restructuring could be a 
useful bargaining chip.  By 
agreeing to open the markets, 
concessions could be won for 
more stringent standards on 
emissions 
Restructuring would allow 
the citizens of every 
community direct say in what 
their electric power is to be. 
Restructuring would provide 
cheaper energy and accelerate 
the pace of ecology-friendly 
technological innovation. 
Restructuring may well prove 
more efficient at introducing 
greener technology to the 
market, but it will have to be 
done within a properly 
defined framework to prevent 
abuses. 
People who take the 
responsibility to choose their 
own electricity provider 
might be forced to find out 
just how much damage the 
electricity they are buying is 
causing the Earth.  This may 
reduce consumption. 
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Continuation of Table 1 
Question Administrative Rationalist Democratic Pragmatist Economic Rationalist Ecological Modernizer Green Romanticist 
How is the new system 
working for you and others? 
 
Deregulation presents new 
problems, but the problems 
and the successes both 
highlight the need for 
informed decision-making by 
well-trained administrative 
specialists 
Deregulation is unfortunately 
hampered by the people’s 
apathy and lack of interest.  
Still, some communities have 
mad substantial progress by 
embracing distributed 
generation and greener 
technologies 
The business community has 
been slow to take advantage 
of this opportunity, no doubt 
due to excessive fear on the 
part of businesses that the 
government will regulate the 
electric power market once 
again. 
Deregulation fails to address 
the basic issue of what 
resources are available to the 
generating firm, and which 
technologies these firms are 
comfortable with using. 
Deregulation can serve the 
cause of harmony between 
humanity and the planet, but 
it shall not unless each 
individual consumer realizes 
the need to act. 
Could you characterize some 
of the things that you 
disagree with about the 
restructuring? 
Electric power is no 
commodity.  A stable service 
by a controlled utility ensures 
reliability and fair prices, 
something that a competitive 
market tends to overlook. 
Wholesalers may gain unfair 
advantage by manipulating 
the distribution companies, 
ultimately costing money to 
that state’s taxpayers. 
Deregulating electric power 
and leaving other necessary 
parts of the electric economy, 
such as oil refineries, 
smothered by regulation, is 
an absurd proposition. 
Deregulation addresses short-
term profits as opposed to 
long-term optimization. 
Deregulation can encourage 
greater and crasser 
consumerism by tempting 
buyers with cheaper electric 
power. 
In your opinion, what caused 
the California energy crisis? 
The irresponsible pursuit of 
profit by wholesalers lacking 
any long-term relationship 
with their customers 
The fact that all big decisions 
regarding generation sites, oil 
refineries regulation, and the 
rules of energy trading 
market were made without 
input from the individual 
communities whose citizens 
were purchasing the 
electricity. 
Constraints on energy trading 
imposed by the inability of 
the trading parties to hedge 
against high prices through 
long-term contracts. 
The improper awareness of 
implications caused the 
government to look for quick 
fixes rather than implement a 
comprehensive plan to make 
energy both green and 
abundant 
Human desire to place 
themselves outside of nature.  
If there had been no 
consumerist pursuit of 
material gain, there would 
have been no excessive 
demand for electric power 
Do you know of other states 
that have de-regulated?  In 
your opinion, how do the 
differences between those 
states’ and California’s 
deregulation plans influenced 
the subsequent fate of the 
energy markets in those 
states? 
Obviously in those states, 
government kept a tighter rein 
on wholesalers.  The example 
of California exposed them, 
so that they no longer felt safe 
attempting their gouging  
The other states lacked 
California’s bloated 
bureaucracy and were more 
open to input from the 
common consumer 
The example of California 
has taught state governments 
to trust the buying decisions 
of free economic agents in an 
unconstrained field that gives 
the laws of the market an 
opportunity to operate 
States which deregulated 
successfully are those which 
managed to bring the various 
groups interested in the 
outcome together with a 
common goal.  Their input 
allowed state governments to 
formulate a wiser policy. 
States known for successful 
deregulation cared less about 
the environment than 
California, and so were not 
constrained by the damage 
they were doing  
Do you think that something 
like the California crisis could 
happen here? 
Yes, if special industry 
interests somehow manipulate 
voters into choosing 
unconstrained power market 
deregulation and loosening 
the policy controls that 
currently keep their 
operations socially 
responsible 
Yes, unless New England 
voters take more 
responsibility for the fate of 
their own community and 
stop abdicating their political 
power to the bureaucrats  
No.  The example of 
California has taught states to 
be on the lookout for price 
gougers and wholesalers not 
to endanger their reputation 
with questionable business 
practices. 
No: the experience of 
California has taught future 
policymakers.  In all 
negotiations, they will be able 
to use California’s example if 
any interest groups advocate 
wrong kind of policies 
Yes: the crisis was caused by 
an overuse of electricity, and 
other societies are just as 
consumerist as California 
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Continuation of Table 1 
Question Administrative Rationalist Democratic Pragmatist Economic Rationalist Ecological Modernizer Green Romanticist 
If so, do you think there are 
any ways to prevent this from 
happening? 
The only way to do that is by 
leaving policy-making to 
informed experts, not 
industry pressure groups 
To do that requires an 
informed and active body of 
citizens, who can exercise 
their political power with 
wisdom and foresight, 
keeping the government from 
betraying them. 
To do that, market forces 
must be allowed to build up 
safeguards against market 
volatility, which means that 
sometimes, even retail prices 
must be allowed to go up. 
To do that, the basic problem 
of the environmental impact 
of electric power generation 
must be addressed, so that 
citizens no longer have to 
worry about pollution caused 
by generation. 
To do that, people will need 
to come to the realization that 
living in harmony with Earth 
is more important than having 
a few extra megawatts of 
electricity 
What do you think drives 
companies to be more or less 
resourceful in achieving 
efficiency, environmental or 
otherwise? 
The restrictions set on a 
company by an informed 
regulatory code force the 
profit-seekers to develop 
new, and more acceptable 
ways to accomplish their 
objectives 
Having a demanding 
consumer  market, with buyer 
that know what they want and 
whose community empowers 
them to demand it 
The never-ending process of 
Schumpeterian “creative 
destruction” 
A government that actively 
rewards innovation and 
resourcefulness, both directly 
and through creating a 
demand for new technologies 
through policy action 
Having ecologically-
conscious people at the help, 
who recognize the 
consequences of every small 
action on all of nature. 
What do you think the role of 
energy prices are with respect 
to achieving a better state of 
sustainability? 
If energy prices fall without 
restraint, it unleashes 
irrational economic 
exuberance which can 
damage the environment; if 
they rise without restraint, it 
can create a rush of attempts 
at finding new sources of 
energy that bear their own 
dangers, moderation is the 
key to sustainability. 
By voting on the provider for 
their community, citizens will 
ensure, if they so choose, that 
only the most sustainable 
methods of generating energy 
will get that provider a profit.  
This will lead to an increase 
in sustainable electric power 
output. 
As long as energy generated 
by sustainable practices 
remains more expensive than 
its alternative, it will remain a 
minority taste.  Under free 
market, money will flow to 
satisfy public wish for 
sustainability, making the 
price of sustainable electricity 
lower by funding and 
developing new technologies 
Energy prices are an effect 
and not a cause: they reflect 
the underlying premise of the 
economy’s operation.  If the 
way in which electricity is 
produced changes throughout 
the country, so will the 
prices, including the price of 
electricity generated by 
sustainable means 
Energy prices are artificially 
maintained by people’s 
dependence on abundant 
electric power to further their 
materialistic desires.  Start 
living sustainably, and energy 
will become cheap if only 
because the demand for it 
will plummet 
Do you think the 
government’s role should 
change with respect to the 
power generation sector, and 
why? 
 
The government should 
extend a firmer hand to 
prevent excesses of 
deregulation from victimizing 
the public. 
The government should get 
out of the way of citizens 
solving the problems of each 
particular locality through 
direct participatory 
democracy 
The government should 
actively encourage 
entrepreneurship in the 
energy sector, and remove all 
obstacles to the operation of 
the laws of the market. 
The government should 
implement a comprehensive 
plan that relies on the 
cooperation of both private 
and public sector 
The government should 
encourage lifestyles that 
cherish the non-material 
treasures and should actively 
intervene to prevent at least 
the most glaring forms of 
environmental destruction 
What is your take on 
government programs that aid 
in research and development 
of more efficient energy 
sources, or programs that give 
incentives to people who have 
ideas about better energy 
sources? 
The government should make 
certain research money is 
allocated to socially 
beneficial topics and tasks 
The aid money may be 
necessary, but how it is to be 
allocated should be left to the 
voters, who would assign it to 
problems they care the most 
about. 
The government can help 
R&D best by encouraging an 
atmosphere of 
entrepreneurship and giving 
tax benefits to R&D investors 
so money is more likely to 
flow to the most innovative 
and original thinkers. 
The government should 
sponsor R&D as part of an 
all-encompassing plan with 
specific goals.  To 
accomplish them, massive 
funds should be channeled to 
research programs involving 
many scientists. 
The government should 
allocate money to study the 
living wilderness so that its 
beauty and the threat it is 
under can be brought to 
public attention 
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Continuation of Table 1 
Question Administrative Rationalist Democratic Pragmatist Economic Rationalist Ecological Modernizer Green Romanticist 
How do you feel about the 
service benefit surcharge 
included into every electric 
bill? 
 
The surcharge benefits the 
ratepayers by providing 
them with a cleaner 
environment to live in, so it 
is only fair that they pay it. 
Whether or not to accept the 
surcharge on their energy bills 
should be up to each 
community to vote on 
The surcharge is not 
necessary.  The best way to 
fund “green” energy R&D is 
to give tax breaks to 
businesses that sponsor it. 
The surcharge is a useful 
item of policy, but to make 
full use of it, a 
comprehensive plan of what 
to research and how is 
required 
The surcharge is a poor and 
artificial way for the 
consumerist members of the 
nature-despoiling society to 
feel they are doing something 
to preserve that nature.  A 
reduction in the consumption 
of electricity would be far 
more helpful 
Do you think that educating 
people and changing their 
ideas about electric power 
generation will better lead to 
sustainability, or do you think 
that companies will only alter 
their production methods and 
consumers – their buying 
patterns, when supply 
problems begin to 
materialize? 
 
Education is usually the best 
alternative, because by the 
time supply prices signal it is 
time for a change, a lot of 
damage might have been 
done already.   But a context 
of regulation, in which 
sustainable practices are 
viewed as business’ social 
duty and companies are held 
to their responsibilities, is 
more important than either. 
Education empowers 
communities to demand their 
rights from the central 
government, and individuals 
to exercise their franchise 
intelligently.  To trust too 
much in the power of supply 
prices to produce changes in 
company behavior is to 
abdicate the duty of 
individuals and communities 
to influence business behavior 
through informed purchasing 
Education is likely to create 
some new demand, but, under 
most circumstances, the 
money that makes companies 
come up with new products 
and fan the demand higher 
will not flow into the 
alternative methods until the 
prices justify investors in 
doing so.   
The tangible benefits that 
would result from a 
proactive transformation of 
the generation sector would 
be the best form of education 
and create a sustainability 
conscious population while 
keeping prices down. 
Prices are nothing compare to 
the cost the se “lower” prices 
are wreaking on the Earth.  
Education through personal 
example is the only way to 
transform people’s hearts, not 
just modify their behavior in a 
limited and insufficient 
context. 
In your opinion, what drives 
companies to be more or less 
responsible with natural 
resources and the 
environment? 
Companies need to be held 
to a high standard of 
responsibility by the state, 
otherwise all they will think 
of is their profit margin 
Companies need to have a 
strong relationship with the 
community they operate them, 
so they see responsible 
behavior as being their own 
best long-term interests 
Companies act responsibly 
because, in a marketplace full 
of never-ending competition, 
reputation for honest and 
responsible dealings, both 
with the individual clients and 
with the larger community, is 
a business’ most valuable PR 
asset 
Companies act responsible 
when it is in their best 
interest to do so.  It is up to 
the government to make it 
more profitable for them to 
be responsible than 
otherwise 
Companies don’t act 
responsible: only people, who 
might happen to work in a 
company, “act” in any 
meaningful sense of the word.  
And they are responsible if 
they understand the 
importance of what is at stake. 
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2.2 Analyzing the Policy 
 The literature played a key role in us learning about the policy taking 
place in Massachusetts. Dryzek included many examples on how the different discourses 
reacted in certain situations and allowed us to gain a better understanding on how they 
would appear in society. Using these examples, we analyzed the policies that had taken 
place in California and described the way they are each a representation of different 
discourses. In each of the different discourses, examples are provided in order to give you 
the sense of what each discourse looks like in practice. The discourses mentioned will be 
described in the next section. 
 
3 Background and Analysis 
Since the majority of our paper is analyzing literature while using literature as our 
background, we felt it would be better to include them both in the same section. The first 
thing that will be discussed is the different discourses and how they both appear in and 
affect society. These discourses are the heart of our paper; they describe how we 
interpreted all of our information and how we finally concluded our findings. After the 
discourses we talk about the history of the industry to give a sense that change is 
something that happens all the time to the industry and that deregulation is just another 
step in its path. Next we will talk about one of the most disturbing cases of deregulation 
in American history: California. What happened in California set up the reasons some of 
the legislature in the deregulation act was inserted. Next we will talk about the policy that 
is occurring in Massachusetts and how the different discourses can be seen in it. Next we 
will discuss what was discovered in the interviews and how people are reacting to this 
new deregulated industry. Finally we will describe Massachusetts policy and how the 
discourses relate to it. 
The analysis is broken up into three distinct parts, all of which relate to the 
deregulation and current condition of Massachusetts. The first part is a literary analysis of 
other authors and their opinions on both Massachusetts and the first people to begin 
deregulation, California. Understanding the opinions of other authors allows for a more 
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diverse perspective of the situation. The second part of the analysis is the observations of 
Massachusetts policy and how it has both controlled the process of deregulation and how 
it is set up for a more sustainable economy and ecology. Looking at Massachusetts policy 
is also important since most of our other information is based on how legislation has dealt 
with the issue of deregulation and how the different discourses take a role in that issue. 
Finally, the third analysis is that of the interviews. The interviews give a better 
understanding of how policy is actually practiced. The interviews also give insight into 
how each of the different roles of society view the way the deregulation process is 
working. 
3.1 Dominant Discourses 
We selected 5 of the discourses described by Dryzek as being the most relevant to 
our analysis of the electric power industry. The list we created contains the following 
discourses: Administrative rationalist, Ecological modernizer, Economic Rationalist, 
Democratic Pragmatist and Green romanticist. Each one has their own views about the 
world around them and each with their own different forms of practice, both of which are 
described under each discourse. At the end of the discourses there is a table built to 
exemplify some positions of the discourses in the work force. There is, however, more 
than just the discourses list below, but we felt that these were the most relevant. 
3.1.1 The Administrative Rationalist 
The administrative rationalist is the first discourse. To give you a better 
understanding, and for easier organization, we have categorized the different aspects of 
the discourse. First, the definition, followed by the relationships, actors and metaphors, 
then to methods whereby the discourse’s beliefs are implemented into policy, and finally 
we analyze and exemplify the administrative rationalist in practice. 
Definition and Classification 
The administrative rationalists are people that believe in the power of the 
informed expert to steer society along the optimum path.  They reason that most 
individuals do not have the information or the specialized training to make rational 
 Electric Power and Social Attitudes - 18 - Naiman, Bollinger, Waldron 
 
decisions on such complex subjects.3  On the other hand, assert the adherents of this 
discourse, even before environmental issues, in the modern sense this phrase, became a 
concern, scientists and administrators working together within a structure of bureaucratic 
control had already dealt with problems ranging from national defense, to the sanitation 
of cities, to universal public education, to the improvement of agriculture.4  On the pre-
1960s environmental scene, Administrative Rationalists point to the administration of 
Gifford Pinchot, the first chief of US Forest Service.  Under this man, (who later went on 
to become the Governor of Pennsylvania) the old trend towards the disappearance of the 
nation’s timber reserves was sharply reversed, and a new trend began, which saw the 
fraction of US land area covered by forests expand steadily from decade to decade.5 
With firm faith in the power of expert advice and administrative training buoyed 
by what they see as past successes, the adherents of Administrative Rationalism remain 
convinced that, while the problems of pollution and environmental degradation are a new 
chapter in the story of challenges faced by the modern industrial society, they are not a 
fundamentally different sort of challenge.  Problems such as pollution can be solved by 
the same methods – that is, by institutionalized expertise combined with social and 
economic control by an informed hierarchy -- which the typical industrial society had 
used to deal with challenges before pollution became a primary concern in the 1960’s.  In 
other words, the adherents of this discourse (as well as many others) believe that when 
properly managed, the modern type of industrial economy can grow and expand 
indefinitely. 
In Dryzek’s terminology, Administrative Rationalists are adherents of a sub-
discourse; classified as part of the larger discourse he names “Environmental Problem 
                                               
 
3
 Dryzek (1997) page 63: “when [natural environment] issues came to new prominence in the 
1960’s, they could be readily associated with a public policy tradition which accorded substantial status to 
scientific expertise as harnessed by the administrative state.”  Note that it does not state that any other kind 
of scientific expertise is granted much status. 
4
 Dryzek (1997), page 63 
5
 Dryzek (1997) page 12, see also, www.wikipedia.org, entry for Gifford Pinchot 
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Solving.”6  The larger discourse is itself classified as a branch stemming from a supra-
discourse, which Dryzek calls Reformist7 (as opposed to Radical) – to be specific, the 
particular branch of it that follows the Prosaic (as opposed to the Imaginative) approach 
to finding solutions.  That branch is primarily characterized as viewing the damage 
humans do to the environment as a series of distinct problems that experts, markets, or 
participants in the democratic process can solve one at a time, rather than as a single 
fundamental flaw of modern industrial society, which can only be resolved by a 
fundamental transformation that rejects industrial society’s commitment to economic 
growth. 
As mentioned above, Administrative Rationalists believe in the possibility of 
indefinite growth of population and economy, which separates them from the prosaic 
discourses classified in the Radical camp (such as Survivalism), but do not reject the 
inevitability of conflict between short-sighted business interests on the one hand, and the 
public’s need for a healthy environment on the other, which separates them from those 
imaginative discourses that are classified with them under Reformism (such as the 
Ecological Modernizer discourse.) 
In general, Administrative Rationalism is the most successful attempt by the old 
business8 and government elites, who dominated industrial society before the 
environmentalist movement gathered strength, to go on with business as usual in the new 
context of widespread public concern for nature and outrage for the damage that this 
method of doing business has dealt to it over the course of a century.9  It must be noted 
though, that in the United States, the role of the business elite in the formation of 
regulatory agencies was much smaller than it was in many nations.  This smaller role of 
                                               
 
6
 Dryzek (1997) pp. 61-62 
7
 Dryzek (1997), pp. 19-20 
8
 Business in the sense of large corporations of the sort Schumpeter feared would mean the death 
of entrepreneurial spirit.  For these guys, their lobbyist in the government was at least as important as their 
chief of operations. 
9
 Dryzek (1997), on page 62, says that “Administrative Rationalism captures the dominant 
governmental response to the initial onset of environmental crisis.” 
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business accounts for the growing popularity of the Economic Rationalist discourse, 
which has capitalized on the mutual antagonism between industrial and administrative 
elites.  The reason this antagonism came about can be seen in the history of the 
legislation that established regulation in the United States and prescribed its actions.  
Ontology, Relationships, Actors and Metaphors 
The Administrative Rationalist ontology sees the public as shortsighted and 
impulsive, and the market as guided by Keynes’ “animal spirits” rather than Hayek’s 
accurate and precise system of delivering information where it is most needed.  The 
bureaucracy is seen as unglamorous and indispensable “thin gray-suited line” of devoted 
public servants.  Their position of public trust has been earned through their zeal for 
reason and efficiency and their superior education, which makes them able to see through 
the short-term concerns that distract most other people.  The bureaucrat is seen as being 
able to strand aside from the entanglements that cloud the situational perception of all 
other agents, and to make a true appraisal of current conditions, based on carefully 
verified statistical facts. 
In terms of relationships natural to the realities assumed in the ontology, the 
Administrative Rationalist discourse assumes a hierarchy where information from all 
sources constantly flows to the top, where it is integrated by a staff of experts into an 
optimal decision according to a set of strict criteria.  It is natural, contends this discourse, 
for hierarchies of suitably educated public servants to process information better than the 
chaotic markets driven by blind short-term interest. 
The predicted success of such a hierarchy also implies that the lower levels of 
society are immediately responsive and eternally faithful to the decisions made upstairs, 
so that the experts can be sure that any policies they promote will be implemented as 
planned and won’t be hindered by any social backlash.  Obviously in real life, this soon 
becomes a major concern, but the regulatory agency still sees the lower tiers as the acted 
upon and themselves as the actors, with any resistance from below treated as an 
undesirable aberration that must be contained and brought to heel.  From this, another 
relationship can be discerned: the discourse assumes that a hierarchy of bureaucrats can, 
by virtue of its superior organization, enforce its regulation of economy and society with 
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a pervading thoroughness.  This last assumption is one that had caused adherents of this 
discourse the greatest amount of difficulty. 
The chief actors in the Administrative Rationalist discourse are the experts, who 
are given power to change society through their superior knowledge.  The experts are 
empowered to act through the bureaucratic hierarchy, which recognizes their talents and 
puts them in a position to impose their enlightened policy on the public.  The public, 
faced with environmental (or any other) problems, may demand solutions from the 
government, but the precise form this policy takes is decided upon by the hierarchy, since 
only the hierarchy are seen as qualified to predict which solution will have the desired 
effect.  It also acts to gather the information that the experts require in their policy 
formulations, and to ensure compliance. 
All other characters in the story, such as businesspeople, consumers, taxpayers, 
lobbyists, populist politicians, scientists and journalists are perfectly free to act rationally 
within their own sphere, but their unawareness of “the big picture” makes this otherwise 
rational behavior a long-term detriment to the stability and prosperity of civilization.  In 
other words, their role is that of wild horses the administrators and enlightened experts 
must restrain for the public good and force to pull in tandem with the others.  In general, 
they are actors only in a limited sense: in all contexts in which they are not expert, these 
characters are rather those acted upon. 
The wild horse metaphor brings us to the rhetorical devices, metaphors in 
particular, that this discourse uses to appeal for support.  According to Dryzek, this 
discourse relies less on metaphors than on such rhetorical devices as pointing to the 
successes of the system and drawing up horror stories of the various risks, which the 
unchecked short-sightedness of special interests groups poses to the poor innocent babies, 
puppies and spotted owls (not to mention the elderly, the middle class, the second-hand 
smokers, the factory workers, people vulnerable to the rising prices of gas, and so on).   
The bureaucrats themselves are not in the forefront of the debate, since a 
bureaucracy does not resonate with great dramatic appeal to most people.  Instead, the 
appeal is rather something like “leave the people who know what they are doing to do 
their jobs” combined with a leader who shares the Administrative Rationalist worldview 
and can be portrayed as a champion of the individual against the special interests willing 
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to sacrifice the Future of Our Children in the name of short-term advantage. 
Methods of Control 
There are three different types of control mechanisms which members of the 
Administrative Rationalist discourse use to implement their views into real changes: the 
Bureaucratic Apparatus, whose task is to assign its agents various tasks within and 
outside the hierarchy and to monitor their successes and setbacks, the Analytical Tools, 
which are used to judge the likely effects of specific regulations and finally Lawmaking, 
Regulatory Plans and Enforcement, which provides the Bureaucratic.  
Bureaucratic Apparatus 
The assumption of the Administrative Rationalist that a hierarchy of trained 
bureaucrats can successfully enforce the experts’ policy decisions on every level of 
society requires any society where this discourse is dominant to adopt certain very 
distinctive features.  The most prominent of these is an elaborate, arcane, and frequently 
ponderous and micromanaging apparatus of inspectors, administrators, and analysts 
existing on every level, from national (in this country, Federal), to state, to municipal.10 
Of course this is nothing surprising: this sort of apparatus has been a ubiquitous 
characteristic of the modern industrial society for a century and, as was mentioned above, 
the Administrative Rationalist discourse is essentially an attempt by the industrial-
bureaucratic elites of the 1950’s to deal with a new problem using old methods.  
Nevertheless, what characterizes societies where this discourse is pre-eminent to this day 
is the degree to which the society relies on stacked tiers of pervasive functionaries and 
closed ranks of fussy micromanagers, as opposed to other methods of information 
processing and allocation that have become increasingly important in other societies 
since the 1960’s11.  Recently, there have been many attempts in most First World 
countries to make such bureaucracies less rigid and more transparent – attempts which 
are characteristic of other discourses, notably that of the Ecological Modernizers, gaining 
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 Dryzek (1997) pp. 65-66 
11
 Patricia W. Ingraham and Donald F. Kettl, ed (1992) Agenda for Excellence: Public Service in 
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a position of increasing dominance within those societies. 
In the United States, the federal level of control relies on the actions of various 
departments belonging to the executive branch of the government.  Among these, the 
Environmental Protection Agency, the Center for Disease Control, the Department of the 
Interior, the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Energy are pre-eminent. 
These departments examine the larger question, such as emissions produced by 
electric power plants, according to the mandate of each separate department.  The 
information is then brought together and integrated during briefings of legislators and 
executive officials, as well as during interdepartmental conferences. 
For example, if we have one giant coal-burning plant emitting unacceptable levels 
of polluting by-products, the actual pollutant levels and how they compare to acceptable 
standards of air quality, would be investigated, assessed, measured, and rated by the 
Environmental Protection Agency.  Various questions regarding the power plant itself -- 
how indispensable it is, how much it would cost to sequester the pollutants, whether it is 
feasible to switch to an alternate fuel supply, and so forth -- would be looked at by the 
Department of Energy.  The Center for Disease Control would seek to determine how 
much these pollutants are hurting the health of US residents, and how these statistics 
break down in terms of specific diseases caused and the number of deaths from each 
disease, as well as the probability with which fluctuations in disease frequencies can be 
assigned to the plant’s particular emissions.  The Department of the Interior, the 
Department of Agriculture, and the EPA would share the responsibility of determining 
the effects of the pollutants on the non-human parts of the ecosystem, such as acid rain 
damaging forests, or mercury isotopes settling out into lakes and then accumulating in the 
bodily tissues of fish and birds. 
Analytical Tools 
The primary tools of assessment used by the agencies described above are cost-
and-benefit calculation and risk analysis.  Both of these instruments have a distinguished 
history in resource management: in fact the first agency to use cost-and-benefit valuations 
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was the US Bureau of Reclamation (a subdivision of the Department of the Interior) 
working together with the US Army Corps of Engineers.   The two organizations 
developed cost-and-benefit analysis in the 1950’s using it to analyze and justify the 
construction of the dams they were assigned to build.12  Later, President Reagan’s 
Executive Order 12291 signed in 1981 as part of his effort to rein in private sector 
regulation he saw as excessive, required all significant Federal regulations (including 
environmental ones) to pass a cost-benefit test with the Office of Management and 
Budget.13  This cemented the role of cost-benefit analysis as the fundamental tool by 
which any agency responsible for enforcement of environmental law seeks to influence 
the laws to be made on the subject or to justify the regulations it drafts for the purpose of 
implementing this law. 
 
The principle of cost-benefit analysis lies in converting all effects of the action 
being analyzed into nominal dollars and then adding up the negatives and the positives.  
This is done according to the following steps: 
 
1. Identify at least two policy options (one being “Do nothing” 
2. For each option, list all desirable and all undesirable effects. 
3. For each item for which a market price can be calculated, price it accordingly 
4. For each item for which market prices cannot be calculated, use “shadow 
pricing” (list all assumptions made during the shadow pricing, include with 
item price.)14 
                                               
 
12
 Dryzek (1997) page 71 
13
 Dryzek (1997) page 72 
14
 This is a very sensitive part of the analysis.  To illustrate the mistakes possible in working out 
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5. Use a discount rate (include justification of rate used) to convert all costs and 
benefits that are predicted to occur in the future into present dollars. 
6. Add up positives with negatives for each option. 
7. Choose option with the greatest net benefit. 
 
Countless books have been written on the importance of different factors in 
assigning some item a “shadow price,” as well as on the selection of proper discount rate 
in measuring the benefits of events likely to happen in the future.  It is obvious that 
though both of these are readily calculable themselves, they depend on factors outside the 
scope of the usual type of quantitative analysis, such as the discourse to which the 
analyst, the analyst’s client, the official reviewing the client’s proposal, and the different 
people affected by the potential outcome all respectively subscribe, and the values they 
hold important in life.15 
The second instrument used by the agencies in formulating policy and advising 
senior department officials, Congress and the President, is the related discipline of risk 
analysis.  This is used to quantify both the probability of an undesirable event occurring 
(usually this is done by failure testing of engineering equipment, toxin testing of animals, 
and so forth, combined with studies of statistical correlation)16 and the degree to which 
that event will harm people and the environment (this usually involves detailed studies of 
past occurrences, or using laboratory data to program a computer model for a simulated 
catastrophe.)  In that sense risk analysis is a lot like cost-benefit assessments.  The 
difference is that risk analysis focuses on the negatives, and seeks to answer questions of 
how acceptable each particular risk is.  For example, the possibility of a nuclear accident 
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line is that according to the Harvard business school, this is the deal of a lifetime!  
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in a properly managed nuclear power plant is vanishingly small, but if such an accident 
does happen, the consequences are catastrophic enough that very few people find it 
acceptable. 
On the other hand, a coal-fired power plant has a 100% probability of emitting 
greenhouse gases (which have been proven pretty conclusively to contribute to global 
warming), of emitting toxic mercury isotopes in its exhaust (which bio-accumulates in 
marine life, with a 100% probability of harming the health of anyone eating seafood), and 
of dumping more background radiation into the atmosphere than a nuclear power plant 
normally does.  This is considered if not exactly acceptable then at least tolerable, since 
on any given day, any given coal-fired power plant does not emit enough pollutants to 
kill anyone, at least not in a way that can be traced to the nuclear power plant as directly 
as the deaths after Chernobyl were traced to radiation.  This public perception of risk is 
what shapes the political reality of environmental policy, while the scientific perception 
of the costs and benefits (on any given day, provided it is managed properly, the nuclear 
power plant is infinitely healthier to live downwind from than a coal power plant is) may 
often conflict with it. 
Naturally the sort of disaster whose very possibility a culture would consider 
unacceptable even if there were virtually no chance of it happening varies from discourse 
to discourse.  For example, while most US citizens would rather tolerate a coal-fired 
power plant than a nuclear one, in France, these conditions are reversed.  The public 
trusts the expertise of the nuclear power plant managers to avoid a local Chernobyl, while 
having soot and mercury isotopes polluting the terroir of the wine country downwind 
would probably lead to the power plant being charged by a rioting mob. 
Analysts working for the EPA, Center for Disease Control, and other regulatory 
agencies usually use both cost-benefit and risk analysis, combining the two to gain a full 
picture of the situation.  This is done by taking each possible action and attempting to 
calculate the probability of each possible outcome (or, rather, as many different 
consequences as is practical.)  Each outcome that is judged likely enough is then 
subjected to cost-benefit analysis as before. 
The situation is complicated by the fact that some outcomes are independent of 
others and other outcomes interact to make each other either more or less likely; systems 
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dynamics usually has to be employed in such cases to trace the pathways of mutual 
influence.  When all outcomes that have a reasonable probability of occurring are 
considered, the analyst moves on to the next possible action.  If this is done right, the 
policy planners can make decisions based both on how beneficial an action’s possible 
outcome would be, and the probability of it occurring.  Of course the probabilities 
themselves depend on other probabilities of other events; an attempt to analyze them all 
would take an infinite number of iterations.  What modern policy-makers get is a 
reasonable approximation. 
Lawmaking, Regulatory Plans, and Enforcement 
Once the analysts’ reports are in, the various departments and agencies of the 
executive branch would then make their findings available to the US Congress, so 
legislative statutes could be passed to address the problem, to the White House, so the 
President would know exactly what steps to take to ensure compliance with these 
statutes, and to the Supreme Court, so that the Justices would have all the relevant 
information regarding any cases they might have to try that challenge the statutes.  Of 
course both members of Congress and Supreme Court Justices also have their own 
research staffs, to supply them with required information on any issue that must be 
addressed urgently. 
Once the information has been collected and the Legislative and Executive 
branches have processed it into policy, which is then upheld by the Supreme Court, the 
policy must now be enforced.  This is mostly done by the EPA, which maintains regional 
offices across the nation.  The central office, headed by the EPA Administrator, 
formulates regulatory plans which take into account the official policy the agency must 
enforce, the need for concerted action between different regional offices, and the local 
needs each office must address: the regulatory plan is then passed downstairs.  The 
regional offices maintain liaisons with state EPA organizations, municipal councils, and 
local industry, and together all the actors involved develop detailed plans of bringing the 
local industry, the particular city, the region’s small business sector, or anything else the 
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agency decides to focus its efforts on, in accord with Federal environmental standards17.   
At the same time, other, non-regional EPA offices address specific issues (such 
Air and Radiation, or Prevention, Pesticides, and Toxic Substances) work throughout the 
nation to address concerns sector by sector.  They usually maintain liaisons with major 
corporations involved in the non-regional office’s sector: for example Air and Radiation 
pays close attention to carmakers, Prevention, Pesticides and Toxic substances has 
representatives keeping track of pesticide manufacture and use across the nation, and so 
forth. 
Regular inspections and audits ensure subsequent compliance.  Factories, mines, 
power plants and other industrial operations must submit environmental impact 
statements that the EPA finds satisfactory, and then demonstrate their good faith and 
continued efforts during subsequent inspections.  In that case, the enterprise is issued 
various permits to continue with its plan of operations, or to install the different pieces of 
equipment it needs for that plan.  If all inspections and audits are passed, the permits are 
periodically renewed, while those enterprises already in operation failing to meet Federal 
standards, and are penalized with various sanctions.  (The EPA also has other duties as 
well, such as the operation of research labs, but those are not directly involved in the 
implementation of bureaucratic control.)18 
On the state level, as mentioned above, there are EPA organizations instituted by 
individual state governments.  Their main purpose is to address issues that do not come 
under Federal EPA jurisdiction, specifically those enterprises whose products and by-
products do not cross state boundaries, and so cannot be considered under the 
Constitutional clauses of interstate commerce and interstate disputes.  These clauses 
directly authorize the federal government to intervene, since the interests of more than 
one state’s residents are involved -- and by causing any change in air or water quality 
across a state line, an enterprise implicitly impacts quality of life and economic activity in 
that other state, bringing its operations under federal jurisdiction.  On the other hand, an 
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enterprise which cannot be proven to affect anything outside it own state’s borders is 
much harder for the federal EPA to confront directly, which is where the state 
organizations come in. 
In addition, state EPAs deal with environmental issues specific to a given state -- 
such as the large number of threatened endemic species in Hawaii, the threatened 
wetlands in Maryland, and the deposits of environmental pollutants that settle on 
Massachusetts from the winds borne out of the Midwest states where so many coal-fired 
power plants are located.  They also seek to ensure compliance of mines, factories, power 
plants, and other regulated agents with pollution standards set by the state, which may be 
different from, or higher than, those standards the federal EPA enforces.  As before, 
companies seeking approval for an industrial or a construction project must submit 
statements and hope the state EPA grants them a license.  On occasion, the federal EPA, 
if overwhelmed with many tasks requiring attention, cedes jurisdiction of some of these 
tasks to the EPA agencies of relevant states, often as a result of a petition by one or more 
state. 
On the local level, a city government often has one or more office with names 
such the Environmental Protection Committee, or Environmental Design and Protection 
Bureau.  Such offices address issues specific to urban concerns, such as air and water 
quality, the sewer system, the runoff, if there is one, of polluting substances into the soil 
and water of the surrounding suburbs, etc.  This branch or branches of city government is 
responsible for ensuring city ordinances, which, once again, can be different from state or 
federal statutes.  Sometimes it also seeks to pre-empt state and federal EPAs, and stop the 
city from getting bad press in official reports by addressing EPA concerns before the 
EPA finds it necessary to turn its attention to the sector or industry in question.  Usually 
municipal governments work closely with state and federal EPA, often implementing 
specific plans for the city developed by these agencies. 
Administrative Rationalism in Practice 
In both federal and state-level cases, the important thing to remember is that 
bureaucracies, like most complex systems, evolve over time, usually according to a sort 
of general law.  This “law” derives from the basic nature of the bureaucracy as a system 
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of processing information, which naturally seeks to bring as much of this information as 
possible within its purview and as many different activities as possible under its control.  
This is not done in the name of some grand scheme to drown the world in red tape, but 
simply because the greatest threat to the smooth functioning of a bureaucracy comes from 
entities and events it either did not know nor had no jurisdiction over. 
Thus, in any particular case, the bureaucrat perceives more information and more 
control as preferable to less and, as the bureaucracy’s control extends, the tasks pile up 
and the amount of time to do them in decreases in proportion.  Paradoxically, the more 
information must be collected, the less important that collection becomes, until it is only 
a secondary task of the hierarchy (though it never stops so much as becomes re-defined.)  
In an organization as large as a modern bureaucracy typically becomes after a decade or 
two of growth, most of this information is never analyzed in context, anyway, so that any 
given piece of data can provide only cursory, and frequently misleading, indication of the 
situation on the ground.  Even the collection of many such pieces of data may very well 
lead an analyst badly astray by not mentioning all the things the writer of each report had 
to omit in an attempt to make the information manageable19. 
The mature bureaucracy’s primary activity becomes an exercise of control over 
the economic and social agents it regulates, and the gathering of information becomes 
less important for its own sake and more of a tool to let all the other agents participating 
in the process being regulated feels the extent of the bureaucracy’s control over them.  
Again this is not done from ill will, but simply because the bureaucracy‘s work is made 
easier if it does not encounter resistance from lobbyists and lawsuits.  By this point, the 
importance of formulating policies apt to the context is de-emphasized (since no one can 
keep track of all the myriad different contexts) in favor of a strict insistence on the 
subject agents’ strict adherence to the letter of whatever policy is in place at the moment.  
As this evolution proceeds, the picture of the dedicated and well-informed brotherhood of 
bureaucrats painted by the Administrative Rationalist discourse often falls increasingly 
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short of reality20. 
Another problem with the Administrative Rationalist ontology of informed 
experts collaborating with enlightened administrators for the public good is that in a 
modern industrial society, the concept of “public good” is itself predicated on the smooth 
operation of the industrial sector.  A good example of the consequences that follow when 
the regulators forget this fact would be the Reagan years in the United States, when 
frustration with a regulatory policy that was widely perceived as harmful to employment 
and prosperity put a government in power that, during Ronald Reagan’s first term, 
certainly did its best to curtail the power of the EPA as far as possible.21 
As administrators recognize this fact, this allows industries that deem themselves 
indispensable to society’s economic or strategic interests to get a foot in the door for 
obtaining official exemptions from the rules and obligations that smaller businesses must 
faithfully adhere to.22  A bureaucracy not being a monolithic hive mind, some 
administrators will, even if we assume no other motivation than the recognition of the 
need for a healthy industry, be more sympathetic towards these claims than others, 
making the application of environmental policy increasingly more inconsistent.  The 
bureaucracy becomes like the proverbial spider-web that can only trap small flies while 
the larger ones rip through it and fly away. 
In other words, in the absence of an objective force, such as the market, or 
perhaps a direct expression of public support, to drive the economy towards a solution 
that satisfies the needs of the industry without sacrificing the needs of the environment, 
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the Administrative Rationalist approach, having only prescriptive regulations to offer in 
place of an objectively verifiable optimal course, constantly risks being trapped between 
the Scylla of public backlash and the Charybdis of inconsistency and ineffectuality 
(which is almost guaranteed to generate a different public backlash sooner or later.) 
In Europe, according to Dryzek,23 this weakness of the Administrative Rationalist 
discourse is dealt with in two different ways.  First of all, European, particularly British 
regulatory bodies are much likelier to ask a neutral scientific organization, such as the 
Royal Society, to separate fact from fiction regarding some particular issue.  This makes 
them much less likely than the US regulatory agencies to get mired down in such debates 
as the 20-year American epic of trying to figure out if the rising average temperatures 
across the globe, combined with melting polar ice and a strong correlation with carbon 
dioxide being emitted in greater numbers than the globe’s plant biomass can absorb, 
really implies there is a global warming.  This approach fails to deal with the problem 
that even if the facts are known, the administrators still have to devise a way to deal with 
these facts that hurts neither the economy nor the environment, and that buck is much 
harder to pass to a science laboratory. 
The second European solution is to work closely with the industries themselves, 
inviting them to meetings where the regulatory policy is developed, and taking their 
suggestions into account to begin with, rather than passing a regulation and immediately 
being faced with a barrage of petitions from industries claiming that the new rules are 
making it impossible for them to operate, or to make a profit, or to supply the growth in 
demand, or do any of these things without laying off some catastrophic number of 
employees.  The history of European culture, with its greater emphasis on subordination 
of private profit to public requirements, obedience, and social hierarchy than can be seen 
in the United States, makes it possible for the regulators to maintain the upper hand in 
these negotiations and establish regulations that the industry can live with without turning 
the process into a tail-wags-the-dog situation. 
Unfortunately, the concessions made by the regulators to industry may or may not 
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be enough to offset negative economic impacts; yet by agreeing to participate in the 
discussion in an advisory capacity, but still feeling obligated to accept the final verdict of 
the regulating body, the representatives of industry forces essentially sign away their 
moral right to challenge any future effects of that regulation that may still prove harmful 
to their interests.  This can result in industries, now unable to complain to the 
government, quietly passing the costs of regulation down to the consumer, resulting in 
unnecessarily high prices and supply-side constraints. 
At the same time, the fact remains that, given the ontological assumptions of the 
discourse and the consequent decisions in policy formulation, regulation of industry 
means losses to that industry.  By staying within the boundaries of stresses they can 
impose on the industrial economy without provoking a recession and subsequent reaction 
to environmental reform, the regulators run the risk of limiting themselves to half 
measures: actions that can assuage their consciences by slowing the degradation of 
natural environment and minimizing its impact on public health, but leave the task of 
actually stopping and reversing that degradation to a more informed generation with 
wiser experts.  In the meantime, the very negative effects that the regulatory agency was 
formed to combat still continue to accumulate, slower, but no less certain. 
These inadequate solutions to the dilemma of industry-regulator relationship 
eventually caused the discourse of Administrative Rationalism in Europe to evolve, 
giving birth to discourses of sustainability, such as the Ecological Modernizer discourse, 
which will be treated later in this document. 
In the United States, the precautions against inconsistent enforcement and public 
backlash took the form of extreme Congressional micromanagement.24  Essentially, the 
obligations of the EPA and other regulatory agencies, the courses they were to take, the 
impact statements and inspections they were to demand, were all spelled out by Congress 
in such laws as the Clean Air Act, Water Pollution Control Act, and Toxic Substances 
Control Act.  The targets for pollution reduction, matched up with dates by which each 
target must be met, were included in the body of the law, and the regulators were given 
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very little room to accept excuses from industries.  The philosophy was: if you “hold their 
feet to the fire” (actual metaphor in common usage among political advocates of 
regulation during this period) the industrialists will produce results, using their 
technological and capital wealth to meet regulatory targets.  The regulators in this 
scenario were essentially assigned the role of not listening to the subjects of regulation. 
Note that this is not pure Administrative Rationalism, which usually leaves more 
room for deals between industry and administration, bringing the possible in accord with 
the desirable – in the United States version, regulatory institutions started out greatly 
influenced by the statutes which established their responsibilities, and these were more 
informed by populist discourses such as Democratic Pragmatism and to a smaller degree 
by Survivalism, Green Radicalism and other discourses that saw industry as the 
implacable enemy and New Deal type of regulation as easy prey for industry takeover. 
Despite that, it can be argued that the paradigm of environmental regulation in the United 
States underwent a shift towards a purer form of Administrative Rationalism later, before 
moving on to more imaginative discourses in the 1990’s. 
In the end, this lack of discretional authority made the EPA into an industry 
bogeyman, provoking the infamous backlash of the Reagan years.  The Congress, which 
was controlled by Ronal Reagan’s political opponents, responded by making the laws 
governing EPA work even more intensive and aggressive.25  This created an atmosphere 
of the eternal lawsuit, where industry sued the EPA for excessive stringency and arbitrary 
action violating (as they allege) Constitutional guarantees of due process, while 
environmentalists sued the EPA for not being stringent enough.  At the same time, the 
EPA sued industries for not complying, and industries devoted teams of legal experts to 
preparing preventive lawsuits for “defamation” against any group that might seek to bring 
the EPA down on them.26 
This state of things persisted through the early and middle 1980’s until it became 
obvious that things could no longer go on this way.  When the first President Bush took 
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office in 1989, he made it clear that he was not going to continue the previous 
administration’s confrontational policy, and did his best to defuse matters between 
Congress and the executive branch.  This combined with strong pressure from industries 
that the US government considered strategically vital, such as steel and aerospace. 
 
By 1990, the EPA was completing a shift towards greater autonomy, which was 
begun by William D. Ruckelshous during his second tenure as EPA head, between May 
of 1983 and February of 1985.  Ruckelshous’ cohort of appointees were occupying senior 
posts by then, and most of them recognized that if the EPA could get any useful work 
done at all, it needed to be together with the nation’s industry and in opposition to it.  
This resulted in purer Administrative Rationalist practices taking hold.  At the same time, 
the old cohort of populist Democrats in Congress was getting older and, in some 
opinions, wiser: no longer as interested in confronting the evils of industry as in taming it 
and rendering the onetime evils benign.  These new Democrats were more willing to 
allow industrial elites to come to accommodation with regulatory elites, making the EPA 
of George H. W. Bush’s term more like the analogous agencies of Europe used to be (by 
this point the Europeans were moving towards the Ecological Modernizer discourse.) 
Eventually the EPA likewise moved in the Ecological Modernizer direction, 
largely under the aegis of Al Gore, who was one of that discourse’s foremost proponents 
on the left-wing side of the US political spectrum. 
The regulatory experience of the United States indicates that this culture is less 
suited to the Administrative Rationalist discourse than Europe.  Americans are less 
inclined to trust the sort of inclusive deal-making that went on between the industrial and 
the administrative elites in Europe: right-wingers would hate it for its implicit assumption 
that the industrialists are there to supply administrators with advice and accept their 
verdict, left-wingers would perceive the regulators as betraying the interests of the people 
to make shady deals in smoke-filled rooms, and both left-wingers in general and the 
libertarian subset of right-wingers would detest the corporate welfare such deal-making 
implies.  While such horse-trading is not itself without faults, and it is true that the way it 
is done in Europe can lead to increased supply-side constraints in the economy and 
inadequate measures in the protection of the environment, the US approach, characterized 
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by suspicious and bullying attitudes on the part of Congress, resulted in widespread 
outrage among business circles through the 1970’s, the Promethean backlash of Reagan’s 
first term, and the lawsuit paralysis of the 1980’s, which no doubt saw many lost 
opportunities to improve the condition of the nation’s natural environment. 
3.1.2 Democratic Pragmatist 
Much like what was done for the Administrative Rationalist, we have categorized 
the different aspects of the discourse. We have also added an ideological pedigree to the 
description because we felt that it was important for understanding the way the 
Democratic Pragmatist thinks. 
Classification 
 This is another discourse Dryzek classifies with the Administrative 
Rationalists under the larger discourse of Environmental Problem Solving, within the 
branch of the Reformist supra-discourse that chooses a prosaic, rather than imaginative, 
approach to meeting the challenges posed by the recognition of the environment as a 
major public concern.  As Administrative Rationalists, Democratic Pragmatists believe 
that the modern industrial society and the economy it is based on can go on growing 
without utterly destroying the natural environment, but, also like Administrative 
Rationalists, they believe that absent an effective restraint, business interests are doomed 
to conflict with environmental needs.  The difference between the two discourses lies in 
the form they believe that restraint might take in order to be effective. 
Rather than a retrenchment of the old corporate-bureaucratic elite in the face of 
the new social challenge, which the Administrative Rationalist discourse essentially is, 
the Democratic Pragmatist discourse is a reaction of the traditional culture of public 
debate and transparency (as exemplified by, for example, the New England town 
meeting, or the soapbox in London’s Hyde park) to the efforts of other discourses to do 
things to the public for its own good. 
Ideological Pedigree 
Democratic Pragmatism as a discourse has its origin in the concept of the “open 
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society” as elaborated by Henri Bergson, developed by Karl Popper, and currently 
advocated (as he alleges) by George Soros. 
Bergson, a French philosopher of the late 19th and early 20th century (and the 
recipient of the Nobel Prize for Literature for 1927), advocated a principle of “creative 
evolution” that had a considerable influence on the thought of William James, the 
founder of the Pragmatist school of thought in the United States (though James confessed 
that he was baffled by a lot of Bergson’s more idealistic utterances.)  In his turn, Bergson 
quoted several statements from James’ psychological articles in his seminal 1889 work 
The Immediate Givens of the Conscience.  Thus the thoughts of the French and the United 
States philosopher ran on parallel tracks from the beginning27. 
In his later works, entitled Creative Evolution (1907) and Two Sources of 
Morality and Religion (1932), Bergson advocated a society whose social order evolved 
with the creative strivings of the various people who lived in it.  In other words, changes 
in the microcosm of each individual human soul would act as an engine of transformation 
in the social macrocosm.  Among the things Bergson cautioned the human mind against 
is the blind attempt to reduce the larger world in which the mind existed as a single part 
to some logical system contained within that part (e.g. the mind.)  Since no system of 
logic could account for all of existence, it followed that as many individual creative 
minds each arrived at some new truth, it would benefit them all if the system within 
which they existed (e.g. the society) was responsive to these truths and evolved as each 
mind contributed its own truth to it.  The society could thus serve as an integrator of 
creativity. 
Karl Popper put Bergson’s idealism on a rigorous scientific footing in his 1945 
book The Open Society and Its Enemies.  As a philosopher of science, Popper argued that 
on no subject of study can we arrive at the Truth, beyond which there is nothing left to 
discover: rather we can arrive at a hypothesis that can be falsified – that is, shown to be 
false if certain conditions are met (as in the course of an experiment.)  If the experiment 
is performed and the hypothesis is not proven false, it is allowed to stand until somebody 
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devises an experiment that does prove it false successfully.  But even if it stands 
undisproven for a hundred or a thousand years, we cannot prove it True. 
In the realm of psychology and sociology, Popper noticed various would-be 
reformers and “enlighteners” who made claims impossible to prove false (that is, claims 
that could explain any event within the context of their own claims about social and 
human nature, thus they could be utterly inconsistent with any part of reality but still 
consistent within themselves.)  This was not disturbing in the case of movements that 
operated in a sphere science inherently could not touch, such as the various religions.  
Indeed Popper goes to some pains to point out that a statement could be non-falsifiable 
but still meaningful, and often valuable. On the other hand, some of the new movements 
challenging the social order in Popper’s time sought intellectual credit for themselves by 
claiming to be “scientific.”  Among these, Marxism and radical nationalism were the 
chief culprits, and by 1945 they were already responsible for hundreds of millions of 
deaths between them – and more lives wrecked forever, all in the name of their alleged 
truths that their adherents constantly had to assert with the mouths of cannons. 
Popper sought to combat the tendency of 20th century societies to fall prey to 
such claims, but he was wise enough to see that merely repressing the ideologies was not 
enough – the True Believers had to be discredited in the eyes of people looking for 
answers, not merely periodically arrested.  To create social conditions that fanatics could 
not exploit, Popper sought the answer in a society that, first and foremost, made no claim 
to being the product of “inexorable truths of historical development.”  “No society can 
predict, scientifically, its own future states of knowledge” was his primary assertion in 
social sciences.  Since no one could scientifically predict how societies should be 
operated and social policy crafted with the knowledge humanity will have a hundred, or 
ten, or even one year from now, the logical thing to do would be to allow the advocates of 
every possible kind of policy to compete against each other, seeking to attract a following 
in a transparent and open marketplace of ideas. 
At any particular point in the evolution of such a society as Popper postulates, if 
the majority of citizens disagreed with their government, they should encounter no 
obstacles in an attempt to remove this government and replace it with an alternative, 
provided the new government agrees to assume the same risk in exchange.  With the 
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power to choose freely, and with no government having the power, even if it had the 
intention, to prohibit alternative ideologies from attracting followers, society would never 
be one thing or the other: it would rather be a mix of different ideologies, each holding a 
measure of power proportional to its current appeal with the voters, constantly trying to 
get more at each other’s expense.  Aside from the basic concept of competition keeping 
them honest, the experience with different ideologies is likely to make voters too 
sophisticated to fall for any particular ideology’s attempt to bamboozle them – Popper 
seems to have envisioned each voter as a habitual Socrates, catching would-be saviors of 
Truth and Justice in the web of their own claims28. 
A leading modern propagandist of the Open Society is the well-known billionaire 
and philanthropist George Soros.  The degree to which he is committed to a society that 
is truly open, rather than open to his manipulations, is currently being debated; suffice it 
to say that his attempts to evict George Bush from the Oval Office won him a lot of 
friends and a lot of enemies.  In any event, his organization, known as the Open Society 
Institute, has truly done outstanding work in promoting transparency and open 
government in the post-Communist societies of Eastern Europe.  It is perhaps ironic that 
he has been so dismissive of the present administration’s successes in promoting the 
same values in the Middle East. 
Ontology, Relationships, Actors and Metaphors 
  The Democratic Pragmatist knows, essentially, that people are not robots.  
This discourse does not believe that isolated policy wonks will be able to deal with the 
unforeseen results that are sure to arise from their policies, and that they are unlikely to 
produce policies that will uniformly produce optimum results in every on-the-ground 
situation.  What worked in one case may be quite inappropriate in another, but an expert 
who deals in generalities from several hierarchal removes above the situation may not be 
aware of the circumstances that create the need for a revision.  The description of a 
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typical bureaucracy’s life cycle cited above, with the hierarchy evolving to assume more 
control of everything and understand less of anything, is a Democratic Pragmatist’s 
favorite parable.  Moreover, according to this discourse, even a well-informed policy 
forced down the public’s throat will fail of its purpose for reasons the bureaucracy can’t 
affect.  Quite often, believe the Democratic Pragmatists, policies imposed from above 
will encounter resistance and circumvention from the people whose interests they 
threaten, and thus will not achieve the desired results.29 
Because of this, the Democratic Pragmatists believe that the people directly 
involved in the future changes must have the information to fully comprehend them and 
the power to decide on their implementation.  A Democratic Pragmatist is likely to be a 
grassroots activist, working on changing their community one practical step at a time.  
This discourse emphasizes the power of the individual to make informed decisions and to 
convince others.  Nevertheless, Democratic Pragmatists share with Administrative 
Rationalists a firm belief in the power of informed social action, though they disagree as 
to the origin of this power. 
Just as the ontology of Democratic Pragmatism is founded in the firm belief in the 
inability of a reductionist top-down hierarchy to govern living individuals, it is equally 
fundamental to this ontology to recognize that the government and the society are not 
monoliths, and that there are composed of disparate individuals just as much as the 
governed.  The Democratic Pragmatist ontology sees the community as the sum of many 
active, but independent and individualistic participants, and the government, and 
whatever policy the government pursues, as the product of multiple decision processes 
taking place in a multitude of citizen minds, each with its own one-of-a-kind perspective. 
From postulate of government and policy as resultants of individual decisions, it 
follows that when policy produces results that cause unhappiness among a great number 
of citizens, there can (barring special cases such as tyranny, or mass illiteracy and 
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ignorance, that prevent people from acting) be two reasons for this: either a large number 
of citizens do not care enough about the democratic process to articulate their wishes, or 
they do not take sufficient responsibility to inform themselves about the issue and make 
sure that their decisions are such as to produce the desired results.  In one case, the 
apathetic citizens are robbed of their unused decision-making powers by a bureaucratic 
establishment representing the interests of a small group in power (whatever this group 
may be).  In the other, the citizens vote through some disastrous measure, such as the 
citizens of Weimar Germany voting in the Third Reich because they thought it would 
bring them stability and a prosperous economy. 
Both problems, claim Democratic Pragmatists, come about because people do not 
experience the results of policy as the direct outcome of their actions.  If people truly felt 
they could change things and make their individual concerns and wishes felt in the 
actions the community finally takes, they would be less willing to leave the decisions to 
the bureaucrats.  And if they realized that, by making a wrong decision, it is themselves 
they are condemning to live with the results, and that trying to abdicate this power will 
not suffice to redirect the consequences to fall on anybody else’s shoulders, they would 
take action to inform themselves of the facts before making their voices heard.  In other 
words, say the Democratic Pragmatists, the more people participate in crafting social, 
economic, environmental, or any other policy, the better they will be at it, and the more 
educated they will eventually become on all the subjects being debated.  As an ecosystem 
or a free market, democracy, believes these people, is a self-regulating, self-upgrading, 
self-adjusting evolving system.  Any errors in judgment, unsatisfied minorities, or 
disastrous unforeseen consequences that the first iteration of the participatory process 
might produce will, provided the process itself remains viable, be ameliorated over its 
subsequent iterations, as open dialogue between participants spreads the relevant 
information through the voting blocks that previously failed to include it in their 
decision-making.30 
Note that the role of experts is not necessarily dismissed.  A public that is 
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concerned enough about the consequences of inaction will take the trouble to research the 
issue and debate it in a number of forums, from newspapers to newsgroups, which will 
give anybody with scientific credentials or experience in the subject ample opportunity to 
voice their views and educate the people on the facts.  The difference is that in the case 
when a multiplicity of forums exists, debating the matter simultaneously, together they 
will be able to draw in a greater variety of opinions, and so allow the experts to receive a 
greater variety of input for their analysis.  At the same time, claim the Democratic 
Pragmatists, there is less danger of any single ideology becoming entrenched and 
persisting with policies that are not producing results, as all too often happens in a 
bureaucratic hierarchy.  Since all the experts will know that the public expects their 
allegedly greater insights to produce workable solutions, and will not hesitate to turn 
them out on their ear if they promise without delivering, they will be less likely to 
commit themselves to dogma and more likely to exchange ideas with those holding a 
different point of view. 
In its turn, if the public knows that it can’t use “bad experts” as a scapegoat, given 
that these experts are only given their mandate through the choice of the public itself, 
such a public would be less likely to turn to charlatans and demagogues in its search for 
solutions.  Individuals comprising such a public would set greater store on education and 
self-improvement, and would be less susceptible than most to the temptation of the 
proverbial “easy, simple and wrong” solution for every problem.  And of course, 
provided that the society is sufficiently decentralized to avoid the public perception that 
all problems are being dealt with by government nabobs much too remote for the 
individual to reach, it is also sufficiently decentralized for the individual communities to 
serve as autonomous social laboratories, dealing with local problems through direct 
participatory democracy.  The harsh lessons of personal responsibility taught by such a 
school would be more than enough to keep the public from following after a demagogue 
in matters of national importance. 
In short, the Democratic Pragmatist ontology recognizes that society is made up 
of unique individuals and policy is composed of a multiplicity of opinions and personal 
agendas, concerns and actions.  The third entity the ontology recognizes is the public 
forum, existing in a multitude of incarnations from the local to the national, from those 
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dealing with a specific sector, question, or proposal, to others dealing with larger 
questions that integrate the concerns of many sectors, social groups, and economic 
agents.  The forum is what makes it possible for the democratic society to integrate 
information better than a bureaucratic one, to provide citizens access to debate and 
provide the administrators access to opinions and facts the hierarchical structure of the 
bureaucracy would not otherwise allow them to obtain.  It also provides the school in 
which a participant learns the responsibility that is necessary for a functioning 
democracy: since the forum allows all to speak, no one has an excuse for staying silent or 
talking without finding out the facts of the matter. 
Of course the fourth entity recognized by the discourse is the legitimization of the 
debate and its conclusion through elections.  The elections essentially tell the winners that 
they have expressed what they want, and now, according to H.L. Mencken’s famous 
definition of democracy “deserve to get it good and hard.”  They also let the losers know 
that the proposal of their opponents must now go through the crucible of real-world 
applications if their victory is to be justified, so that if the losers still believe the winners 
are wrong, the election’s outcome is their best way to demonstrate it to doubters.  In this 
way, elections both set the battlefield for future clashes and make sure that the division 
between factions remains limited to debate. 
The principal relationships recognized by Democratic Pragmatism between these 
ontological entities, are those of competition, cooperation, and equality.  The equality is 
not formulated so as to deny that some people naturally know more about the matter than 
others – the primitive statement that ‘anybody’s opinion is as good as anybody else’s” is 
a caricature of Democratic Pragmatism drawn by those who do not wish to address its 
points honestly.  If it was ever true that large numbers of people held to it, they no longer 
do today, at least not in any First World nations.  Rather the equality is one of being able 
to contribute. 
Just as Economic Rationalism (to be discussed later) does not set much store on 
the equal distribution of income, but attaches enormous importance to the equality of 
opportunity to earn that income, so does Democratic Pragmatism (which is in many 
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respects Economic Rationalism’s ideological cousin)31 find it just and proper that some 
people know more on the subject than others and should be listened to.  But under 
Democratic Pragmatism, anybody has the chance to address others and convince them 
that he or she is one of those people.  Anybody who wishes to can learn the facts of the 
matter, publish a book, address a public meeting, or start a blog.  Anybody can learn 
sufficient skill at winning friends and influencing people to turn a humble start such as a 
public meeting into a permanent place among decision-makers. 
In that sense all the citizens of a Democratic Pragmatist society, though they are 
unequal in knowledge, economic status, and many other criteria, are equal in the chance 
to make their voice heard, and recognized for such merits as that voice, and that voice’s 
proposals, might in fact possess.  The quintessential metaphor for that is Abraham 
Lincoln’s journey from a log cabin where he learned law by candlelight to the White 
House where he protected that law from a violent insurrection that sought to subvert it 
through force. 
The other two relationships recognized by the discourse are competition and 
cooperation.  These are not treated separately, as they are by so many other discourses, 
but as part of a single process.  By competing with each other, proponents of different 
propositions seek to build a network of allies to give their pet agendas prominence, and to 
do that they must cooperate with others in promoting their agenda.  It is no accident that a 
parliamentary system, such as that governing the UK, with its multitude of political 
parties, can get things done and impasses resolved faster than a federal system with two 
major parties such as the United States.  The smaller parties, none of which might 
command a majority by itself, are more used to trading favors and supporting the other 
party’s pet project today in exchange for an implicit promise of support on their own pet 
project tomorrow.  Note that from a Democratic Pragmatist point of view this is not 
necessarily a good thing: if the society does not have an active and participatory form of 
direct democracy, this horse-trading on the parliamentary level allows the people’s 
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alleged representatives to collude more efficiently in order to implement some new 
assault on the citizens’ control of their own lives. 
To a Democratic Pragmatist, any human interaction in a complex society contains 
elements of both competition and cooperation.32  To illustrate with a very common 
example, environmentalists might conflict with developers over a stretch of forest that 
provides a habitat for some rare community of species. 
Both groups seek allies wherever they can get them -- the scientific community, 
the major voting blocks, the electoral machinery of the political parties, etc.  This makes 
it necessary for both groups to accept obligations to support their new allies in other 
matters: an environmentalist might agree to curb protests against, say genetically altered 
food crops, in exchange for a scientific panel calling the world’s attention to the 
irreplaceable biodiversity of some forest threatened with being developed into suburban 
real estate.  At the same time, the developer might find an ally in some candidate for high 
office, who has a plan for a “voluntary curb” on vehicle emissions.  In exchange for 
backing the real estate interests on this particular development project, the candidate 
wants the developers’ financial backers to lend her plan sufficient muscle to quell 
resistance in the business community.  In this manner, the more any two groups oppose 
each other, the more other groups they find themselves cooperating with.  Alternatively, 
the two groups might make a deal with each other: in exchange for being allowed to 
develop this particular stretch of forest, the developers might agree to contribute money 
to a fund that stops suburban sprawl through preemptive buying up of real estate 
elsewhere. 
In short, raw, naked opposition, maintain Democratic Pragmatists, can occur only 
when one of the sides has the threat of force working for it, and feels they can afford to 
grab what they want while giving nothing in return – such a case when one side has a 
bureaucracy behind it.  A bureaucratic hierarchy holds the power of regulation and 
sanction for which it is only responsible before its own higher echelons, and can reward 
its cronies as it desires without the need to account for its actions before a community of 
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concerned and actively participating voters.  Any group it supports does not need to make 
deals, and so isn’t open to them; nor does it need to seek any other allies except the 
bureaucracy.  Naturally the group that feels that its interests are being hurt tries to oppose 
the bureaucracy-backed encroachment on these interests by any means necessary, usually 
through lawsuits and lobbying. 
Such situations have been commonplace in the history of environmentalist 
movements, particularly in the United States, but the Democratic Pragmatists argue that 
they are actually an aberration.  If they citizens had been bolder in demanding 
accountability from the bureaucrats and the courts, and if the role of direct democracy 
had been larger, claim the discourse’s adherents, the confrontation between interested 
groups would have been resolved through the constant search for allies among other 
participants, which would eventually enmesh both groups in a cooperative structure of 
mutual obligations approved by the majority of informed citizens.  At that point, both 
would have had to find a way to reach their goals through constructive uses of 
compromise. 
In the end, the environment and the company bottom line would both be better 
off, if perhaps not in precisely those ways the two groups originally envisioned.  Instead 
of confrontation, claim the Democratic Pragmatists, participatory democracy produces a 
hard-earned consensus.  Competition might be constantly going on with regard to some 
particular issue, but across the whole spectrum of issues, the reality of policy would be 
moving closer and closer to what all the debating citizens can agree it should be – with 
the evolution of consensus driven by the very opposing passions that originally fueled the 
debates and the search for allies. 
Unlike many other discourses, Democratic Pragmatism sets essentially no limit on 
the number of agents.  “Agency is for everybody.”33  This does not only mean 
individuals, but extends to collective actors such as religious groups, banks, corporations, 
venture capitalists, ecological clubs and movements, universities, scientific institutes, 
communities of music and literary fandom, labor unions, hobby communities such as 
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backpackers, hunters, or birdwatchers, and even government agencies.  Their motives can 
be, and usually are, largely composed of self-interest and private agendas, but many of 
the authors Dryzek draws on34 -- authors such as Kelman (1987), Gundersen (1995), 
Sagoff (1988), and Williams and Matheny (1995) -- claim that simply by deciding to 
participate in the open society of debate and democratic engagement, the agents add an 
additional motivation to their actions, oriented to improving, enlightening, and enriching 
the community they inhabit. 
The decision to participate in an open society does not itself make such people or 
groups of people into explicit saints or altruists; but whether they acknowledge it or not, 
by seeking public support for their agenda in an open forum, they recast their arguments 
in terms of this agenda, if accepted, being a benefit to their fellow human beings as well 
as themselves.  This cannot be entirely fraudulent: in a marketplace of competing ideas, 
the public won’t support an agenda that promises but does not deliver, not when opposing 
agendas do their best to convince it that the promises are coming from cheats and frauds.  
Any agent that tries to make his or her goals seem a benefit to the public in order to 
advance them, will have to truly be a benefit to at least enough of the public to have 
strong support in policy debates; and in a climate of transparency, competition and keen 
scrutiny from scandal-mongers, this support base will have to expand as fast as it can 
simply to keep pace with the agendas of competing agents.35 
Arguments framed so as to appeal to public interest will have to become their own 
reality if the are to survive scrutiny at all.  As the new participants enter the debate and 
internalize these arguments in their own personal discourses, those of them who find the 
arguments convincing will seek to implement the agenda the arguments support in the 
name of the public good as much as in the name of any advantage this implementation 
will provide to them personally.36  According to some theorists, just the inclusion of 
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discussions among different viewpoint holders in the process of decision-making changes 
each participant psychologically, making this participant think about long term outcomes, 
and about benefits to the entire community; according to Gundersen (1995), such changes 
occur even independently of the participant’s need to win support for an agenda.37 
Thus, in an open and transparent society with multiple forums of public debate 
and direct participatory democracy pervading every level of organization, even a totally 
selfish agent will have an implicit motive of benefiting the other participants, if only to 
make sure they benefit the agent. 
It is this implicit added motive of public beneficence, argue Dryzek’s sources, that 
makes consensus building possible, allowing the different agendas to cross-fertilize in the 
public consciousness into a pluralistic, inclusive agenda of a community, which the 
people work together at implementing at which reconciles points of view that started out 
opposing each other without forcing those points of view to lose their individual concerns 
and convictions. 
The metaphors of Democratic Pragmatism are a great deal more rich, diverse, and 
emotionally resonant than the Administrative Rationalist’s paeans to restraint, prudence, 
and trust in the administrative elite.  It is always more enjoyable for people to come 
together in the creation of a constantly evolving, pluralistic and endlessly re-inventable 
compact between free individuals than to adhere rigidly to rules imposed on them by a 
mechanism of social clockwork.  Several important metaphors stand out, although, 
typically of the pluralism that characterizes this discourse, they do not always agree 
precisely with each other. 
The metaphor is of policy as a resultant – something akin to what Tolstoy meant 
when he referred to history as the “quotient of millions of individual wills.”  Unlike 
Tolstoy, who sought to use this metaphor in his self-appointed task of showing the 
immutability of determined historical processes and the helplessness of an individual 
hubristic enough to try changing them, Democratic Pragmatists imbue this metaphor with 
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an optimistic outlook.  After all, if public policy, public opinion, and public action are 
each a resultant of many individual decisions and agendas, with society staying on its 
present course because every participant in it is pushing hard in his or her own direction, 
well, this implies that anybody can change the course of society, or at least make a major 
contribution to this change, simply by challenging the status quo in public debate and 
convincing a lot of agents to pull or push in concert.  At the same time, the political 
scientists who use this metaphor place a lot more emphasis on competition between 
agents than on consensus building, maintaining that a policy that evolves as a sort of 
mathematical average of the very different forces attempting to change it will always 
leave some of these forces gravely disappointed.38 
Another metaphor is that of social policy as experimental science.  This metaphor 
has a distinguished history, going back at least to the Federalist Papers of Hamilton, 
Madison and John Jay.  As Dryzek points out in his book, most of this metaphor’s 
modern users refer for support to the writings of Karl Popper. From this document’s 
section on Democratic Pragmatism’s intellectual pedigree, we can see that Karl Popper 
himself has been skeptical of this metaphor: some of the ideologies he dealt with, such as 
Marxism, were impervious to experimental refutation, at least from their own premises.  
If things worked out the way a Marxist had predicted, it meant the forces of historical 
inevitability were working on schedule; if events did not follow the script, this meant the 
forces of reaction were making a final desperate backlash, or the participants were 
suffering from the last twitches of false consciousness, or the dialectic predicted the 
triumph of repression as a necessary condition of building up enough contradictions for 
the crisis to arrive. 
And yet, while the notion that the validity of a would-be policy-maker’s claims 
could be proven or disproven by the actual results of the policy is not, strictly speaking, 
truly Popperian, it is true that Popper would have approved of a society which allowed 
the public to have a taste of proposed reforms on a smaller scale before it approved them 
for society-wide implementation.  It is also true that while Popper was skeptical about the 
                                               
 
38
 Dryzek (1997) page 97 
 Electric Power and Social Attitudes - 50 - Naiman, Bollinger, Waldron 
 
possibility of experimentally disproving ideologies, he would be the first to argue that the 
Open Society he advocated would permit the public to hold specific policies advocated 
by the proponents of each ideology to falsifiable predictions.  Finally, said Popper we 
know how to tell whether or not a statement is scientific – now it is time to apply this 
discovery to statements of policy.  
 While the claims of a policy-maker whose policy failed to deliver on its 
campaign promises could not be disproven in their own context, the public would not 
care.  The experiment would have been intended to measure the validity of the policy, not 
the internal consistency of any theory.  If the theory could be used to generate a policy 
that delivered on its promises better, it was up to the True Believer to do so;39 in the 
meantime the public would stick with policies that did not fail to satisfy. 
Bolstering this metaphor is Dryzek’s observation that modern advocates of the 
Open Society believe that the proper attitude of a policy-maker is essentially that of the 
scientist:40 open to new ideas, willing to criticize claims using real-world data, but not 
beholden to any theory a priori.  Whatever theory this policy-maker develops based on 
the data of past experience, the promises he or she makes to the public in getting it 
accepted constitute a set of criteria that can be used in the falsification of the policy, 
though not the theory.  Thus the grounding of the “policy as experimental science” 
metaphor in Karl Popper is vindicated: though the proponents of a theory may explain the 
failure of a policy within the theory’s own discourse, the public’s criterion of a policy 
made falsifiable by its promises puts all the theories that influence policymakers on an 
even and impartial footing in the laboratory of public perception.  They must generate 
policies that the public accepts as being possible to disprove by observation of how their 
results tally with their promises: these are called “concrete proposals” and without them 
no agenda can gain public acceptance.  And once these falsifiable proposals are 
implemented, they are indeed treated as any hypothesis must be treated in a chemical or 
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physical laboratory.41 
A typical metaphor used by the fraction of Democratic Pragmatist discourse that 
emphasizes the Pragmatist half of the name is that of the thermostat.  This metaphor 
states that as the course of a society swings in favor of certain agents, whether these 
agents represent ideologies, private interests, political fractions, or any other motivating 
factors, the outrage of the agents being deprived far exceeds the enthusiasm of the agents 
being rewarded.  Such is the nature of the human psyche: those who are robbed fight 
harder to regain what they lost, while those who gain grow content and less motivated to 
exert themselves.42 
From this observation, the users of the thermostat metaphor go on to say that 
when a pluralistic, transparent, and open society starts moving in a course that hurts some 
groups; their voices in public debate will be stronger than the voices of those groups who 
benefit.  The public’s response to these voices is likely to be a swing of popular support 
back to the original course of society.  Of course if the “temperature” swings too much 
the other way, the resulting backlash from whichever groups are the losers this time will 
steer society back again, towards an optimal course where the largest possible number of 
people are happy and fulfilled with the existing arrangements. 
Naturally precisely what these arrangements are differs from culture to culture: 
the Swedes seem satisfied with greater state intrusion into the private sector of the 
economy than the United States citizens are ever likely to tolerate, the Swiss would be 
outraged by the degree of federal control the United States government has over 
individual states, as opposed to a much looser arrangements between the Swiss 
Federation and its constituent cantons.  They would also be furious if someone asked 
them to give up their power of resolving vital matters by direct referendum, while in the 
United States the very nature of the Constitution that forms the foundation of US federal 
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democracy makes certain that direct popular vote does not carry any significant weight 
on the national level.  In short, while the thermostat metaphor predicts that a government 
in a pluralistic, transparent, and open society is most likely to stabilize at a policy that 
satisfies the largest possible number of agents, it cannot predict where that equilibrium 
point might be outside the reference points of a particular culture. 
Another major rhetorical device used by the Democratic Pragmatist discourse is 
the metaphor-based concept of “atomization.”  The metaphor is implicit in the word 
itself, where a cohesive whole is shattered into individual “atoms,” small and 
insignificant.  These unattached, unconnected “atoms” are now easily manipulated by 
forces too immense for an atom to resist, such as a bureaucracy.  Citing the example of 
Greek poleis, where all activity revolved around the community, producing the most 
individualistic culture of the ancient world, while the separation of people from their 
connection of gens and tribus produced the faceless mobs of late Republican Rome, fit 
only to provide dictators with sword fodder and riot in the street if their bread dole came 
in late, Democratic Pragmatists assert that the only way for an individual to be truly free 
is through participation in community life, hopefully through the direct democratic 
process. 
Methods of Empowerment 
From the above it is obvious that to empower citizens and make Democratic 
Pragmatism a workable proposition, a society must satisfy the conditions of transparency, 
which means the actions of all decision-makers must be open to scrutiny from any 
interested agent, pluralism, which means that multiple points of view must be able to 
debate any issue in multiple uncensored forums of discussion, and openness, which 
means that the rulers (i.e. the policymakers) lack the power to prevent the ruled from 
replacing them when a majority of agents should desire to do so. 
Real-world experience teaches us that all three of these qualities rapidly become 
restricted and circumscribed unless the citizens care enough to use them, actively and 
habitually.  In order to maintain the civic spirit of the public and keep the citizens from 
lapsing into political apathy, citizens must acquire the ever-present conviction that what 
they do matters, and that any agent, from a voting block down to a single individual, has 
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the power to change the current policy into something more fulfilling and satisfactory.  
And to empower a single individual in a society of millions, it is necessary that as much 
power as expedient be devolved to the local community, so as to give individual citizens 
a schooling of active, direct participation in capital-D Democracy.  With the community 
to magnify the efforts of a concerned and determined participant, an individual who can 
achieve changes on the local scene can make the state and the Federal level of policy-
crafting sit up and pay attention. 
Thus, the first task of a Democratic Pragmatist is to empower direct democracy, 
and that, in turn, can only be done by liberating the decision-making process from the 
shackles of bureaucracy, hierarchy, and legalism, while at the same time developing a 
culture of active participation and a positive view of policy debates.43  To do that, 
Democratic Pragmatism has developed its own repertoire, which is analogous to the 
repertoire of analysis and control developed by Administrative Rationalists. 
Since under the most democratic of constitutions, the actual implementation of the 
people’s choice must be carried out by a bureaucracy of experts, analysts, and managers, 
it is of the highest priority to a Democratic Pragmatist to democratize the bureaucratic 
structures themselves.44  For this purpose, the repertoire of Democratic Pragmatism 
includes the items of public consultation and policy dialogue.45 
For effective public consultation, the constrained structure of any bureaucratic 
hierarchy must be balanced with a public forum, existing in multiple incarnations across 
many different media.  The individual forums can be electronic, printed, transmitted by 
television or radio, or conducted face-to-face, such as a question-and answer session in a 
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town meeting.  Such a forum can answer two needs.  Firstly, it can inform the public of 
the hierarchy’s deliberations, inducing transparency.  Just as importantly, it can serve to 
allow lower members of the hierarchy, as well as concerned stakeholders (a category 
which, under Democratic Pragmatism, includes ordinary citizens) completely outside it, 
to bring issues directly to the attention of the hierarchy’s senior administrators, bypassing 
the selective editing that invariably accompanies the processing of data by middle 
management.  This last effect is a necessary condition for pluralism, creating access to 
the decision-maker for voices that would otherwise be stranded out in the echoing voids. 
The presence of such a multiple-headed debating forum also solves a perennial 
problem of even the best-managed Weberian bureaucracies: it allows for easier 
coordination between offices of, say, Air Purity and Water Purity in dealing with the 
problem of pollution in concert from several directions.  Not only would it be easier for 
the administrators to devise an interdepartmental plan of attack on an environmental 
problem, it would also allow agents outside the bureaucracy to infuse freshly relevant 
information, which would frequently be of the sort that requires two or more offices to 
coordinate if it is to be used effectively.  A requirement for the hierarchy to make use of 
this information would not only make coordination easier to start with, but would drive 
the offices involved to constantly seek out ways to improve coordination in the future, 
sowing seeds for a process rather than a onetime reform.  As the different offices 
coordinate in order to use information best, they will change their organizational 
behavior, which will make it easier for them to coordinate their use of information in the 
future – and earn them praise and rewards from above.  As this will now be easier, the 
offices will cooperate more often to earn even greater kudos from the top of the 
hierarchy, starting a virtuous cycle of evolution and transformation. 
In short, a public consultation forum would encourage a new culture of public 
input outside the bureaucracy and a new culture of keeping up with the activities of 
neighbor offices inside it. 
The practices of public consultation and policy dialogue differ in that during 
public consultation, the process of debate and the sharing of information with the 
hierarchy are formalized, and policy-makers are obligated to put their proposal up for 
comments and debate from the public and then to respond to those comments within a 
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certain length of time.  This sequence of steps is made a necessary condition to the 
ultimate approval of whatever project the policy-makers are advocating.  This is a benefit 
in the sense that it at least allows democratic processes to get a foot in the door, but since 
each round of public consultation is oriented towards a specific project, the practice is of 
limited use in creating a continuous habit of cooperation between a bureaucracy and the 
contributing public. 
Since the hierarchy won’t be accepting input from the public as a matter of 
course, in many cases the hierarchy’s intra-organizational culture would persist in 
regarding such rounds of consultation as unwelcome intrusions, which must be endured 
like all other practices mandated by law, but certainly not welcomed.  In such cases, the 
hierarchy may well attempt to brush the public off with a prepared statement that 
acknowledges the public’s contribution and uses the rest of the response to justify what 
the agency was going to do anyway.46  At the same time, a public without a continuous 
habit of cooperating with the experts and contributing to their decisions is unlikely to 
know how best to influence the hierarchy, and likely won’t see it as worth their while.  
The input from citizens who are concerned enough to contribute would be limited to a 
relatively small subset of the public rather than a large cross-section.  
On the other hand, public consultation can evolve into a public policy dialogue.  
This is the next step beyond consultation, when the public forums constantly keep up 
with the deliberations of administrative hierarchies, and provide input not only on 
specific projects, but all the time, at every stage of every project’s planning and 
implementation.  The participation of various agents in the discussion eventually evolves 
into a strategy for dealing with a larger issue, environmental or otherwise, that gathers 
public support and influences the opinion climate in which different projects are 
approved.  Such a wide spectrum of discussion cannot be stonewalled by an official 
response to some stated concerns, as so often happens during a public consultation -- 
even if the bureaucrats are not required to listen to the public all the time, the discussion 
would form the public opinion that gives the hierarchy its mandate, and the information 
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and ideas they provide would be a necessary part in the formation of any proposal that the 
hierarchy’s experts would assemble, provided they want it approved.  In this manner, 
participants in a policy dialogue provide indispensable input to any individual project 
before the bureaucrats even considered submitting the proposal for a public consultation! 
And of course proposals would now be going both ways.  Policy dialogue would 
involve groups interested in the outcome in discussions, education, and negotiations 
outside the context of the hierarchy, which would allow them to discuss their way to a 
solution that all sides find equitable without the threat of coercion.  Because many of 
these solutions would frequently make it possible for policy to handle issues that were 
previously considered politically untouchable, these solutions would often reach the ears 
of policymakers at the hierarchy’s apex, and once approved “from the bottom up,” they 
would then be submitted down to the hierarchy for implementation.  Any expert or 
analyst working for the hierarchy would be aware that the other interested parties are 
looking over his or her shoulder, and that he or she is free to submit proposals to the 
consultations of other interested groups for approval – in essence no longer giving the 
hierarchy organization a monopoly on expertise.  This alone would diversify the range of 
opinions an expert can state: after all, now there is no upper management to put a nix on 
opinions that do not fit well with accepted wisdom.   
In the beginning, such changes are likely to encounter institutional resistance from 
bureaucratic organizations, but such resistance will likely be replaced with grudging, and 
then with enthusiastic acceptance as the bureaucrats realize that the dialogue enables 
them to craft better policy which encounters less resistance because the citizens have had 
a hand in its formulation.  Moreover, the experts would be realizing that thanks to the 
negotiation taking part in the forums, many of the problems they were forced to wrestle 
with have now developed a habit of resolving themselves, and that with a constant and 
not just a project-by-project transparency, they can now better transmit needed 
information, both along the vertical and the horizontal axes.  Of course the course of this 
transition can be greatly aided by the hierarchy’s bosses. 
Cooperation between a hierarchy and the public can be encouraged through many 
channels of incentive.  The chief administrators could reward those hierarchies, or subsets 
of a larger hierarchy, that are most successful at addressing the concerns expressed by the 
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public, and use the suggestions introduced on such public forums most creatively.  These 
rewards could range from salary bonuses to be distributed among individual bureaucrats 
to increased budgets given to offices within an agency most effective at resolving issues 
through policy dialogues with interested parties, to increased importance assigned to 
these organizations, or their members, in the larger hierarchy of decision-making. 
For example, a state EPA that has been particularly successful in making use of 
public input and satisfying various complaints can be rewarded by asking it for input on 
re-organizing the Federal EPA to answer these needs.  A city liaison office of the EPA 
that effectively coordinated with industries, citizen groups, the local business community, 
and the City Hall in order to curb emissions of toxins into soil, water and air in this 
particular city should be given a chance to network with other city liaisons in the EPA 
and spread its techniques of coordination to urban areas that has hitherto had to suffer 
under the more usual practice of confrontation and mismanagement.  Such rewards 
should both ensure that sub-hierarchies that accept the most public input and use it the 
wisest should have a disproportionate influence in forming the hierarchy’s institutional 
culture, and that other officials and administrators, in their search for more influence, 
higher budgets, and faster promotion, make their institutions open up to input from 
outside themselves, and seek out a chance to invite outside sources of knowledge, or even 
non-expert but concerned citizens, to examine the hierarchy’s work and contribute 
opinions and ideas. 
The cultivation of such acceptance, and in some cases enthusiasm, for pluralism 
and transparency, should in its turn make certain that discussion forums would remain a 
continuous process through the hierarchy’s day-to-day operations, and not a onetime 
event focusing on a specific public consultation.  Thus such practices would promote 
both greater acceptance of policy dialogue and the evolution of more public consultation 
projects into new policy dialogues, which would then range over many topics to produce 
workable strategies acceptable to every party in the debate. 
Obviously the public forums would not be worth much if the facts about policy 
deliberation were withheld from anyone but the hierarchical elite.  Because of this, 
transparency must be ensured through public measures such as right-to-know legislation, 
which constitutes the third item on the Democratic Pragmatist repertoire.  This must not 
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be limited to the mere laws that mandate disclosure of information – explicit guarantees 
that the public will actually be able to interpret and share the disclosed information must 
also be established, although such matters are much harder to legislate. 
Whether the forums of public debate exist in print, in cyberspace, on TV, on talk 
radio, or in the form of direct assemblies of concerned citizens, the structure of social 
organization must guarantee them access not just to the policy-makers’ deliberations, but 
also to experts, independent of policy-makers, that are able to provide the context in 
which these deliberations occur, and instruct the citizens in making sense of the 
information revealed therein.  While these are usually easy to come by in a sophisticated 
modern society, there are exceptions, such a hypothetical case when the citizens involved 
belong to some group that suffers from previously established disadvantages in income, 
in education, in the number of contacts with potential allies outside itself, or in familiarity 
with the topic.47  Another requirement is the ready ability of the participants in one forum 
to communicate their information, decisions and concerns to other forums where the 
issue is being discussed, so as to empower the participant in any given forum to be heard 
anywhere anyone takes an interest in the issue, potentially across the globe. 
The fourth item on the Democratic Pragmatist repertoire seeks to encourage wider 
use of alternative dispute resolution between interested parties (such as industry, 
environmental activists, and regulators.)  The task is to avoid a lengthy and convoluted 
process of litigation, which can take decades to resolve an issue and in the end results 
increased paranoia on the part of both winners and losers.  An alternative resolution, on 
the other hand, can result in a learning process for sides involved, leading to the 
avoidance of at least some clashes looming on the horizon, and possibly even to a 
constructive dialogue.48 
The stakeholders involved must agree to come together, and to debate the issue 
before impartially chosen mediators.  If possible, this process must be made as 
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transparent as possible, with the public being able to offer input on the situation and the 
stakeholders able to appeal their case directly to the public.  The public, even more than 
the mediators themselves, is to act as a guarantor of fair dealing: since it is 
heterogeneous, and both points of view are likely to have many supporters among the 
people, unfairness to either party will cause an explosion of focused outrage by its 
proponents (think of the multitude of blogs actively working to spot the fibs of either side 
during the recent elections.)  The blogosphere is a great advance in making Democratic 
Pragmatism’s adherents more confident of themselves, and spurring them to practice 
what they would preach. 
Alternative dispute resolution (also known by the acronym ADR) has one 
additional advantage: even if any particular negotiation falls through, the participants 
walk away with a much better awareness of what pushes the other side’s buttons.  
Because of this, they each have a better chance of planning their next project, whatever it 
is, around the other’s sensitive spots.  For example if an oil company seeks to build a new 
refinery, and the inhabitants of a local small town protest, no matter how many times the 
oil company assures the residents that its air quality precautions are adequate, the likely 
response would be a certainty that the oil people are somehow trying to trick the 
residents.  The result is that in the last three decades, the construction of new oil 
refineries within United States has run into a brick wall.  
On the other hand, if the oil company invites the town council to dictate terms to 
the company, and spell out exactly which precautions they want the company to take 
against odor, emissions, and the complex’s unaesthetic appearance, the town council, 
now feeling in control, can be very reasonable in its demands.  Of course that won’t help 
the company much, since there would still remain the state and Federal EPA to convince, 
plus the various groups of environmental activists.  Bringing all of these interests together 
is a much more challenging proposition, but not impossible – Dryzek cites a Canadian 
case where ADR was able to produce mutual agreements between all interested parties on 
the siting of a toxic waste dump.49  Experts in air quality and pollution control 
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engineering can serve as an impartial sounding board for specific proposals, holding up 
the evidence presented by every side against the standard of their knowledge.  The public 
can follow the debates over the Internet, printed page and talk radio, and concerned 
groups can write letters to the editor, stir up public opinion for one side or the other, or 
even address the deliberations and demand guarantees of their own from the oil company. 
And if the dialogue succeeds, the environmentalists would have a new 
environmentally friendly oil refinery design to use in comparisons with old oil refineries, 
enabling them to insist on higher standards for refinery emissions, while the oil company 
would have a refinery and, after all these years, a way to win public support for it.  The 
town, of course, would have whatever inducements the oil company will throw in to 
sweeten the deal – and the state EPA might have the company’s support as a sponsor on 
some state program to restore an endangered species’ habitat. 
Some critics say that ADR is essentially a way for agents with greater economic 
or administrative power to co-opt the potential opposition, clearing the way for their 
agenda, not because it truly addresses the concerns of their opponents but because these 
opponents are presented with a consolation prize and then threatened with being branded 
as fanatics if they reject it.50  This criticism could be valid or not, depending on the 
particulars of each case, but a Democratic Pragmatist would say that a power 
administrative agency or a wealthy corporation could only get away with such an 
approach if the public was not concerned enough to research the issue and attract the 
expert mediators that would not allow Goliath to sell any promise on which he could not 
deliver.  A coalition of active citizens speaking before the eyes of the nation, argue 
Democratic Pragmatists, would be the best possible way to prevent special interests with 
economic or administrative power from acting like the proverbial 800-pound gorilla. 
Dryzek also names a fifth item on the Democratic Pragmatist repertoire, namely 
the public inquiry panel.51  This is basically an impact assessment that summons 
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witnesses.  While it does feature a “specific and visible forum in which proponents and 
objectors alike can make depositions and arguments,” the forum is shown to be defined 
by the constraints of the administrative agent that established it.  As such, the only 
evidence that is admitted for deposition before the “impartial” panel is the sort that the 
forum’s administrator is comfortable with.  For example, a public inquiry panel in 
Britain, examining the proposed construction of a Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant 
(THORP) in 1977, admitted evidence from the project proponent on the supposed 
economic benefit of the plant, but economic counter-evidence from objectors was not 
allowed52. 
Dryzek contrasts this type of discussion with the independent forum that arises 
during a policy dialogue, and comments that the more successful a public inquiry panel 
is, the more it looks like a public policy dialogue.  In other words, with the evidence 
admissible to the forum prescribed by the administration and the process of establishing 
the forum itself being open only to the administrators who decide to set up an inquiry 
panel, this item fails the criterion of pluralism, and quite possibly the criterion of 
transparency, since the public is typically not invited to observe the process whereby it is 
decided on what criteria evidence is or isn’t admitted to be presented before the inquiry 
panel. 
Democratic Pragmatism in Practice 
The first great triumph of the Democratic Pragmatist discourse with respect to 
environmental issues is the birth of the environment itself – at least as a widespread 
public concern.  The mass movement that eventually evolved into modern 
environmentalism first exploded in the early 1960’s as Rachel Carson’s book Silent 
Spring won itself a wide and enthusiastic readership, who saw Carson’s portrayal of a 
dying ecology not merely as a caution, but as a call to immediate political action.  The 
ideas that gave birth to modern environmentalist awareness were present for at least a 
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century before the 1960’s,53 and it certainly aided the spread of environmentalist ideas 
that President John Fitzgerald Kennedy and his Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. 
Udall54 took a keen interest in the problems of conservation and pollution at just about 
the time Silent Spring shocked the US middle class out of its consumerist innocence.  But 
it took thousands of public agitators, speaking before millions of suburbanites55 and 
small-town folks about the dangers of pollution in the particular creek running outside 
their particular backyards, which propelled the outpouring of public concern and 
involvement made visible on the first Earth Day on April 22, 1970. 
According to Senator Nelson, who was the first Earth Day’s widely-recognized 
“midwife,” the first Earth Day worked not so much due to anything government 
organizers did as because of spontaneous action taken by the 20 million demonstrators 
and the thousands of schools and local communities that took part in the event across the 
nation.  The participants themselves took action to discuss local and national topics, to 
educate their respective communities, and to debate possible solutions, acting in a venue 
provided by the government, but not delegating the responsibility of action to any official 
representative.  In Senator Nelson’s own words, the event “organized itself.”56 
The 1960’s and early 1970’s proved to be grassroots environmentalism’s heroic 
age.  In the subsequent decades, as environmentalism came to depend on regulation and 
lawsuits to obtain its objectives, advocates soon came to complain of diminishing returns 
and what Dryzek calls an “implementation deficit”57 – a term invented by German 
environmental policy analysts who noticed the same problems in their society.  The 
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people who previously campaigned for environmental action were often left on the 
sidelines, and, paradoxically, as their message of environmentalism gained greater and 
greater acceptance with the voting public, the specific policies the government undertook 
to translate this message into concrete outcomes became increasingly distrusted and 
disliked.  The grassroots activists of yesterday once more began to seek a course of 
inclusion, which would motivate the public to debate the issues and advance solutions 
without waiting for rescue from the establishment.  At the same time, new grassroots 
movements were evolving, which sought to integrate concern for nature with other public 
concerns, such as employment and protection of communities from unfair regulation.  As 
Robert Taylor put it in his book: “[Many] different Third Wave [of environmentalism] 
concepts emerged, but the unifying theme was that the new wave should be solution-
oriented.”   
At the same time as this debate was gathering force in the environmental policy 
arena of United States, the basic nature of the relationship between the governor and the 
governed was evolving across the globe.  As the ideas of Carl Popper were gaining 
increasing acceptance, more and more governments came under increasing social 
pressure to open policymaking up to wider citizen participation.  Across the First World, 
this process has been one the defining traits which characterize the last third of the 
twentieth century.  After the fall of Communism, the evolution of governments towards 
greater public participation has become a global pattern.  All discourses relating to the 
environment, but of course Democratic Pragmatism more than the others, must evolve in 
a context defined by greater ability of individuals and small communities to influence the 
course taken by large polities.  Within the last two decades, the drift towards greater state 
control of local community issues has appeared to be reversing as well, with many 
governments adopting policies of devolution, in which regions and municipalities are 
saddled with less regulation and more responsibility. 
The pioneer in this regard was Switzerland, which has had the most direct 
democratic system and the most open society of all nations on Earth ever since, in the 
year 1890, its constitution was amended to provide for greater popular participation in 
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government.  In the past 200 years, there have been 800 nationwide referendums across 
the globe.  Of these, 400 were in Switzerland.58  Throughout the 20th century, Swiss 
policymakers have increasingly come to rely on “double majorities” – that is, a majority 
of voters in a direct nation-wide referendum and a majority of majorities in referendums 
held within each federal canton -- to legitimize all major shifts in policy.  Any group of 
Swiss citizens, no matter how insignificant, which feels itself aggrieved by any political 
decision, can essentially force the country to hold a referendum on the topic if they make 
sufficient noise.  Only 100000 signatures on a petition are needed out of a population of 
4.7 million citizens.  In addition to being able to change existing laws, these same 100000 
signatures can force a referendum on an entirely new statute drafted through citizen 
initiative – if successful, the proposition becomes law, and if not, the interested group can 
at least constantly maintain the topic in the public eye, generating debate and informing 
the citizenry through argument.59 
 The system has evolved over the century since its adoption, demonstrating both 
remarkable powers of generating consensus and, more recently, a remarkable capability 
for peaceful change.60  Its effects have made a dedication to direct participation in 
decision making, on every level from Federal to municipal, one of the defining elements 
of what it means to be Swiss.  Besides the power the system delegates to cantons, the 
example of successful popular power at the Federal level inspires the citizens of every 
individual canton with a fierce insistence on their rights as individuals, and on the rights 
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of their communities before the canton’s own government.  For example, in 1978, the 
Swiss city of Jura and its surrounding territory had successfully seceded from the canton 
of Bern and become a canton in its own right, seeking the permission to secede in a 
nationwide referendum and gaining the legitimacy of a double majority. 
Within each canton, the inhabitants enjoy a reach and varied political life, with 
many local parties debating local issues and contesting the right to represent intra-
cantonal districts and municipalities in the canton’s own legislature.  In effect, the canton 
itself becomes a confederation of the communities that comprise it, with the effect that 
the natural size of a canton appears to be a major city and some surrounding villages. 
Switzerland’s 7-member Federal Council has been neatly apportioned between 
the four main parties for most of its existence.  The Swiss saw it as a symbol of stability: 
rather than a contentious wrangle over seats, analogous to the maneuvers of political 
parties over ministerial portfolios that have bedeviled other nations, the Swiss Federal 
council had traditionally been filled according to a consensus established before a single 
vote was cast, with each major voting block assured a voice.  Since the power of the 
Swiss Federal government is limited as it was, the other voting blocks remained secure in 
the knowledge that if any the four main parties ever stepped out of line, they had the 
option of recall referendum and voter initiative to hold over the Federal government’s 
head. 
This system of consensus-based apportioning did not depend on voting as much 
as the Swiss constitution said it did, but that was only because in a stable, wealthy and 
conservative society such as Switzerland, the likely behavior of voting groups could be 
predicted in advance, and the voting would usually bear the prediction out.  Or at least it 
would once.  As Switzerland becomes less homogenous socially, the election scene has 
grown increasingly more dynamic.  After the election of 2003 the composition of the 
Federal Council had to be changed in accordance with the new election results, a shock to 
the Swiss as they suddenly discovered that consensus-building cannot completely replace 
actual appeals to the voter. 
In short, the Swiss system of government has not, as some critics of Democratic 
Pragmatism allege, brought about wildly inconsistent policies passed by the ignorant at 
the urging of the ignominious.  On the contrary, direct participation seems to have 
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inspired all involved parties with a great deal of responsibility, making it possible for 
interested stakeholders to broker multiple agreements and arrive at a satisfactory policy 
through reasonable discussion, so that society could operate without being swamped in a 
torrent of referenda.  If the system could be accused of anything, it is conservatism, 
which was brought about by the understandable realization that if a law was to stand any 
chance of gaining the legitimizing double majority, it should be hammered out in every 
detail before being proposed, with special care taken not to leave out any party with a 
legitimate interest.  The converse, of course, is that it could run no chance of offending 
any group, which meant that controversial subjects like allowing women to vote were 
repeatedly put off for the next Federal Assembly to deal with.61  As Swiss society grew 
more globalized and diverse, the process of policy debate gained new intensity, as 
consensus building could no longer resolve all challenges before the votes were cast. 
As far as dealing with environmental issues went, the Swiss model of Democratic 
Pragmatism has had a mixed success.  A Federal-level Green Party entered the political 
scene in 1979 (when the first Green member of the National Assembly was elected), but 
has enjoyed limited success since, electing town mayors and members of canton 
governments.  The maximum membership in the National Assembly they had achieved 
was 14, in the Assembly established by the election of 2003.  Although, given the 
multiple factions of Swiss politics, this makes it the fifth largest party in the 200-member 
Federal Assembly (the largest has 55 seats), the party has hitherto failed to gain a 
member in the Federal Council. 
Nevertheless, Switzerland has achieved an exemplary record on atmospheric 
emissions, showing the highest carbon efficiency of all developed nations.62  This has 
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largely been achieved through a commitment to nuclear power combined with a transition 
from manufacturing to service economy and high air quality standards.  In order to ensure 
high environmental standards, the Swiss government has been given new federal powers: 
a sign of departure for the Swiss who have historically preferred to trust cantonal 
government and private enterprise on most issues.  Perhaps the limited success of the 
Greens at the ballot box is a sign that the larger political parties have been so responsive 
to the citizens’ concerns regarding the state of the environment they do not see the need 
for a new party to come in and reshuffle their carefully apportioned Federal Council 
seats. 
Another nation exemplified by direct democracy is Norway – in fact, the concept 
of devolving state powers to the citizens has become popular throughout the 
Scandinavian nations, but Norway has taken it to the highest extent.  The Norwegian 
policy has been to strip the central authority from Oslo as much as possible, emphasizing 
the power of the county assembly to direct affairs that it knows best.  Even the county 
assembly has to defer a lot of its power to the nation 434 municipalities, which can work 
with the county but frequently have an agenda of their own. 
3.1.3 The Economic Rationalist 
Classification 
Like the two discourses discussed before it, Economic Rationalism is a Prosaic, 
Reformist discourse oriented towards maintaining the current state of affairs – that is, a 
liberal Western society founded upon an industrial economy – essentially unchanged in 
its fundamentals.  What changes it does seek to make, it seeks one at a time, in response 
to each particular challenge63, rather fall into the temptation to resolve all challenges 
posed by the relationship between this society and the natural world in one all-
encompassing re-imagining of relationships. 
The difference lies in the discourses’ source of intellectual legitimacy for 
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solutions to be adopted.  Administrative Rationalists believe in the power of a panel of 
experts to arrive at the correct solution, while Democratic Pragmatists proclaim that a 
working solution can only be reached through transparent public debate and open, 
participatory consensus-building, overseen by the watchful gaze of actively involved 
concerned citizens.  An Economic Rationalist, on the other hand, looks to questions of 
affordability in deciding whether or not to pursue a policy, and believes that if either 
experts or debating citizens choose to ignore the information distributed through the 
economy by the constantly shifting forces of supply and demand, whatever policy they 
decide on will simply be impossible to carry through. 
The ultimate legitimacy, in the eyes of an Economic Rationalist, comes from an 
awareness of scarcity: there just aren’t enough resources to do everything everyone 
wants, and in a society of competing subjective interests, it is mathematically impossible 
for any central authority that is a subset of this society to maintain awareness of sufficient 
information to decide on how to allocate these scarce resources.  Therefore the only way 
these resources can be allocated to achieve whatever goal the consensus decides upon 
must lie in the operation of free trading, and an economic system that multiplies 
resources through the operation of market laws.  This way, when the social authority 
decides to do something, it is actually possible for society to afford it without either 
breaking under the strain or losing the consensus between different agents’ personal 
perspectives that legitimizes the action in the first place.  In that regard, the health of our 
ecosystem is just another good to be paid for, though, as it turns out, one as vital as food 
or water. 
As we can see, just as the Democratic Pragmatist discourse is a reaction to the 
inefficiency of Administrative Rationalism in dealing with the chaotic world that cannot 
be reduced to an assessment report, Economic Rationalism is both its twin and its heir: it 
seeks to address the problem of dealing with too much information for a panel of experts 
to handle, and at the same time to make the debating citizens aware of the cold facts on 
the ground, that are not going to change no matter how many different points of view are 
expressed regarding them.  The hope is that in the light of economic theory, policy 
debates between different agents will be limited to propositions that can actually work, 
and that decision makers will learn to use the laws governing market interactions rather 
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than stand in the way of their operations and spend wasted energy trying to bail out some 
unsalvageable policy that makes its own stated goals impossible to afford simply by its 
own continuing influence on supply and demand. 
The nature of these laws and their relationship to the laws of nature such as 
physics and chemistry will be discussed further in the section on Economic Rationalist 
ontology.  For now we shall look at the origin of Economic rationalism and the 
intellectual justification its adherents have developed.  It is instructive to note that steps 
of this discourse’s development bear an uncanny parallel to the steps taken by the 
developing philosophy that finally became Democratic Pragmatism. 
 
3.1.3.2.1 Hayekian Catallaxy: Twin to Popper’s Open Society 
 
 The school of thought which articulates the main principles of the 
Economic Rationalist discourse certainly has its start in the works of Adam Smith64 and 
David Ricardo65, who described the operation of the free market and its superiority to 
state intervention in creating any good or service for which demand existed.  All 
subsequent scientific economics is either founded on the principles elucidated by these 
scholars, or converges with these principles from a different direction; but neither Smith 
nor Ricardo articulated the main argument for modern Economic Rationalism – the 
description of the way free markets allocate resources through the use of information that 
is simply unavailable to any other form of decision-making.  A precise and detailed 
description of the market as an information-processing system slowly evolved over more 
than 200 years, developing through the work of the Austrian School of Economics in the 
late 19th and early 20th century,66 and was only fully articulated in the writings of 
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Ludwig von Mises,67 Fiedrich Hayek,68 Henry Hazlitt,69 and the neo-Hayekian arguments 
of their modern intellectual heirs, who expressed Hayek’s discourse of catallaxy70 arising 
from uncertainty in terms of rigorous mathematical analysis71. 
 
Hayek’s argument seems to have been founded on the same fundamental concerns 
as Karl Popper’s: the impossibility of any central authority, however well-stocked with 
learned experts, being able to predict economic events accurately.  Popper phrased it in 
terms of falsifiability and the contradictory task of a society attempting to predict its own 
future state of knowledge, while Hayek focused on the impossibility of a bureaucracy 
being able to understand economic data outside the irreducible and idiosyncratic context 
in which the millions of economic agents whose activity comprises this data must make 
their individual assessments of risk, cost and benefit.  A modern neo-Hayekian might use 
the analogy of the well known mathematical proof that it is impossible to create a lossless 
data compression algorithm that will compress all possible inputs – such an algorithm 
would need to map a larger set onto a smaller set on a one-to-one basis72.  In the same 
way, compression of data on economic activity to a form in which a panel of experts can 
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profitably analyze it by definition excludes the context of each individual decision. 
 
 In the aggregate, the exclusion of so many contexts makes the information 
a meaningless set of numbers that may or may not mean what the analyst’s personal 
biases, or honestly performed calculations, or sudden mystical insights, might say it 
means – the information to decide before the analysis is tested through implementation 
simply isn’t there, and after it is tested, any number of theories could be formed on the 
basis of this data to explain most deviations from the predicted outcome. 
 
 Both Popper and Hayek argue that the cure is to bring context back into 
decision-making.  Both agree that this must be done by bringing into the decision loop 
those millions of individual agents whom the policy is going to affect.  Each of these 
people, say the two philosophers, holds a small piece of the solution, hitherto atomized 
and unconnected.  Brought together in a way that allows the system to benefit from all 
the information distributed among their multiple, though limited, points of view, these 
individual decision-makers, interacting in networks of mutually reinforcing competition 
and cooperation, will produce workable solutions that the distorted and necessarily 
procrustean vision of any central authority will be unable to achieve.  So far, the above 
statement provides an accurate expression of both discourses. 
 
 Popper would argue that the best arena for such competition/cooperation 
networks would be the forum of public discussion, while Hayek argues that the arena of 
economic interaction would enable the competing/cooperating agents to make use of 
information that they cannot articulate in words, and that the consensus evolved by the 
operation of the free market does not suffer from the weakness of relying on verbal 
propositions.  A discussion forum, argues Hayek, would still be limited to the 
economically feasible in whatever solution it evolves, and the signals of supply and 
demand would mark feasible solutions out for adoption much faster than endless rounds 
of speechifying.  Hayek describes this evolution of ordered optimization out of chaotic 
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competitive/cooperative interactions by frequently misinformed participants as a 
catallaxy73.  According to his writings, the evolution of human consciousness out of the 
interactions of mindless neurons is an example of the same natural phenomenon74. 
 
 In fact, Hayek asserts that the Open Society Popper advocates cannot 
maintain itself in the envisaged open state without giving people liberty in the economic 
sphere as well as political.  Conversely, he claims, economic freedom brings with it the 
political empowerment of formerly marginalized groups, and makes any ruling clique 
that originally controlled society rapidly lose its monopoly on power.  Any constraint on 
the freedom of markets, writes Hayek, results in the government being forced to take 
coercive action to maintain this distortion, marginalizing the groups that advocate its 
repeal.  Even if the distortion on the market is voted through by democratic means, such 
as in Sweden or in the United states during the New Deal, the government apparatus 
enforcing this distortion must necessarily exclude input from all groups other than those 
that toe the party line.  Eventually, the apparatus assumes undisguised bureaucratic 
qualities, beginning to act for the benefit of those interests that profit from the economic 
constraints it enforces, a process which renders the society increasingly less open as the 
effects of this constraint accumulate in all spheres of human activity. 
 
On the other hand, a free market brings with it a growth of the middle class and a 
reduction in poverty, both of which are necessary for a democratic government to 
function without violent clashes between opposing class interests.  As more people 
assume the creative mental habits of the successful entrepreneur, they become more open 
to new ideas, and as networks of competition/cooperation spread through every level of 
society, people seek ways of resolving other problems, not related to business, through 
bargaining and negotiation rather than prescriptive methods.  Thus the principles of 
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economic and political catallaxy are not distinct in Hayek’s thinking – a certain 
distribution of information in one sphere, whether optimal or sub-optimal, brings about a 
like effect in the other. 
 
Distributism and Syndicalism: Early Discourses of Correcting Externalities through 
Property Rights  
 The other half of Economic Rationalism’s intellectual pedigree focuses on 
the market as a motivating force, and as a source of legitimacy for specific policy 
decisions.  It also includes arguments from areas previously considered only tangentially 
related to economics, such as individual and social psychology, jurisprudence, 
anthropology, even neurobiology.  These arguments are used to study the failures and 
successes of individual cases, none of which quite corresponds to the ideal free market 
portrayed in economic theory.  These cases are studied, and their individual successes 
and failures tabulated and examined for patterns as the economists seek to discover 
optimal means through which externalities (that is, costs whose value is not transmitted in 
the price signals, thus distorting resource allocation away from optimal) can be 
internalized and included in the market signaling system without imposing further 
distortions on the system, such as those that come with excessive intervention and 
regulation. 
The notion that people care more about resources they personally control and 
projects they personally choose to participate in has been known since antiquity75, and 
has certainly been a major topic of discussion through the Enlightenment; theorists from 
Kant to John Stuart Mill have commented on it, and in the early 20th century, Joseph 
Alois Schumpeter used his model of wealth creation through the activity of creative and 
eternally unsatisfied private entrepreneurs to shoot Marx’s argument of property-as-
expropriation full of holes76.  Conservationists in the United States, such as George 
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Perkins Marsh, Gifford Pinchot, and Frederick Billings, have always argued that the best 
way to save the wilderness was to involve private capital in its wise and sustainable use, 
and tie the sustainability of each particular portion of a public resource to a particular 
industrialist’s private profit.   
As the 19th century ended and the 20th began, the Catholic Church, concerned 
with the growing alienation and resentment among the working classes, advocated an 
early version of what modern politicians call “ownership society” as a way to halt the 
dependence of the poor on the jobs provided by the rich, which the Church argued made 
the poor susceptible to Communist or nationalist agitation and drove them to violent 
revolution.  This Catholic doctrine of “distributism” advocated by Popes from Leo XIII77 
to Pius XII, preached that the ownership of the means of production should be spread as 
far across society as possible – an antidote, they claimed, both to the pernicious seduction 
of socialism and to the dehumanization of their workers by the corporate and banking 
leviathans that dominated the developed economies of the day. 
Under distributism, people would still be engaged in a capitalistic system of free 
trade, but they would now be working for themselves as opposed to a boss, and the 
resulting increase in entrepreneurship and personal responsibility among the newly 
empowered working class was supposed to bring about a new birth of economic 
prosperity and social justice78.  People would cease seeing the businessman as an 
exploiter or the moneylender as a parasite, because they would be secure in the 
knowledge that they own the means to make themselves a living, and no one can take that 
away from them. 
This view obviously never found wide acceptance among economists, who saw 
giant corporations as necessary to minimize transaction costs (Ronald Coase79), reduce 
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overhead (also Coase80), recruit vast amount of capital for large projects in an 
economically feasible period (Hilferding81), and amortize entrepreneurs against the risk 
of ideas that did not work out (Schumpeter).  On the other hand, intellectuals and writers 
readily took to distributism as a convenient vantage point, from which they could criticize 
the dehumanizing tendencies of both socialism and the corporate oligarchy of trusts and 
banks82. It is therefore not surprising that this philosophy is best summed up by the 
British writer G.K. Chesterton, a well-known promoter of its goals.  Chesterton was 
supposed to have quipped that: “The problem with capitalism is that there are not enough 
capitalists83.” 
In other words, distributism, though it was not by any means an Economic 
Rationalist discourse, kept alive the idea that for people to act responsibly and manage 
resources wisely, they must be owners and not peons.  Indeed, since the main argument 
against distributism lies in the transaction costs that many individual businesspeople 
would incur building the connections they need in order to operate, and in procuring the 
necessary clients and suppliers, it can be argued that libertarianism, which abhors 
oligopolies almost as much as state-run monopolies and advocates a model of social 
evolution where transaction costs are constantly decreasing, is distributism’s more 
realistic, post-Hayekian heir. 
Another early discourse that attempted to isolate the good points of capitalism in a 
non-capitalist system was syndicalism.  This system derives its name from the French 
word for “trade union”, and is based on the notion of private ownership of the means of 
production through public association – in essence have the labor unions own the 
factories, and distribute the factories’ profit according to a democratically decided 
                                                                                                                                            
 
http://people.bu.edu/vaguirre/courses/bu332   
80
 Summarized by Steven Suranovic (1997) at http://internationalecon.com/v1.0/ch80/80c020.html  
81
 Rudolf Hilferding (1910) Finance Capital: A Study in the Latest Phase of Capitalist 
Development, Routledge, Oxford, United Kingdom 
82
 G.K. Chesterton (1910) What’s Wrong With the World, (1927) The Outline of Sanity, Ignatius 
Press, San Francisco, Ca. 
83
 www.distributism.com  
 Electric Power and Social Attitudes - 76 - Naiman, Bollinger, Waldron 
 
internal code of rules.  Each full member of such a syndicate owns a share in the profits, 
and so works as a partner rather than as a proletarian who contributes only labor and 
receives only a living wage. 
This is superior to distributism as a working model, since it at least gets to retain 
high densities of capital in the form of factories. But syndicalism is unable to compete 
with more conventional economic arrangements, running into the obvious problem: 
making every worker a partner nearly freezes the operation of the labor market. How do 
you suddenly hire 500 new partners?  Or dismiss a hundred to stay profitable?  This, in 
turn, imposes a severe distortion on the pricing of goods and services, and thus on 
investment. 
Once again, this discourse is not Economic Rationalist, but it does show a 
constant search for a way to make it possible to cultivate responsibility and awareness – 
in this case in the social, not the environmental sphere – by expanding the private 
ownership of wealth and resources, whether complete or partial84.  Both distributism and 
syndicalism demonstrate an intuition, yet unstated but clearly implied, which lies at the 
core of Economic Rationalism’s description of the ways through which markets can 
become more inclusive, constantly re-weaving their own evolving web of price signals to 
reflect factors that were previously externalities.  It is the idea that problems – whether 
social or economic, or, in the case we are discussing, environmental -- can be resolved in 
a manner fair to all parties through a democratization and widespread application of 
property rights and their enforcement on any party that attempts to make others bear the 
social costs of its activity. 
In the case of distributism, the market externality – though the distributists 
themselves did not so describe it – was the unequal bargaining power of the unemployed 
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worker in the street and the set-for-life plutocrat in his mansion.  On the one hand, capital 
is worthless without labor, so that labor, in theory, can bargain capital down to a fair 
share of the surplus value.  On the other, in practice any individual worker would rather 
accept being underpaid than not being paid at all, because a capitalist only stands to lose 
the profit this one worker brings while the worker stands to lose his life to starvation and 
disease.  This enabled the plutocrat to force the worker into accepting deplorable working 
conditions, excessive hours, cuts in wages, and other indignities so as to avoid going back 
on the street.  The plutocrat did not have to bear the cost of creating alienation, envy, 
social unrest, propensity towards alcoholism, and other such blights on society – the 
apparatus of the state assumed these costs.  Hence the social cost of the plutocrat’s further 
enrichment, not reflected in the price of hiring labor.  By respecting a worker’s property 
right to his or her labor and the means to employ it, distributism sought to make anyone 
wishing to hire that labor pay the true market price, a process which was supposed to 
result in the cessation of exploitation and the assumption by the worker of a new mantle 
of responsible ownership.  While the arguments themselves are anti-capitalistic, the 
underlying logic is nevertheless a precursor of the Economic Rationalist discourse. 
In the case of syndicalism, which often used the Marxist concept of surplus value, 
recognizing the workers’ property right to a share in the surplus value generated by a 
factory was supposed to make this worker less vulnerable to exploitation even in the 
outwardly-unchanged context of factory labor.  The worker would be doing the same 
thing, but instead of going to build the factory owner a new mansion in Capri, the surplus 
value would be going to provide every worker with a decent house, milk for his children, 
a ticket to the theater for him and his wife, and so on.  Once again, anyone wishing to hire 
labor would be forced to yield the surplus value – an integral part of the labor’s costs -- to 
the worker, instead of pocketing it as Marx claimed the capitalist does.  In modern terms, 
Marx’s capitalist would be taking advantage of a positive externality and a syndicalist 
organization of ownership would mean making this capitalist pay the full costs of the 
service rendered. 
In the modern era, syndicalism has been widely used in such socialist nations as 
Yugoslavia, which had many factories that were owned and managed by the workers.  
While Yugoslavia never became any more of a worker’s paradise than the Soviet Union 
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did, it did provide the workers with a slightly higher standard of living, and Yugoslavian 
manufactured goods were generally considered highly desirable in the Warsaw pact 
nations, demonstrating that Yugoslavian consumer-goods industry never reached the 
stage of total quality deterioration which characterized the consumer goods industry of 
the Soviet Union85.  Even after the collapse of Yugoslavia, syndicalist enterprise 
remained a very successful developmental tool in the Third World, frequently emerging 
in regions that desired the benefit of foreign investment, but were too economically or 
infrastructurally backward to make themselves attractive to foreign capital86.  For 
example, until the great burst of economic growth in Thailand of the 1980’s, and 
afterwards in regions of Thailand that the growth did not reach, peasants often clubbed 
together to put together a textile factory, or a cash crop plantation87.  After the “market 
socialism” reforms of 1986, similar phenomena could be found in Laos, whose farmers 
achieved a certain measure of success, and even investment capital, marketing 
ecologically sustainable coffee to the First World88.  Unsurprisingly since these 
cooperatives operate against an ecological background they cannot wall off with city 
walls, their environmental practices have often been superior to those of large 
corporations coming in from around the globe to make a quick profit. 
Distributism has also been reinvented in the form of micro-enterprise, and 
microfinance, which aims to reduce poverty “from the bottom up” by building an up an 
economically productive class of small proprietors in the place of former inert mass of 
peasantry.  Nations that have place the highest emphasis on building a “society of 
ownership”, such as Senegal, Mozambique, and Bangladesh, are often touted as success 
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stories in the unending struggle of Third World nations to make a dent in the poverty of 
their citizens.  The growth of microenterprise in these once-impoverished nations, 
devastated by decades of war (Mozambique), decades of socialist mismanagement 
(Senegal), and decades of crushing, unsupportable overpopulation (Bangladesh) has 
brought about steady and rapid economic growth and a great improvement in cultural 
attitude towards work and business.  Government revenues and attractiveness to 
corporate investors have raised enough in all three nations to finance much-needed 
improvements in everything from public health to infrastructure89.  As poverty is being 
alleviated, people in these poor nations finally have a choice of occupations that do not 
destroy the environment the way their attempts at subsistence farming perforce did in a 
land long since pushed beyond its carrying capacity. 
Finally, even in developed nations such as the United States, the basic model of 
large, vertically integrated corporations tightly regulated from the central office has given 
way to an explosion in the number of small businesses and independent subcontractors to 
whom the major corporations farm out almost all non-essential tasks, naturally 
multiplying the number of niches in the nation’s economic “ecology”.  More companies 
than ever offer their stock for purchase by the public, and a greater percentage of the 
public than ever before owns stock in publicly traded companies.  Even towards their 
internal offices, the corporations have adopted a new culture of governance, emphasizing 
creative and independent thought by regional office leaders, so that sometimes a 
corporation evolves into something resembling a network of closely cooperating 
businesses rather than the old organizational pyramid with a narrow apex.  The overall 
trend in global capitalism, both in the First World and the Third, appears to be towards an 
increasing emphasis on democratization and a wider distribution of ownership assets – 
combined with increasing humanization of the market and greater emphasis on 
independent, nonconformist thinking.  Not coincidentally, the period also sees increasing 
concern of companies with their environment-related public image, and active attempts 
by corporations to operate in an ecologically sustainable manner. 
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Coase’s Theorem: It’s all In the Transaction Costs 
The next major advance came when the recognition that social costs can be 
negotiated away through the privatization of the formerly unattended resource entered 
mainstream capitalist reasoning.  This was largely due to the work of Ronald Coase, a 
British economist who studied the assignment of broadcasting frequencies to radio 
stations.  Obviously it would hardly be a good idea to have two stations trying to 
broadcast on the same frequency, but a given frequency would be more desirable to some 
broadcasters than to others.  Coase was taken with the question: is it better to assign 
frequencies to broadcasters or to allow them to bargain it out between themselves which 
of them was to get which frequency?  This led him to the larger nature of the question: 
under what circumstances would an externality (examples he gives are smoke from a 
factory or a polluted stream) be better controlled by government action, and under what 
circumstances can the market internalize the externality through bargaining between the 
aggrieved and aggrieving parties?  
The answer, Coase found, (and the panel which decides on the Nobel Prize for 
economics agreed with him in 1991) lies in transaction costs.  Essentially these are the 
costs of finding something you want and time spent bargaining, so that when the 
economic agent, such as a firm, actually pays for the good or service it purchases, the real 
cost of the item to the buyer is in fact larger than the price that the seller receives for it.  
Obviously the market economy of the past several centuries has been evolving to 
minimize these as far as possible, and such institutions as the bank, the insurance 
company, the stock market, the modern firm, and the modern practice of venture 
capitalism are all, whatever else they might be, ways of minimizing the costs of bringing 
together supply and demand. 
Coase found that in a hypothetical situation where transaction costs are zero, it 
does not matter what situation the various interested parties start out in – provided 
property rights are enforced strictly, people will negotiate an equitable solution.  For 
example, in the case of radio stations, if two stations interfere with each other’s 
broadcasting, the one that stands to gain the greatest profit from having uninterrupted 
access to the frequency band will pay off the other station and the two would strike a 
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mutually advantageous deal.  In the real world, where transaction costs do exist, an 
outside agent (the government) might have to allocate property to the party assigning it 
the greatest utility.  But, as Hayek has demonstrated, governments are fallible, and it is 
usually better to bring the transaction costs down and allow the parties to negotiate a deal 
that both consider fair – among other things, this approach is the most likely to minimize 
resistance from whichever party would not get the coveted position or resource. 
Coase’s Theorem, as it came to be known, provided a ready solution to the 
criticism faced by advocates of the free market with regard to “market failures”, such as 
pollution.  The libertarian movement in the United States, which became the Libertarian 
Party in 1971, could now successfully argue that these “market failures” are nothing more 
than the result of transaction costs imposed on the free flow of money by government 
regulation.  Make it easier for free economic agents to do business, argue libertarians, and 
transaction costs will go down to a point where such matters can be settled through 
negotiation between the entities involved.  At this point the critics usually ask: how can 
you settle a case where, absent a government-imposed restraint, it is clearly profitable for 
a firm to pollute than to go clean, using nothing more than economic negotiation.  The 
libertarian answer is provided in the two examples below. 
 
The Libertarian Case: Property Rights plus Low Transaction Costs Equal 
Internalized Social Costs  
First, of all, argue libertarians, since government (as proven by Hayek) never has 
a full picture of the facts, any intervention it undertakes itself carries a social cost.  
Moreover, by establishing a precedence of reliance on government intervention, 
government action opens the door for further such social costs, up to the point where 
these social costs of government action costs society far more than the original cost of 
pollution.  Hence the need, argue the libertarians, for individuals themselves to come 
together and impose restraints on the polluter by using their power to influence the 
polluter’s profit margin.  
Suppose we have a case such as that mentioned by Coase himself in his article 
“The Problem of Social Cost”.  Suppose a factory is dumping waste in a stream.  If the 
stream had been on private property, it’s obvious that the owner can just take the factory 
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to court for damage to the property – including the aesthetic damage to the stream, the 
death of the fish and water birds, the damage to soil and groundwater, the threat to the 
health of the owner’s family and pets, and so on.  So we see that the externality only 
arises when the stream does not belong to anyone in particular. 
If everyone who lived near that stream was forced to determine exactly how much 
of their health decline had been due to the pollution in this particular stream, and then to 
negotiate with the polluter for compensation on a separate basis, the transaction costs of 
doing so would have been much too great to curb the social cost without the government 
stepping in.  Essentially the would-be negotiators would have to undertake a precise 
statistical evaluation of their lives while exposed to the pollutant, then the arduous 
process of arguing in court that their arguments blaming the polluter for their health 
problems are in fact valid. 
But if the different people who live along the banks of the stream find some way 
to aggregate their claims on the purity of the water, through a process similar to the 
formation of homeowners’ associations in a suburban development, the transaction costs 
of their claim on the polluting factory can decrease.  Now it is only one entity, acting 
through its elected representatives and supported by resources that the members produce 
by clubbing together (so that each can easily afford the costs) that collects evidence, 
makes the assessment, and argues in court that a violation of its members’ property rights 
took place.  Any costs won by the association would be distributed only among its 
membership, thus eliminating the problem of free riders.  Just as a homeowner’s 
association has the legal power to prevent a new homeowner from rebuilding a nearby 
house into the shape of a purple giraffe due to the damage that such a building would 
cause to real estate values of their own houses, so an association of citizens living next to 
a particular stream, river, forest or mountain can force a polluter to pay the social cost 
that the pollution of this locale inflicts on the members of the association. 
Once the transaction costs of coming together, collecting the evidence and paying 
for an expert analysis are out of the way, it can often be easy for the association to 
demonstrate that a polluted stream is, in fact, bad for the residents.  Their property rights, 
in the form of the monetary valuation of the health and comfort that they lost, were taken 
from them without compensation.  Even the real estate value of their property in the more 
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conventional sense has been impacted, since a house next to a polluted stream is worth 
less than a house next to a pristine one.  The same evidence could very well demonstrate 
that no, the property owners’ own septic tanks could not have been responsible for this 
level of pollution, thus pinning the responsibility on the factory. 
The situation would be analogous to someone opening a city dump and leaching 
toxic material into the soil of a backyard – in the legal sense, the stream can be 
considered the backyard of everyone living in the neighborhood, with every property 
owner nearby holding a share, just like a stockholder owns a quantifiable share in the 
success or failure of a large corporation even though he or she does not own the 
corporation in a more conventional sense.  A claims court could very well recognize the 
merits of this argument, forcing the polluting factory to pay the cost of their activity, and 
thus internalizing the externality90. 
The court won’t shut the factory down, but it could well force it to pay Streamside 
Inc. the costs that were hitherto absorbed by the externality, making pollution less 
profitable.  Alternatively, the factory can negotiate with Streamside on its own, agreeing 
with the chosen representatives of every property owner in the region on a way it can stop 
polluting the stream without its bottom line suffering excessively.  Negotiations might 
help the factory avoid the costs of a court case, and perhaps get off with a cheaper price 
tag.  For example, the factory can stop all discharges in the stream if the local residents 
agree to allow the construction of an incinerator where the waste can be burned and the 
fumes sequestered away.  The citizens might not have permitted the construction 
otherwise, but knowing that the factory will have to pay the cost of treating any health 
problems it causes would make them more likely to agree to compromises where they 
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 Dryzek (1997) writes on page 106  “The legal system would come to play an extended role in 
any such regime.”  This is not necessarily true for the time after this privatization of streams was 
demonstrated as a workable system.  The associations of property-owners might prefer to negotiate rather 
than grapple with the other side’s lawyers, and the factory might believe that it could get away with a 
smaller price for its activities if it settled with the property-owners’ association.  The threat of legal action 
would have to be implicit in these negotiations, but it is quite possible that the number of actual lawsuits 
would decrease once the courts have established that the factory can be successfully sued. 
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would otherwise feel are merely covers for a new attempt by the polluter to get a free ride 
at their expense. 
As a side issue, the possibility of negotiated end to pollution creates the problem 
of free riders once again, since if the factory stops polluting the stream altogether, it 
could benefit those property owners who took no part in the negotiations or collecting the 
evidence.  There are different ways for the association to deal with that – the most 
obvious one being a recruiting drive that gives joiners other benefits, such as the 
association subsidizing a fraction of their house mortgages, or, in a poor neighborhood, 
starting a club to help residents with house repair, holding a raffle, or selling tickets to a 
social event.  If the main aim of the association is to protect the pond’s fishing stocks, it 
might attempt to woo reluctant joiners by raffling off some fishing tackle, or perhaps a 
powerboat.  As long as the potential payoff to the association is significantly greater than 
the costs of wooing free riders, but the payoff to potential free riders, though small, is 
immediate and evident, it is possible for the association to keep the free rider problem 
down to a tolerable level.  In the end, if the transaction costs are made low enough by 
developments in science and the legal system, a few free riders will not even make any 
difference: if even a few local property-owners come together and win a court case, the 
firm will have to deal with the risk that the rest of them, attracted by the payout, will seek 
their own, so that the risk alone will force the polluter to seek an alternative. 
The transaction costs of every individual citizen seeking his or her own damages 
are reduced by the fact that only one entity negotiates with the polluter now, or, if 
necessary, refers the matter to a civil claims court.  The process is also simplified by the 
lack of any need to assess the specific damage done by the pollution to the particular 
interests of every resident.  Instead, the association can hire an insurance company to 
perform a risk assessment for a hypothetical resident living next to a clean and then next 
to a polluted stream, and then multiply the assessment by the number of association 
members.  The resulting number can then be used as a starting point in the negotiations. 
Notice that the only government authority necessary for the process is the court 
 Electric Power and Social Attitudes - 85 - Naiman, Bollinger, Waldron 
 
system91.  Otherwise, the problem is resolved through pure legal or financial negotiations, 
with every member, in effect, enforcing his or her property rights to a fraction of the 
stream that he or she uses personally, as well as to personal values, like health and 
aesthetic pleasure, that the pollution of the stream would impact. 
The fun begins when the various interest groups will realize that a particular 
property owner’s interest in the stream can be bought out, just as a stock owner may be 
persuaded to yield his or her share in the company to a different firm attempting a 
takeover.  In some cases, the polluting company will seek to do so, in others, a 
conservation group interested in stopping the polluting company from manipulating the 
property-owners.  In some cases, the situation may evolve into a sort of pollution-credits 
trading applied to stream water, with the conservationists and the environmentalists 
attempting to bid the costs of buying property-owners out up past the point where the 
polluter is interested in doing so.  In others, the polluting power plant might find the river 
or stream to be worth too much as an investment to ruin it with polluting discharges – 
after all, provided their actions do not ruin the value of the water for their neighbors, as 
long as proper safeguards against thermal pollution are in place, the presence of a nearby 
factory using water for cooling purposes increases the value of an individual share in the 
stream, and is thus in a stakeholder’s best interest. 
In the second example we have air pollution – represented by the typical coal-
fired Midwestern power plant.  Because the wind in the Midwest is usually blowing 
towards New England, the power plant can use the wind direction as a positive 
externality, saving itself the cost of dealing with the heavy metal particles and radioactive 
isotopes rising from its smokestacks.  If the emissions settled over the state the plant’s 
home state instead, the plant owners might have had to deal with public outrage from the 
residents, and spend money upgrading its outdated equipment, sequestering the 
particulates with expensive technology, or spending a lot of money on legal fees.  Instead 
it is the residents of New England that get to suffer. 
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 Murray N. Rothbard (1982, 1997, 2002) Law, Property Rights, and Air Pollution, available 
online from www.mises.org  
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Obviously this is an externality harder to correct than a polluted stream, since by 
the time the pollution gets to New England states it is already mixed with pollution from 
many other sources, such as car exhaust, pollution from many other different power 
plants, factories, and so forth.  As Dryzek puts it “Am I coughing because of the methane 
from a nearby landfill, heavy metals from a toxic waste incinerator, smog coming from 
car exhaust…?  Or is it because my neighbor is burning her garbage?”92  
Of course a libertarian theorist would answer Dryzek that it does not matter why 
he is coughing on any particular day – in every big city, insurance companies employ 
thousands of expert mathematicians using tried and true methods of estimating risk to 
determine the exact contribution of each particular factor to the illnesses bedeviling the 
residence of every particular region.  The percentage-wise contribution of the landfill, the 
incinerator, the car exhaust, and all other factors combining to erode Dryzek’s health 
would swiftly be determined by any insurance firm that knew its business, and published 
in a report Dryzek could obtain and peruse to his satisfaction.  A lot of such calculations 
are regularly done every day for insurance purposes, so that the calculations are already 
paid for by the premiums of insurance buyers, with no need to commission them 
specifically for the event.  In those cases where there is such a need, we, and Dryzek, 
must remember that the risk need not even be stated with a very great degree of precision.  
For an insurance policy the risk needs to be evaluated as exactly as possible so that the 
company will know how likely it is to have to pay.  But for a proof that a factory does in 
fact contribute to health problems in a particular state, an estimate will do. 
The levels of sulfur dioxide in the air could be estimated mathematically, and so 
could their part in the harm our hypothetical Dryzek has suffered.  And since the amount 
of sulfur dioxide emitted by each Midwestern coal-fired power plant, and the pattern of 
its scattering by the winds, would be known, the fraction of sulfur dioxide in the air 
above Dryzek’s head (if Dryzek lived in New England rather than Australia) which is due 
to the emissions from this particular plant and no other could also be estimated, even if it 
was not known precisely.  So could the contribution of radioactive particles from the 
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power plant’s emissions to Dryzek’s increased risk of cancer, the contribution of the 
plant’s mercury emissions to the increased risk of disease striking Dryzek’s nervous 
system, and the harm done by all of these factors to the nonhuman elements of the New 
England ecology.  Estimates and statistical studies exist that originate from hospitals, 
public health studies, various environmentalist advocacy groups, Earth Science 
departments at universities and numerous other sources, measuring the likely increase in 
health risk an added unit of coal-fired fumes pose to a baby, a grown man, a grown 
woman, a child, a teenager, a non-smoker, a smoker, a diabetic, and so forth.  Very often 
these estimates disagree on the precise probability of illness, but no reputable study 
claims that fumes from coal-fired plants do not increase the risk of disease by some 
amount.  Since we are discussing claims made by organizations rather than by private 
citizens, it makes estimation of risks easier as well – the idiosyncrasies that make 
calculating the risk to a specific person so difficult can be averaged away when 
estimating the risk to a group. 
Just because it is impossible to prove that a particular particle that made 
somebody sick originated from a certain power plant three states upwind and two blocks 
to the left, does not mean that the fraction of this plant’s contribution to the probability of 
an average inhabitant of, say, a large city like Worcester, getting sick cannot be known 
with some degree of verifiability93.  The less precise an estimate becomes, the more 
certain it is likely to be – it is difficult to prove that situation X increases the group 
members’ risk of illness by 37%, but much easier to prove that the risk is increased by 
between 5% and 45%, and even the lowest estimate is usually considered unacceptable 
by people who have to live with that risk from year to year!  Even if the estimate is only 
exact to within, say, 50% -- as long as it could be conclusively shown that the risk of 
illness has gone up due to the factory’s activity, the jury is unlikely to find itself 
sympathizing with the polluter, and if it errs, will probably err on the side of too great a 
punishment than too small (think of the penalties with which a jury hit McDonalds for, in 
                                               
 
93
 For details, refer to: www.actuary.net  
 Electric Power and Social Attitudes - 88 - Naiman, Bollinger, Waldron 
 
effect, making its coffee hot enough to taste good94.)  Even if the polluter wins, it would 
little appreciate having the amount of heavy metal particles and radioactive isotopes it 
emits paraded in court – both for PR reasons, and because it would increase the risk that 
some other claimant, who has done his or her homework better, could hit the polluter 
with a better-managed claim and win this time. 
Obviously each particular risk related to human health would then be reflected in 
the premiums Dryzek would have to pay to obtain insurance coverage.  So would his 
next-door neighbor.  Since the actions of the polluter, no matter what state the polluter is 
in, are obviously costing New England residents in concrete and delineable ways that can 
readily be expressed as monetary values, a civil suit brought against this polluter can 
stand a good chance of succeeding.  Such a suit could demonstrate the polluting power 
plant’s share in the damage done to the plaintiffs in the form of money the plaintiffs 
spend on raised insurance premiums, on doctors, the monetary losses that their businesses 
suffer due to loss of worker productivity, and many other factors.  Since the chance of the 
lawsuit succeeding is nonzero, and since one day the power plant would need to install 
modern equipment in any event, the plant management may very well prefer to negotiate 
and deal with its emissions problem voluntarily. 
It could be argued that there have been numerous lawsuits against polluters so far, 
and they have not yet succeeded in getting them to stop.  On the other hand, those suits 
mostly intended to obtain a cease-and-desist order from courts, which resulted in the 
years of legal wrangling described in the section on Administrative Rationalism.  An 
attempt to win back the costs of insurance premiums is more likely to succeed; in 
addition, as the sciences of epidemiology and risk assessment develop, the estimation of 
risk due to emissions would be made increasingly easier.  Moreover, a culture more 
devoted to libertarian principles than our own would change the legal code to make 
businesses more responsible for their impact on individual lives, as a quid pro quo for the 
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 www.wikipedia.org, article for “Stella Liebeck”.  And yes, she was burned very badly, and yes, 
McDonald treated her very shabbily before she sued, but anybody in the world should know that hot coffee 
can burn!  McDonalds was not punished for making hot coffee per se, but for being the stereotypical evil 
corporation in the jury’s minds. 
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increased freedom they will enjoy from regulation – thus a claim against a polluter would 
be easier to pursue in a libertarian context than in a regulatory one. 
It would naturally be harder to estimate the degree to which damage to New 
England’s natural ecosystems could be valued as monetary losses of private citizens, but 
obviously New England states spend a certain fraction of their GDP on safeguarding the 
ecosystem – measures that are approved by the voting public.  Public surveys indicate 
that most New Englanders would support the spending of still more money if it was 
necessary to preserve the living ecology of their home states.  Thus it would be possible 
to assign ecological damage a monetary value measured by how much money New 
Englanders would on average be willing to spend to undo it.  After all, any harm to the 
natural world, no matter if it is done to a wetland, a lake, a forest, a backyard, or a field, 
would still lower the area’s real estate value, thus constituting damage to the property 
rights of either individual New Englanders, or of the various state governments, 
depending on whether the land was public or private. 
So we have multiple potential claimants to the polluter’s money.  It could be an 
association of New England citizens frustrated by their high insurance premiums – or of 
New England businesses frustrated by the high costs of the insurance premiums they 
must pay in providing their employees with an insurance plan.  Perhaps it could be the 
insurance company itself, frustrated at being forced to pay money to cover the treatment 
of more sick people – even if most of these costs are passed down to customers as 
premium rates, given the insidious nature of pollution, some of these people would get 
sick without their added risk being reflected in the rates they pay, and it could be quite 
possible to establish this fact upon closer investigation and then estimate the likelihood of 
such an event.  Perhaps it could be an association of New England taxpayers frustrated at 
the tax dollars they spend on environmental preservation going to waste because 
pollution is being dumped on them from, outside state borders. 
If any or all of these entities bring a lawsuit against the Midwestern power plant 
and cited the various estimates of health and environmental damages the plant’s action 
was causing, it is quite possible that a court could rule in their favor.  In any event such 
an outcome is possible provided the tort law system was reformed along more rational 
lines, helping people recover what really is due them, as opposed to the current tort 
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system, which encourages frivolous lawsuits that only serve to drive up costs of 
necessary services. 
From these two examples, we can see that as long as the law shows a clear 
support for property rights, and as long as the transaction costs of seeking justice are kept 
law by the aggregation of private complaints into an association seeking to recoup the 
damages of all its members together, it is possible to make companies pay for the social 
costs of their activities without resorting to government-imposed prohibitions.  Even 
when the social costs are spread out between many victims, some of them not even 
human, as in the case of water or air pollution, it is still possible to quantify them and 
aggregate the damage done to individuals into claims made by organizations.  Thus the 
polluting firms will find themselves unable to escape the costs their activity imposes on 
others.   
 
The Market Response to Internalization 
Since businesses will hardly wish to draw back from their current levels of 
activity simply because they will now have to pay a fair price for the costs that were 
previously written off due to an externality, in effect this hypothetical new interpretation 
of property rights is likely to result in two parallel outcomes.  The first of these would be 
an extremely intense infusion of investment capital into all R&D efforts and proposals 
with any hope of finding technologies that would be able to minimize industry-related 
damage to public health and the natural world.  Since the costs of producing pollution 
would now have to be paid, the market for reducing pollution would expand in 
proportion, transforming the investment priorities of banks and venture capital firms. 
The second outcome is likely to be a greatly reduced anti-environmentalist 
agitation on the part of businesses.  It will be much harder for the business lobby to 
protest against having to consider the environmental consequences of their actions: while 
a mandate from a regulatory agency, or from Congress, would be resisted as an 
unwelcome distortion of the catallaxy process, here the restriction upon it would be 
caused by the market laws themselves.  A company under this hypothetical system, 
which is based solely on an improved enforcement of property claims akin to that already 
practiced within any society that recognizes property rights to capital stock, would 
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always be free not to care for the environment -- as long as it finds it preferable to pay the 
real cost of its activities. 
Thus environmental measures will be just sound business rather than a forced 
imposition: the company will classify them under “cutting costs”, together with all other 
efficiency improvements such as fuel efficiencies and payroll efficiencies.  Of course in a 
libertarian environment industry giants will be forced to pay more attention to all forms 
of efficiency than they did before, since they would no longer be able to depend upon the 
“corporate welfare” policies which routinely allowed them to get away with practices that 
would have bankrupted a smaller company.  This will change the general climate of 
investment in general, with Big Business becoming a great deal more receptive to 
investing in innovative proposals in order to improve efficiency, thus creating markets for 
such technologies that would allow smaller businesses to do likewise. 
Even though the various boards of directors will hardly be thrilled with the 
percentage of their yearly operating budget that they must now assign to paying costs the 
market did not reflect at all only a year ago, these boards would hardly find a sympathetic 
audience if they do complain.  The enforcement of property rights is an absolutely 
necessary part of a free-market economy, and whatever the objections of any given firm, 
Hayek and his heirs have proven that resources are always allocated more efficiently 
when the market reflects more real-world information rather than less.  So this new way 
of internalizing externalities, through civil claims lawsuits and business negotiations 
rather than through government mandates, would enjoy a far greater legitimacy with 
advocates of economic liberty than the old Administrative Rationalist approach of direct 
regulation.  That is not to say industry giants will like it at first, but they will be forced to 
accept them as a reverse side of the same rights to property that recognizes their rights to 
enforce a claim against someone who owes them money.  As years go by they will find 
the new rules a fair price to pay in exchange for the removal of our current regulatory 
network. 
In fact, according to Hayek’s concept of intertemporal equilibrium, the very 
overproduction of items favored by the old externalities, such as steel and electric power, 
will make it easier for any given firm to rebuild its activities to be clean and non-
polluting – after all, the previous overproduction has made the overproduced goods and 
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services, and all other goods and services that depend on these overproduced goods and 
services for their own production, much cheaper than they would otherwise be.  At the 
same time, pollution made the people more interested in using their new wealth to buy 
quality of life, including cleaner air and water.  Thus gives any firm seeking to develop 
nonpolluting and yet economically competitive methods of production a greater pool of 
surplus capital to draw on, and a larger number of customers willing to tide it over during 
transition by paying a little extra for a non-polluting version of the product.  Thus the 
very disequilibrium that resulted in an overproduction of polluting goods and services 
will aid in the replacement of the old methods for producing them with new, less 
wasteful, and non-polluting ones, which give the firms using them an actual competitive 
advantage which, once the transition is completed, more than offsets the advantage 
provided by the old externality. 
Notice that after internalization, it will always be possible for businesses to try to 
redistribute the financial burden of these newly internalized costs through negotiations 
among themselves – in fact some of them, like the coal-fired power plants mentioned 
above, will just about have to do so.  Power plants have immense refurbishment costs, 
and under new market conditions these old coal-fired plants would need to raise vast 
volumes of liquid capital just to replace their old coal-fired turbines with new gas-fired 
ones. Forcing these power plants to pay off the social cost of their past activity just as 
they need all the money they can raise to prevent the incurrence of more social costs in 
the future would only slow down the pace of change.  From the needs of mired 
establishments like these power plants, a ready market for pollution credit would develop 
-- something that a forward-looking bank could take ready advantage of. 
Suppose a firm that manages to avoid most of these newly internalized costs due 
to its greener operational practices.  Using either the money it saves through its greater 
environmental efficiency, or the money a bank to whom it demonstrates such efficiency 
can readily supply it, the green firm can sell a fraction of its green status to dirtier 
businesses, in effect agreeing to bear some of their restructuring costs today in exchange 
for compensation tomorrow, when the dirty firm is itself made clean through 
restructuring and re-equipment.  After the dirtier firm has refurbished itself with more 
modern technologies, and made enough money, it pays off the green firm, and the green 
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firm can pay off the bank that made the original loan. 
In a situation like this, the green firm acts in a way that closely parallels a 
technology licensing process.  In one case, intellectual capital is given away in exchange 
for money in the future, with the IP owner careful to select a firm that can use the 
technology best and provide the greatest rate of return on its license.  In the second, the 
firm with the greener status makes financial capital available in exchange for the dirtier 
firm changing its ways, multiplying the loan, and providing the green firm with a return 
on its investment.  The bank which supplies the capital could also make the loan directly 
to the dirty firm, though this would be riskier, since having a firm with established green 
credentials act as a go-between would guarantee that at least the greener firm would be 
on a more stable financial footing during the transition period, and is therefore less likely 
to lose the bank’s money.  In addition, by having experience with pollution-reducing 
techniques and technologies, the greener firm could make a better judgment as to which 
firm is likely to do the best job of reinventing itself, and is thus most likely to pay the 
money back. 
The arrangement can be formalized through the financial institution of a 
“pollution futures market”, where green firms can extend “pollution credits” to 
businesses that must bear the new costs but need time to restructure before they can stop 
incurring more of them.  The greener the firm, the more pollution credits it will be able to 
issue, because during the market re-adjustment following internalization of the social 
cost, suppliers of capital would give it the highest credit rating.  Checking the green 
claims of different firms in order to determine their credit rating would also be an 
effective way for the bank to verify that a firm is as green as it claims to be, preventing 
false claims (and of course the various stakeholder groups ready to make tort claims 
against polluters will be keeping their own records).  The total amount of pollution 
credits circulating in the economy would thus be determined by two factors – the degree 
to which the new tort law system is able to bring the social costs of pollution back to the 
firm, and the degree to which firms manage to devise new and ingenious ways to reduce 
their own emissions, attracting credit thereby. 
A third factor would be the priorities of the pollution victims: they might prefer 
constraints on their local factories to minimize pollution, or the removal of such 
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constraints to maximize job creation.  A town that depends on industry to provide the 
population with jobs may prefer not to make tort claims on the major employers for fear 
of driving the factories away – and while it might be delighted to make such claims on a 
factory located in a town some miles upwind, if the town chooses to tolerate its local 
polluters it is unlikely to obtain a favorable decision in an attempt to sue polluters located 
elsewhere!  On the other hand, a city like Seattle is unlikely to permit high levels of 
pollution in its territory for any price at all – it is already a thriving hub of many lucrative 
industries, such as aeronautic engineering, software and electronics.  It is wealthy enough 
to ignore the potential jobs to be gained from becoming more pollution-tolerant, and so 
any business seeking to take advantage of operating in Seattle will have to maintain 
standards of cleanliness and efficiency higher than the citizens of, say, Mississippi are 
likely to demand of a business seeking to operate there. 
Thus every region would have to choose: would its citizens prefer the jobs a 
polluting factory brings along with it, or the clean air that they would obtain when their 
tort claims may potentially force it to relocate?  As a region solves its problems with 
unemployment, it is likely to set higher standards of emissions it is willing to tolerate, 
and the factories that have been attracted there in the meantime would have to face the 
costs of their actions.  This way, the free market would always provide the people what 
they demand most.  Of course even in a city willing to tolerate pollution, a factory might 
still be subject to claims from cities downwind receiving pollution from it without even 
the compensation of jobs for their trouble.  This would prevent a factory’s management 
from believing that it can evade the social cost it incurs by relocating – relocation will 
certainly help, but never completely abolish the price of producing toxic chemicals. 
As factories across the nation retool themselves to be less polluting, the market 
for manufacturing pollution-control technology will receive a powerful growth signal that 
would create jobs even as the polluting factory’s idleness during the retooling process 
may temporarily destroy them.  In this manner, the economy will be able to afford the 
introduction of non-polluting technologies, and the populist backlash that so often 
accompanies environmentalist regulation will not manifest itself when the change is 
mandated by the market forces themselves. 
This disparity between the needs of different markets could create different forms 
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of pollution credits, some more valuable, backed by the issuing firm all across the nation, 
or even the globe, with no questions asked regarding the buying firm’s plans for 
restructuring, and some less valuable, backed only as long as the given firm operates in a 
particular area, or adheres to a pre-approved restructuring plan.  This multiplicity of 
options in buying pollution futures will provide an even better amortization of the  
The cost of paying a fair price for the environmental damage that a firm is 
currently inflicting will serve as an unofficial upper limit on the cost of the “pollution 
credit” which the green firm sells to the dirty one – a firm can pay the cost of its 
environmentally harmful activity today, or it can have the greener firm cover part or all of 
the social cost it needs to repay, and assume a debt to that greener firm to be paid in the 
future, when the dirty firm has already restructured its operations and being able to 
pollute is no longer a matter of solvency or bankruptcy to it.  This sort of trading will 
allow the current polluters to reorganize their methods of production without imposing 
burdens of price that would prevent them from finding the capital needed to do so.  At the 
same time, since the cost of polluting would still need to be paid, the trading would also 
provide every incentive for the polluter to re-organize fast! 
Or, on the contrary, a firm that is relatively green today, but anticipates a need to 
pollute more in the future due to some project it will need to undertake, can acquire 
promises from greener but currently needier firms to cover its environmental-damage 
costs in the future in exchange for money in the present.  In effect, by selling the financial 
ability to afford polluting, firms involved in such a market will shift the costs of 
internalizing environmental damage to those among them who could afford it best – and 
since the costs will still be paid for, these pollution futures markets will drive every firm 
involved to implement greener technologies as fast as it can. 
If these “polluting credits” are to be considered as quanta, with each credit giving 
a company the right to pollute a certain amount -- for example, a single credit could 
entitle the holder to emit an amount of pollutants equivalent to $100 worth of social cost, 
as incurred by an average coal-burning power plant -- it can be possible for a firm which 
emits less than that average to get more “pollution mileage” out of the credit it purchases 
than a firm whose actual emissions are greater.  This would naturally be an incentive for 
the would-be buyer of pollution credits to improve its ways, as well as the would-be 
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seller.  In addition, the environmentalist groups themselves can always bid for pollution 
futures offered for sale by a clean firm, removing them from the market.  Since any clean 
firm can only afford to offer a finite amount of pollution credits on the market (after all, 
each credit represents an obligation on the part of the creditor to pay the social costs of 
this amount of emissions if the credit is used within a limited period of time), this action 
by the environmentalist would drive the price of a single pollution credit upwards, 
resulting in greater economic pressure on every firm in the market to cut its total output 
of polluting emissions95. 
 
More Solutions through Clear Property Rights  
These sorts of market-based approaches can bring an effective and satisfactory 
resolution to any number of problems that otherwise result in years of futile debate.  For 
example, Dryzek cites a proposition to privatize the world’s population of whales, with 
buyers able to track their new purchases by using radio tags to keep track of each 
individual.  This way, a whaler will know that to kill another whale, he or she will either 
have to pay the whale’s cost, or lose the opportunity cost of selling a whale to someone 
else.  Under such a system all whalers will have to pay careful attention to the size and 
health of the whale stocks they do own.  If conservationists and whale-rights groups enter 
the market and bid up the costs of a whale beyond what the demand for whale meat, 
baleen and blubber can justify, some whales will be kept completely out of danger of ever 
being harpooned. 
Similar projects may succeed with stocks of schooling fish, since a school of fish 
can be tracked by radar, radio tags, and harmless reporter chemicals, enabling the 
school’s owner to keep track of its size, health, and ability to support harvesting.  Or a 
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system of tradable quotas may be instituted, with the fisher fleets of a given region where 
fish are growing scarce able to buy fishing quotas from regions where fish are plentiful 
while the fishing stocks in their former region of activity recover their numbers96. 
Endangered species can be privatized by giving zoos, conservation groups, 
philanthropists, and other interested parties property rights in the genetic markers 
identifying a particular gene pool.  Ecosystems such as the Amazon rain forests can be 
privatized by selling research firms the right to harvest the ecosystem for suitable genes 
that can be patented and used for pharmaceutical research – or to developers for the right 
to harvest them sustainably for wild-growing medicinal plants.  Since it has been 
calculated that sustainably harvesting a rainforest this way would bring in six times the 
amount of profit than clear-cutting it and using the land to pasture cattle97, those who buy 
rain forests for this purpose would easily be able to outbid the ranchers, since the 
sustainable harvesters’ backers would be willing to advance them more money. 
The progress of modern biology and biotechnology makes it much easier to 
privatize endangered species effectively.  For example, an owner of a forest inhabited by 
a rare moth, or an empty plot which serves as the habitat for an endangered beetle, would 
once have found it more profitable to sell the timber or build a parking lot under most 
circumstances.  But today, biotechnology makes a rare bird, insect, fungus or snail into a 
potential treasure trove of patentable genes.  If the gene is similar to that already used by 
some other firm, it is a way to get around the other firm’s patent; if it is different, it could 
have potential applications that the gene’s discoverer might not even guess at when he or 
she is isolating it. 
Any habitat that harbors such potentially useful species could potentially be 
protected to keep wild-type examples of the species around as a source of patentable 
genetic variation – something that a lab, which deals in specimens of very limited 
baseline genetic diversity, would find it difficult to provide.  Thus simply by existing, a 
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plant, animal, or even a microbe with patentable genes might extend its value over the 
ecosystem that supports it, preventing its destruction as well as its own.  In any event, in a 
modern economy, a rare bird, beetle, or flower is potentially a better money-maker than 
timber or a mini-mall, and as more biotechnology firms open across the nation, the 
potential worth of ecological habitats as habitats keeps on increasing. 
Firms that produce consumer items that may not actually generate pollutants in 
their manufacture, but are themselves harmful to public health when used, such as 
asbestos and tobacco, can be forced to set aside a portion of their profits to sponsor 
cancer research or addiction treatment, not by any government decree, but just from a 
voluntary effort to offset the now-internalized social costs of the hazardous materials that 
they produce.  It is possible that firms that agree to sponsor some research center to deal 
with the problem their product causes will get off easier, in terms of money spent, than 
firms that simply agree to pay the costs to the health of the aggrieved parties.  It is also 
possible that the aggrieved parties may prefer the firm’s voluntary sponsorship of the 
search for a solution to a legal battle. 
Even in cases where it is clearly demonstrated that a firm does not impose the 
effects of its product on any party not willing to buy it (and thereby absolve the firm of 
any effects it might have) a firm that sell harmful products like asbestos would likely 
support the a plan that has it sponsor a research center into asbestos’ health effects, 
simply to avoid being labeled as a merchant of death – in a modern world, as the amount 
of available consumer choices keeps on increasing, the value of a firm’s PR will be too 
great for a firm to ignore.  Thus a firm that faces a negative public image would need not 
only to offset the social cost of its product – it would need to be seen doing so, as 
publicly as possible.  A research effort to make the product harmless “again” would be an 
ideal project for such a firm to undertake. 
 
Non-Libertarian Capitalism: Internalization through Policy 
The above discussion of internalization and financial mechanisms made possible 
through clear property rights and minimal transaction costs characterizes the libertarian 
strain of the Economic Rationalist discourse.  This strain is far from the only one: there 
are many Economic Rationalists who feel that the libertarian reliance on nothing but the 
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action of an aggrieved party in defense of its property rights ignores cases when the 
public is apathetic or the transaction costs, though low in themselves, are compounded by 
the opportunity cost of pursuing redress, which few people wish to undertake.  In other 
words, even though the health risk posed by the power plant upwind of me is real enough, 
I might prefer to put up with the risk rather than take the time out of my schedule, seek 
out like-minded people, and make a claim that my property rights are being violated.  
Even though it might raise my chances of dying in 30 years, day to day, the risk is quite 
tolerable. 
Firms that have to provide health insurance for their employees may dislike the 
premium prices they must pay to account for the health risks imposed by pollution, but a 
firm has many other concerns that occupy its time or money, and it is by no means 
guaranteed that they will band together and demand redress from the polluters; in 
addition the decision of the court might not be in their favor and the firm, which already 
faces many risks of losses in its regular operations, would not necessarily wish to assume 
yet another risk of spending money and time on a possible pipe dream. 
Because of this, say these critics of libertarianism, though the regulation of all 
externalities through property rights may be possible in the future, when technology will 
make transaction costs still lower and the monitoring of the pollutants’ effects still easier, 
nevertheless our environment, and the people hurt by its hurts, are suffering in the 
present.  The society cannot, say these critics, await the legal and technological 
breakthroughs necessary for this libertarian paradise to dawn.  They argue that although 
the social cost imposed by the action of the government is real enough, sometimes it is a 
better risk to assume than trusting in a market where people often have unrealistic ideas 
concerning risk and do not bother to pursue redress for obvious property-right violations 
as long as such violations play themselves out over decades instead of days.  But the 
effects of the externalities imposed by such a market are just as lethal, whether or not 
they are seen for what they are. 
Because of these considerations, while these people are still Economic 
Rationalists, they do not see anything wrong with the government taking action to bring 
social costs back to externality-using businesses – not through prohibiting the action, but 
through taxing it in a manner graduated with the amount of damage the particular firm is 
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doing to society, imposing higher taxes on the worse offender according to principles 
established by the British economist Arthur Pigou. 98  The taxes could be collected for 
any purpose, just like other taxes established by the government, or they could be 
earmarked only for the redress of a particular social ill, like taxing asbestos factories to 
do nothing but build cancer research institutes, tobacco companies to establish addiction 
treatment clinics, fast food and junk food to finance programs promoting healthy 
lifestyles, or brothels to establish free clinics for STDs.  Note that the absence of direct 
regulations means that the offending business is free to deal with reducing its social cost 
and moving to a lower tax bracket in any way it sees fit: this system has an inherent 
flexibility largely absent from regulatory discourses.  Moreover, when regulatory 
standards are reached, the incentive to reduce pollution further disappears, whereas with 
Pigovian taxes, this incentive is always there. 
Opinion is also split on how much to tax socially costly businesses whose 
customers engage in practices harmful to themselves of their own free will – for example 
it could be argued that the customer of a tobacco company agrees to bear the social cost 
of his or her bad habit; had he or she chosen to do use them, there is a wide selection of 
pharmaceuticals and other aids to quitting smoking, which are all readily provided by the 
market.  Under such circumstances it seems unfair to tax the cigarette makers.  Under the 
same argument, if a community chooses to attract jobs by setting low pollution standards, 
it is their choice to bear the social cost of pollution – and imposing a tax on the polluters 
from outside can scare the jobs away towards an economy with lower standards. 
Moreover, any environmental standards imposed by the government suffer from 
the problem of being extraneous to demand.  Given that their customers are not actually 
demanding reduction, polluters might find it cheaper to reduce their output of pollution, 
or to support candidates for public office willing to lower the standards.  What the 
government gives, the government can take away, and if a green tax causes job loss, the 
resulting backlash from the newly unemployed might cause the government to repeal it.  
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Because of this, in the last two decades, Pigovian tax schemes have been making an 
increased use of the market in an attempt to affirm their legitimacy and the business 
community’s perception of their stability. 
A typical scheme has been the “pollution futures” market described above, but 
with standards of permitted pollution, which the seller of pollution credit has to beat, set 
by government fiat.  It is just about the only incarnation in which emissions trading 
currently exists, though libertarians would argue that their proposed trading system, 
based on property rights and freely evolving markets, would, if it were ever implemented, 
be more efficient and less distorting. In the currently existing system, the government 
usually decides on a scheme where the permissible quotas slowly decrease from year to 
year according to a pre-announced scheme, giving the emitting firms sufficient time to 
adjust to the transition through trading through trading quotas; an alternative scheme of 
similar effect would be a staggered increase in the price of a single pollution quota, 
raising the price of emitting and giving the firms added incentive to reduce their pollution 
today in order to capitalize on the increased price of pollution credits tomorrow. 
The government typically sets a standard for pollution that is equal across the area 
being regulated, since that creates a stable market and prevents fluctuations that would 
result if emissions standards were allowed to vary from region to region in accord with 
the local demand for clear air. Such independent agents as university professors or 
environmental activists, who value their reputations more than they would value any 
reasonable amount of graft, supervise the trading and make sure that emitting firms have 
pollution licenses or contracts that are greater than, or equal to their level of emissions.  
Another alternative involves a private auditing firm operating under contract from the 
government. 
Those firms that fail to meet the standard themselves or to buy credits for doing 
so from non-polluting firms, are either fined by the market’s government supervisors, or 
placed in a higher tax bracket.  This punishment imposed by the state rather than the 
market makes this type of emissions trading a species of Pigovian taxation, though a 
much-modified species. 
Another modification of the old Pigovian tax scheme has been a proposed re-haul 
of the tax system that compensates an increase in taxes on polluting activities with a 
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decrease in (or, in some proposals, the abolition of) taxes on income and capital gains.  
Under such circumstances, taxation would be less an instrument of generating revenue 
and more a means of discouraging economic choices that promise profit in the short term 
and severe damage or destruction in the long.  This approach, claim the proposal’s 
advocates, would truly maximize the Pigovian efficiency of the taxation system, since 
only undesirable activities would be discouraged through taxing them. 
The libertarian critics of government intervention often point out the real problem 
in environmental economics lies less with the allocative efficiency of a market than with 
the interpersonal conflict between persons who advocate different fates, or uses for the 
natural world.  If the market was at perfect Pareto efficiency, argue these critics, it would 
be irrelevant to each individual selfish actor, who would seek their own private 
satisfaction, not the well-being of a hypothetical “society”.  Because of this, argue the 
Hayekians, the only solution which resolves environmental conflicts and brings about a 
result satisfactory to all involved parties is one based on property rights and free 
bargaining on their basis. 
In addition, say these critics, it is impossible for the any central agency to even 
know whether allocative efficiency has been reached.  According to Hayekians, the 
information describing a complex economy is so spread out between the various agents 
acting in it, and so dependent on specialized knowledge, unique contexts, long-time 
personal experience with particular markets or customers, or just on knowledge perceived 
intuitively and without clearly communicable formulas, that these millions of economic 
agents will simply find themselves unable to communicate it to any central authority.  
Thus any centralized attempt to tell how far the economy is from Pareto efficiency and 
what should be done to reach it will necessarily be a gross over-simplification, almost 
certainly imposing more social costs than it corrects by the simple law of probability. 
In the end, since an objective standard of reaching Pareto efficiency is, according 
to Hayekians, impossible in principle, a government attempting Pigovian measures will 
find itself pulled back and forth by special interest groups each seeking their own 
advantage in the name of high-sounding slogans.  It is needless to say that, if Hayekian 
arguments are reflect the truth accurately, once such a government begins to interfere in 
the market, it will keep on interfering, imposing not a simple social cost, but a social cost 
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that keeps on compounding itself as new lobby groups seek to influence the central policy 
for their own benefit. 
The critique of libertarianism based on the perceived inadequacy of property 
rights in reining back slowly-accumulating pollution is answered by the Hayekians with 
the assertion that even though a policy of liberated markets, lowered transaction costs, 
and strongly enforced property rights may not be perfectly developed right now, it is a 
better choice than the endless accumulation of mismanagement that results from a 
government interference in market processes.  In addition, they say, property rights are 
not the only market mechanism driving for pollution reduction.  As has been mentioned 
before, the overproduction of pollution goes hand in hand with the overproduction of 
material goods and services, which produces an economic surplus, which the newly 
wealthy society is now more willing to spend on quality-of-life issues such as clean air 
and water, or the preservation of wilderness ecosystems.  Given a choice, people become 
a great deal more willing to pay for ecologically clean products, while businesses that 
rely on less wasteful production can enjoy a greater efficiency of resources.  The 
advantage of polluting businesses that make use of externalities such as the atmosphere 
lies in free waste disposal, but businesses that do not produce waste do not have to 
dispose of it – and also enjoy more output per unit of resource input.  These factors 
combine to drive a replacement of wasteful and polluting processes with cheaper, more 
efficient, and cleaner ones – note the absence of gas lighting in modern cities. 
In any event, the Economic Rationalist advocates of intervention would agree 
with the libertarians that questions of environmental policy would be much easier to 
answer when property rights are clearly defined and transaction costs kept low.  Perhaps 
as economic science develops, and Economic Rationalist solutions gain greater 
prominence in environmental policy, the two points of view will converge towards a sort 
of pragmatism that accepts government intervention through tax favors or penalties, but 
only when it is obvious that the transaction costs of a negotiation-based solution are not 
yet surmountable by the unaided free market, and only in such a way that it leads to the 
development of free-market-based resources to solve this problem in the end. 
 
Eco-Capitalism: Hayek and Coase Meet Muir and Carson 
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Modern eco-capitalism is a philosophy that evolves out of the Economic 
Rationalist discourse as a plan of action to bring market capitalism on the next step in its 
evolution.  It is, essentially, an outgrowth of the beliefs of Smith, Ricardo, Marx and 
Schumpeter that one of the distinguishing characteristics of true capitalism is an active 
multiplication of the resources capitalism uses to function.  In a capitalist system, the 
simple operation of the never-ending competition cycle drives individual entrepreneurs to 
new heights of ingenuity and capability, destroying old ways of doing things and 
replacing them with improvements in an unflagging race of creative destruction.  To stay 
competitive, a capitalist strives to increase the productivity of any given operation, not 
only in terms of the sheer bulk of capital but also in the sense of this capital’s versatility, 
of the amount of new capital that a given unit of capital can generate, and of the total 
output of goods and services that a single cycle of buying, processing and selling makes 
available to society. 
According to an eco-capitalist, all forms of capital have their ultimate origin in 
ecological capital – ecosystems which make it possible for the capitalist to operate99.  All 
the other resources that the capitalist relies on, whether grown, extracted, manufactured, 
or, in the case of human resources, trained, must first be made possible by the existence 
of a stable ecology.  Moreover, this ecology itself produces a self-renewing ecological 
yield – for example for the Neolithic humans it was different species of wild grasses that 
could be domesticated into cereal crops, and for the modern biotechnologists it is the 
genetic variety of a modern rain forest that can produce trillions of dollars in marketable 
pharmaceuticals. 
The capitalist who recognizes this natural capital as the greater set of which such 
things as metal ores, oil and timber are mere subsets, would seek to make ecosystems 
healthier and more robust in order to maximize their ecological yield.  Thus the 
intermediate goal of any capitalist whose ultimate goal is the bottom line should be the 
improvement of the planet’s ecological health, on the premise that people whose soil is 
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not eroded, whose biodiversity is not exhausted, who are not constantly sick from toxic 
compound in their water supply and who have green parks and lodges in the country to 
play around in would be able both to produce and to by more things of value. 
For example, an eco-capitalist would not chop down an old-growth forest – he or 
she would develop a process whereby wood products that needed old growth timber 
before could be made from wood pulp, obtainable from wood that can be harvested from 
an ordinary timber plantation.  The old-growth forest could be a “merit good” whose very 
presence nearby would raise the value of campsites, hunting preserves, luxury resorts, 
horseback riding stables, canoe rental outfits, the sales in a camping-goods store, the sales 
of a photography supplies store, or even the value of rooms to rent in a nearby town 
(compare a room with a view of an old-growth forest that explodes with the colors of 
New England foliage every fall to a room with a view of a denuded field full of stumps!)  
Thus anybody who owns a stretch of old-growth forest could leave it standing and make 
more money building a resort hotel nearby, investing in a canoe rental business on the 
nearby river, or even a ski slope on a nearby mountain (compare the number of customers 
that a ski resort can attract if the resort is next to several mountains whose lower slopes 
are covered by majestic old growth evergreens as opposed to a similar resort that 
overlooks a barren clear-cut vista!) 
Similar reasoning would apply to fish stocks – allow the stocks to recover, in the 
meantime invest in ecologically safe aquaculture.  When the wild stocks finally do 
recover, we should harvest them sustainably and then market “genuine, wild-caught fish” 
as a luxury good.  This would make a lot more money than the current desperate struggle 
to support an overcapitalized fishing industry when thirty fishing crews up to their ears in 
debt chase a single swordfish in an ever-widening circle. 
Eco-capitalists also have their own discourse on the internalization of 
externalities.  While they do recognize that to a large extent, internalizations through 
property rights and negotiations between interested parties based on Coase’s theorem, are 
possible, they have also elucidated an additional mechanism for internalization, founded 
on the premise that an externality that makes it profitable for a firm to pollute also lulls 
that firm into inactivity with regard to possible improvements in efficiency.  The pressure 
of competition on the firm is reduced by the presence of the externality; rather than 
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developing more efficient ways to utilize resources, the firm now seeks to squeeze the 
largest possible profit margin from its current method of operation. 
This stagnation lasts as long as the firm enjoys a dominant position in the market 
due to its position of market incumbency, but any firm seeking to enter the market – and 
they will, since the stagnation of the incumbent, externality-using firms will eventually 
lead demand to outstrip supply – will need to use something new to negate the advantage 
of the established behemoths.  This something else is likely to be a new, technologically 
superior productive method, which no longer needs to make use of this particular 
externality thanks to the technological advances made in other, more competitive sectors 
and applied by the newcomer firm to the sector it is entering.  Using such a method, the 
newcomer, free from dependence on this particular externality, quickly out-competes the 
polluter, simultaneously making the externality irrelevant. 
As an example, let us consider a power plant that continues to depend on old and 
inefficient coal-fired steam turbines while other plants develop modern ultra-fast gas 
turbines will get away with doing so for a while, taking advantage of the cheapness of 
coal and the atmosphere as a free waste disposal system.  But it can do so only in 
conditions of regional monopoly, when its management knows that the customers cannot 
get their electricity anywhere else.  The customers of this power plant are not stupid, they 
can read, and they know very well that even if the power plant is not paying the price for 
its use of the atmosphere as a free dump, they are paying these prices, through the 
damage that the externality does to their health and the potential damage to the climate of 
the Earth. 
Since they still want electricity, but do not want the social cost associated with it, 
they will look to entrepreneurs that specifically focus their ingenuity to making electricity 
which is just as cheap, but passes less social cost down to the consumer.  In other words, 
the power plant using the externality becomes a target, attracting entrepreneurs, and 
venture capital investments, who dream of seizing its market share by doing its job better.  
Because of this, even if the coal-fired plant won’t do it, money will still be invested in 
cleaner and more efficient methods of generation, since firms that do so will be rewarded 
by good PR among their customers and lower expenses on physical capital (since a 
smaller and efficient power plant is cheaper to build than a mammoth one.) 
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As time goes by and the society’s demand for electricity continues to increase, the 
company that builds a power plant faster and cheaper, and manages to get a larger output 
from a smaller footprint, will have a significant advantage in obtaining credit, not to 
mention in its negotiations with nearby property owners over siting concerns.  In 
addition, as regional monopolies become a thing of the past, utilities that used to have the 
grid optimized for their own transmission needs would find themselves on a new, 
transformed grid where every newcomer can pay a fee and transmit electric power.  This 
will essentially pass the costs of re-optimizing the grid with the addition of every new 
supplier down to the old behemoths, putting their credit rating at an additional 
disadvantage.  All of these factors together would combine to give modern and efficient 
generators an advantage in competition with the giants, even though the fuel they would 
use would start out more expensive than coal. 
As demand for non-polluting generating technology increases, chemical 
engineering techniques, such as coal gasification, will evolve and grow cheaper, until the 
extra cost associated with making fuel gas out of coal is brought below the price of 
moving high volumes of coal through warehouses and railway junctions in order to feed 
it into the coal-fired plant.  At that point, coal-derived gas fuel will be cheaper at the 
point of use than bulk coal, allowing the modern plants, which are already superior to the 
coal-fired plants in the amount of physical capital necessary to build it, to surpass the 
coal-firing steam turbines, or at least compete with them, with regard to operating costs.  
This will enable the cleaner and more efficient plant to offer electric power at cheaper 
rates than the plant with the antiquated steam turbines, making the older plant not merely 
obsolete but also noncompetitive. 
According to an eco-capitalist, an externality harms the public in the short term, 
but because it relieves the pressure of prices on a sector, it removes whichever enterprises 
take advantage of it from the cycle of creative destruction, and allows other enterprises, 
which seek to satisfy the public demand to have the good or service but avoid its social 
cost, to out-compete it long-term and put it out of business.  Thus, as the pace of 
technological change accelerates from decade to decade, a rational egotist of the sort 
postulated by a typical economic reductionist scholar will have less and less incentive to 
discount the long-term and more incentive to invest in the future, becoming a steward 
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rather than a user100. 
This philosophy has only been articulated in specific terms after Dryzek published 
his book, and he does not discuss it.  He does, however, provide an example of a 
spectacular failure to recognize it, present in the section on Democratic Pragmatism.  An 
environmental philosopher named Mark Sagoff argues that people have separate 
preferences as citizens and as consumers, using his arguments as a supposedly 
“devastating” critique of the economist approach to environmental policy101. 
Sagoff bases his analysis on a poll he conducted among his students with regard 
to the Walt Disney Corporation’s bid to build a skiing resort in the Mineral King Valley 
of California’s Sierra Nevadas.  The students revealed that they would not want the 
existing Mineral King Wilderness to be developed into a resort, but that if the resort was 
in fact built, they fully intended to enjoy the skiing and wildlife available.  Few students 
showed an interest in backpacking through the wilderness as it now was.  Sagoff uses this 
poll as an argument that our preferences as consumers take no account of what we 
ourselves want as citizens, and thus do not reflect in any economic considerations 
regarding the environment102. 
Of course what Sagoff’s results really show is that human beings, who are, 
amazingly enough, the same human people whether their current role is that of consumers 
or of citizens, prefer a ski resort and a wilderness – and, all other things being equal, 
would prefer a ski resort with wild woods around it to one that has obviously destroyed a 
wild piece of nature.  In other words, if a resort is built anywhere in a region, it is more 
profitable for that resort to keep the surrounding woods from further development, and to 
restore ecosystems nearby from whatever damage they have suffered.  Such a resort 
would attract more customers, not just by means of the positive PR its actions would 
generate, but simply by having a better view from its ski slopes. 
Besides these immediate benefits, by having living woods nearby, the resort can 
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capitalize on whatever profits it can get from backpackers, licensed hunters, 
birdwatchers, cross-country skiers and horseback riders in the border areas, and many 
other recreational opportunities, allowing this resort to serve a wider market and attract 
groups such as retirees, who might not be interested in skiing, but still represent a 
substantial chunk of disposable income to swell the hotel’s bottom line.  As resorts across 
the nation become aware of these economic possibilities, a smart property owner is likely 
to make more money selling a plot of forested land to a nearby resort than to a timber 
company – after all, the timber company can always cut timber from a tree plantation, or 
substitute genuine old-growth timber with an ingenious method of processing wood pulp, 
while living wilderness is a resource which, once destroyed, cannot be substituted. 
The main proponents of eco-capitalism are Paul Hawken103, Amory and Hunter 
Lovins104, although some of its arguments are known in works by Robert Costanza105 and 
Herman Daly106.  Besides Economic Rationalism it is also very important to the 
Ecological Modernizer discourse. 
Ontology, Relationships, Actors and Metaphors 
The Economic Rationalist does not share the belief of the two previous discourses 
regarding the necessity, or indeed the long-term possibility, of social restraint upon the 
operations of the market.  To an Economic Rationalist, while individuals may decide to 
change their personal actions, the actions of many people in the aggregate are changed by 
the economic cost-benefit differences of various courses of development, measurable in 
dollars.  It is not, as critics of this discourse sometimes allege, a matter of people being 
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selfish robots following the option of greatest monetary gain and ignoring any benefit 
that is not expressed in dollars and cents.  Rather this discourse describes all choices, 
whether exalted or quotidian, self-centered or filled with a transcendent passion, as 
needing to affect the real world, and in this real world, it is impossible to act outside of a 
cost-benefit analysis provided by economics. 
Adherents of Economic Rationalism are convinced that information on which 
people act in making any particular choice is brought to them by multiple signals 
conveyed through an intricate network of supply-and-demand relationships, and made 
concrete in the form of prices.  So even in deciding to make any choice at all, the agents 
depend on these prices to form their sense of priorities.  A First Worlder has different 
priorities than a resident of the Third World; an unemployed single mother has a different 
set of priorities than an employed and married manual laborer, who has a different 
hierarchy of priorities than a single college graduate with a trust fund.  All of these have 
other goals besides their material needs: even in the Nazi concentration camps, people 
were often motivated by compassion and love of beauty while life remained.  But it is 
much harder to make a priority of higher purposes when in a concentration camp, or on 
Skid Row, or simply faced with three mortgage payments and the sudden need to care for 
an ill child. 
In making choices, since the making of these choices, whether with regard to the 
environment or to anything else, implies management of material resources, any choice 
an a person might make based on convictions, desires, or preferences with regard to non-
monetary priorities, is limited by the availability of these material resources, which is 
signaled to them through prices.  Anyone who makes choices that have no regard for 
prices thereby transfers control of whatever resources that agent once controlled to other 
agents, decreasing his or her influence and increasing theirs.  Thus, even people with 
spiritual yearnings need to look at the price tags when contemplating action -- if they are 
not to limit themselves to dreams and moonshine.  Most people’s activity consists of 
months or years spent doing what they must so that they can set aside as much time as 
they can arrange to do what they want.  Even for people who love what they do for a 
living, there is always the threat that their circumstances might change and they would 
find themselves doing what they must to get by – and once again these circumstances 
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change in response to economic signals. 
As the costs outweigh the benefits, more individuals, on average, turn away from 
a certain course, and as the benefits of another course are demonstrated, more individuals, 
on average, participate in it and support it. 
It is important to keep in mind that according to the Economic Rationalist, these 
changes in market demand cannot be circumvented by policy decisions: any policy 
decision, regarding electric power or anything else, which seeks to force people to act 
against their own economic benefit, will simply be circumvented by new patterns of 
economic activity.  The people may not even wish to do so – if we all went insane 
tomorrow and decided to outlaw gasoline, we might still love endangered species, but we 
would soon find ourselves raiding the zoo to butcher us some panda in the starvation and 
social collapse that would follow.  If we chose starvation instead, this would mean 
leaving those who prefer butchering pandas to inherit the Earth.  For a more realistic 
example, a strict emissions law will simply force emitters who, after all, have a living to 
make, to set up shop across the state lines, where they will pollute just as much, until the 
loss of jobs associated with that will cause a backlash and cause the people of the first 
state to repeal their tough emissions standard107. 
On the other hand, the Economic Rationalists believe that the market itself 
generates solutions to any problem affecting its participants.  Even though many 
Economic Rationalists do recognize a role for the state and its policies in shaping this 
market, they concede that the state should limit its role through processes that use supply 
and demand signals and achieve the desired ends by making them profitable.  The market 
is so highly regarded not because anyone involved in it is necessarily civic-minded but 
because in the ideal state, or a state close to the ideal, the market is fair – no one is 
allowed to get anything without giving back – responsive to changes in demand, and 
because its operations multiply resources available for any project rather than spend 
them.  As long as the people themselves realize that something is a problem, the market 
will reward anybody who creates a solution, and thus resources will be devoted to such a 
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solution – whether the solution is technological, financial, social, or any other. 
If the markets do not account for something (like, say, carbon emissions) in their 
price signaling, that is not, in itself, a problem.  Firstly, the price signaling does account 
for factors correlated with the externality (like, say, plant inefficiency), and reducing the 
second will reduce the first.  And secondly, as long as the people realize an externality 
exists, it will be internalized simply by the fact that someone will produce a solution to 
meet the unfulfilled demand of the people for the product without the imposed social 
cost.  This last example is illustrated by the increasing market for hybrid cars, which 
emerged as soon as people realized that pollution can be solved by a new type of engine. 
If the market contains the information necessary to allocate resources optimally, 
and if that information generates answers as soon as demand reaches sufficiently strong 
levels, it would follow that any attempt to alter the signals of the market by decree, 
forcing people to buy and sell as they do not wish to, would distort that information and 
cause a sub-optimal allocation of resources – in other words, waste, inefficiency, and 
quite possibly additional damage to whatever the distortion is supposed to protect.  While 
it is possible for society to shape active policy within the bounds of the Economic 
Rationalist discourse, this policy should seek not to do something the market attempts to 
resist, but to use market laws, internalize externalities, make the market more reflective 
of the wider world and more like the ideal free market that has never existed outside of 
books.  Then the market will reflect whatever other problems afflict society and 
spontaneously allocate resources in a pattern that is optimal to its favorable resolution. 
Assumptions implicit in this discourse include a belief, shared with the 
Democratic Pragmatist, that the ultimate power to make social changes is distributed 
among individuals and cannot be integrated into the upper levels of a hierarchy.  The 
disagreement lies in the Democratic Pragmatist’s belief that this power depends only on 
the desire for change on the part of the grassroots, while the Economic Rationalist 
believes that the change must fuel its own instantiation by assuming an economically 
profitable form. 
The chief entities Economic Rationalism Recognizes are consumers and 
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producers, or aggregations thereof known as firms, and described by Coase108 as engines 
for reducing transaction costs of economic interaction.  This is done by taking the many 
individuals that comprise a firm and treating their goals as, for some purposes identical; 
for those purposes, the firms “act as individuals”109.  Markets, prices, property and 
resources are recognized in the discourse anthology, with capital being recognized as a 
separate entity from resources: resources are available independently of the actions of a 
capitalist, but capital must be generated through economic action.  The blurring of the 
distinction between capital and resources constitutes the distinctive feature of eco-
capitalism.  As an ontological construct, these resources may be limited by the total 
capacity of the planet to supply this resource, or it could depend only on the ingenuity of 
entrepreneurs, who develop substitutes for any resource that grows scarce as soon as the 
prices justify doing so; the discourse is split between these two schools of thought110. 
The government is also recognized to exist, but its nature in the discourse is dual.  
On the other hand, the existence of government is perceived as necessary to the 
enforcement of property rights and the “internalization” of the externality which consists 
of the advantage possessed during business negotiations by an agent who had previously 
invested in the form of capital known as a firearm.  On the other, the government is 
perceived as, in Dryzek’s words, a “rational egotist”111 seeking power at the expense of 
the productive forces of society.  The bureaucrats and legislators which comprise the 
government seek to dominate the economic landscape through a sort of hostile takeover; 
moreover, since the government is charged by the society with making, or at least 
                                               
 
108
 Ronald Coase (1937) “The Nature of the Firm”, available at 
http://people.bu.edu/vaguirre/courses/bu332  
109
 Dryzek (1997) page 112 
110
 Those Ecobomic Rationalists who do not believe in the limits imposed by Earth’s capacity 
largely overlap with a discourse Dryzek calls Promethean (pp.45-57).  The difference between the 
Prometheans and the Economic Rationalists lies in the fact that Economic Rationalists recognize that 
environmental problems exist, and that the degradation of the environment is proceeding and must be 
halted.  They merely choose a way of doing so that relies on the markets and not on the government.  
111
 Dryzek (1997) page 113.  He uses the words “An assemblage of rational egotists out to plunder 
the public purse.” 
 Electric Power and Social Attitudes - 114 - Naiman, Bollinger, Waldron 
 
enforcing the rules, as rational egotists desiring to maximize their control, they cannot 
resist changing these rules to suit them better.  This naturally implies that it is best for the 
government to be open and transparent, to minimize the damage it could do: thus 
economic liberty is usually accompanied by a social pressure for greater liberty in other 
areas, and more responsiveness of the state to the business interests.  If the society has a 
large middle class, this is translated as responsiveness of the state to the people.  If the 
society is already democratic, the discourse assigns its advocates the role of democracy’s 
guardians. 
With regard to the environment, the discourse’s position is currently evolving.  
Dryzek writes that “at most, the environment is only a pathway for some human 
decisions to have effects on other people – for example through pollution”, and also: 
“There is no such thing as wilderness, only wilderness experiences (that is, human 
perceptions of wilderness amenity.)”  This is not necessarily true in modern eco-
capitalism, where ecosystems are seen as the source of “natural capital” which provides a 
context that makes other forms of capital as valuable as it is.  This natural capital is 
produced by “ecological yield”, which, while it is certainly experienced by humans and 
in turn affected by their activity, results from ecological processes which the humans can 
influence, but which do not center on them.  Thus Dryzek’s statement of “wilderness 
experiences” needs to be corrected in light of recent developments112. 
Relationships in Economic Rationalism, at least according to Dryzek, are 
basically competitive.   “The sort of cooperative problem solving sought by democratic 
pragmatists is ruled out.”  How a man who claims to have read Hayek can say that is 
difficult to guess.  Suffice it to say that although free markets presuppose competition, in 
seeking ways to out compete one opponent, the firm builds a network of cooperation that 
can include a hundred others.  In a modern market actions of competing and cooperating 
are tied so inextricably together that they really constitute as natural a pair as inhaling and 
exhaling.  Dryzek must be confused by the fact that whether a firm is competing or 
cooperating with another, it is still seeking profit, which sometimes causes a resentment 
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of the firm’s egotistic motive by those who do not approve of the Economic Rationalist 
discourse.  But while the firm is indeed mostly driven by self-interest, this self-interest 
can just as well drive it to work together with a potential competitor to fulfill a contract as 
to work against its former ally in trying to beat the other firm to one. The object is not 
necessarily to force the other firm out of the market as it is to maximize profits, which 
could be done in whichever way the occasion warrants.  It must be remembered that in a 
cutthroat market struggle, a firm is always better off with another ally no matter how 
many it already has.  Thus it actively seeks to establish itself in a support network, 
helping other firms where it would pay to do so.  The more intense the competition is, the 
more allies a firm must seek in order to triumph over common challenges, and therefore 
the more it cooperates.  As has been stated before, the two relationships are inseparable in 
the context of modern business practice. 
Another relationship which the Economic Rationalist implicitly acknowledges is 
the hierarchy of experts.  There is a difference, however, in the relationship of an 
individual agent with this hierarchy.  In Administrative Rationalism, the expert is part of 
a hierarchy formed explicitly to fulfill a certain task, with each expert assigned a specific 
niche within which he or she must work.  An economic rationalist would rather see the 
expert as the supplier of two useful commodities – specific skills and specific knowledge.  
The hierarchy is therefore much more fluid, with experts always shifting positions within 
it. 
The experts working for the government constitute an exception, since they need 
to have sufficient grasp of both economics and environmental science to design a policy 
which uses the market laws with the best results to make pollution unprofitable and 
stewardship attractive.  Dryzek says that the Economic Rationalist’s distrusts for the 
government implies that these experts cannot also be economic actors, but this is not 
necessarily true – environmental scientists can be in the business of providing fair 
expertise, which is a vital commodity without which institutions like the pollution futures 
market, or a mediation board solving property rights disputes, simply cannot function.  
The reputation of such an expert would be of far greater worth to him or her than any 
practical amount of graft a potential briber can offer, because unless the expert is trusted 
by every side, his or her position is worthless.  Because of this, experts do not necessarily 
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have to be viewed as a sort of unworldly mystic motivated by nothing but the public good 
– the expert can be just as much of a rational egotist economic agent as those who make 
use of his or her expertise.  The difference is that the expert’s business necessarily 
depends on a reputation for honesty. 
Another hierarchical relationship Dryzek recognizes within the discourse is the 
hierarchy between humans and the natural environment: Economic Rationalism, he 
writes, is “thoroughly anthropocentric”.  This is true enough, since even eco-capitalists 
argue that humans should treat nature with respect because they would make more profit 
doing so.  On the other hand, Economic Rationalism does not preclude measures to 
safeguard nature for its own sake.  The concern rather lies with the ability of society to 
afford it, and the only thing the discourse asserts on this subject is that the society will be 
wealthier, and therefore better able to afford the protection of nature, if policy does not 
interfere with the inherent tendency of the market to maximize the generation of wealth. 
 
Economic Rationalism in Practice 
The most significant influence of Economic Rationalists on policy decisions 
regarding the environment has been on incentives given to businesses in order to 
encourage greener operations.  Pigovian taxes on pollution have proven popular in 
Europe, while the idea of emissions trading has found staunch adherents in many 
policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic.  In Britain, “green taxation” found a surprise 
fan in Margaret Thatcher, whose pro-market values administration coincided with a great 
surge in environmental concern throughout the British society113.  In 1989, the British 
environmental economist David Pearce wrote A Blueprint for a Green Economy, a book 
which recommended the replacement of regulation with green taxes, and whose 
recommendations were further backed by an appendix to a1990 government paper 
entitled This Common Inheritance.  In 1992, the government announced that “There’ll be 
a general presumption in favor of economic instruments” when it came to restoring 
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Britain’s air and water. 
Unfortunately the goal of the British Treasury, which saw taxation in revenue-
raising terms, clashed with the goal of the Department of the Environment, which saw the 
green taxes as an instrument of externality internalization.  This caused considerable 
consternation on the part of the British business lobby, which feared an arbitrary set of 
green taxes, likely implemented in addition to the regulations, and prone to change 
without warning whenever the government felt it was not collecting enough revenue.  As 
a result of this lobbying green taxes never really took off in Britain, making the whole 
situation a prime example of a clash between Administrative Rationalist and Economic 
Rationalist discourses. 
In Continental Europe, Pigovian taxes are used most widely by the French, 
Netherlands, and German governments114.  In the Netherlands, they have produced 
significant results and are widely applauded by the environmental lobby; the business 
community does not resent them because overall, Netherlands is known throughout 
Europe for its low rates of taxation, and the business lobby sees pro-environment 
Pigovian taxes as a small price to pay for a generally pro-business climate.  This rare 
consensus between Green Romanticists, Ecological Modernizers, and Economic 
Rationalists has produced extraordinary achievement in both economic growth and 
environmental efficiency115. 
The experience of France and Germany with Pigovian taxation has been less 
encouraging: Germany has simply added green taxes into an already existing framework 
of regulation, which certainly provides businesses with the incentive to avoid polluting 
the environment, but does not relieve them of the burden which Economic Rationalists 
see in government interference.  Many businesses find themselves unable to marshal the 
resources they need to achieve the reduction in pollution which the state policy demands 
of them; as a result, Germany’s environmental successes are falling short of its 
environmental-policy goals, and German economy is plagued by persistent 
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unemployment of over 9% of the workforce, as compared to the unemployment figures of 
the Netherlands, which fluctuate between 2% and 6% of the workforce116.  As a result, 
new green taxes are being increasingly opposed by the government117.  The usual result 
of green tax proposals in practice has been for the central government to toss this hot 
potato to the discretion of local governments, which means that the regions whose 
economy depends on the presence of polluting industries the most are understandably 
reluctant to endanger jobs in their region any further by taxing the employers’ investment 
capital away. 
As for France, its green taxes have mostly been used by the state as a source of 
revenue, and the business community simply fails to feel any significant pressure from 
them, given the many other taxes to which the French government subjects them118. 
After the Treaty of Maastricht established the modern form of the European 
Union in 1992, the new organization explored the option of a carbon tax for its members, 
levied per metric ton of fossil fuel burned, in accordance with commitments Europe 
undertook on the Rio de Janeiro environmental summit of that year.  The measure was 
approved by the European Parliament on June 24th, 1998, breaking a deadlock in place 
since 1995119.  The agreement that resolved the deadlock was essentially a decision to 
leave the specifics of that tax to individual states, although it was generally agreed that 
the new tax was to be laid specifically on carbon-based energy, and that the rate should 
be approximately 9% of the energy’s market price.  Subsequently the issue deteriorated 
into a still-ongoing debate concerning the percentages allocated to emissions by 
residential emitters, transportation, small businesses, heavy industry, agriculture, and so 
forth120.  Similar fate has befallen a proposed carbon tax proposed after the 1992 Rio 
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summit by the member nations of OECD. 
Emissions credit trading has enjoyed a greater success.  In 1990, the latest set of 
amendments to the United States’ Clean Air act allowed emissions trading in sulfur 
dioxide, held by the Chicago Board of Trade in an auction form.  Considering the rapid 
decline in sulfur oxides emissions experienced by the US economy since then, it appears 
that even with heavy government regulation. Emission trading has proven itself as 
productive in practice as it has been in theory.  Unfortunately the proposed scheme of 
carbon emission credits trading has been deadlocked at the debate stage for over a 
decade, having fallen victim to ideological posturing in the tempestuous debate between 
the US right and left.  Of course Europe, whose politics are not characterized by the US 
type of bipolar deadlock, has nevertheless remained stalled in its own carbon-trading 
debate, apparently mired in the sheer bureaucratic inertia that a proposal has to face 
before it negotiates its way through the maze of committees and interest groups 
entrenched in Brussels. 
The international Kyoto Protocol, which took force for its signatory nations after 
being approved by Russia in 2004, has been touted as a success, but the exact mechanics 
by which the signatory nations will meet their protocol obligations remain up in the air; 
United States, though a signatory, has refused to ratify because of perceived unfairness in 
the assignment of emissions penalties, and although nations can trade carbon credits 
among themselves, the internal markets for carbon emissions are up to individual nations 
to establish, and it is far from certain that such markets can be established without bitter 
clashes of interest groups in most of the respective policymaking bodies.  In addition, 
China, which is the second biggest single emitter of polluting gases after the United 
States (and first when sulfur oxides and nitrogen oxides are considered) is classified in 
the protocol as a “developing nation” and thus exempted from the required reductions for 
at least a decade. 
In short, as Dryzek quotes from Robert W. Hahn, “charges and marketable 
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permits schemes… are rarely, if ever, introduced in their textbook form.”121 
Although libertarian propositions involving privatization and property rights 
might seem to skeptics to be so many theoretical exercises of the “assume a spherical 
cow” variety, they have actually had a significant number of successes.  In Britain, many 
streams, brooks and rivers are returning to a relatively unpolluted condition after a group 
called the Anglers Cooperative Association has pursued an aggressive policy of tort 
claims against discharging industries122.  Dryzek describes them as “very zealous in 
bringing cases against polluters, and often very successful.” 
Conversely, United States, which normally prides itself on protecting its 
residents’ economic liberty to a much greater extent than Europe and Britain do, has had 
remarkably little progress in this direction.  Property rights in the US West have been 
hopelessly muddled up by the activities of the US Bureau of Reclamation, which has 
effectively nationalized a great deal of water rights in the western states: the water is 
delivered to farmers in the desert at prices significantly below market value, which means 
that water is not only being wasted by farmers growing crops completely unsuitable for 
the climate, but the government-financed projects for delivering that water to the farmers 
(and away from its accustomed cycle which sustained the ecosystems of the region) have 
left a trail of vanished streams, siltation behind storage and diversionary dams, and 
extensive salination which rendered vast stretches of Western lands totally useless for 
both farming and natural ecological activity.  Of course the remediation of all these 
disasters provided the Bureau of Reclamation with a never-ending need for larger 
budgets, so from their point of view, it was far from a negative123. 
Those property rights that remain in private hands are held under a “use it or lose 
it” doctrine: the rights of the supposed owner to a portion of the stream flow are taken 
away if he or she fails to demonstrate that the water is being actively used, even if less 
water is actually needed.  This obviously encourages a policy of waste and inefficiency 
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from the private sector to compound the problems of the public. 
It is instructive to note that none of these ecological problems would even exist if 
the farmers living in the US West only had to pay market prices for water rights, which 
would be the case if water rights were privatized and the water sold for whatever the 
market would bear.  The owners of the rights would have clubbed together to survey the 
hydrographic profile of the region and make sure that water supplies were not exhausted, 
and the owners of the land rights would have sued them the moment they noticed signs of 
salination on their property.  Thus the very ecological woes of the region serve as a 
strong argument in favor of property-rights-based solutions within the Economic 
Rationalist paradigm – or at least so claim the adherents of this discourse. 
Unfortunately, given the prevailing discourse of government interference into the 
operations of private firms, those interested parties who could have forced a decline in 
the abuse of water and air streams by polluters through tort claims for an invasion of 
property rights, prefer to lobby for government action instead, so that sophisticated 
trading schemes through which companies might finance a reduction in their emission 
rates, such as those described above, are relegated to predetermined government 
mandated schemes of “emissions trading” which are constantly plagued by infighting 
between interest groups and bureaucratic power blocks, thus diluting the effectiveness of 
the trading through regulations that are often counterproductive. 
In more encouraging news, eco-capitalism appears to be more than a passing 
trend.  The public demands benefits provided by the industrial society without their costs: 
automobiles without accidents, cities without congestion and crime, a food processing 
industry without the negative health effects of junk food, and obviously modern 
consumer goods and services, including electric power, with no negative effects on 
climate, health, resources, or ecosystems caused by the current methods of their 
production.  People with disposable income are not willing to give up SUVs or air 
conditioners in the summer, but they are more willing to buy those that generate less 
pollution and have a smaller effect on nature, all other things being equal – and as it 
happens, less polluting technologies are also less wasteful of resources, so they make 
economic sense too. 
As the culture begins to grow wealthier, it stops attaching as much importance to 
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savings and begins to attach more to quality of life, which includes a clean environment; 
at that stage the members of this culture are often willing to pay more a premium to 
obtain ecologically clean goods.  This has caused investors to see the internalization of 
environmental externalities as a sector worth investing in – as Ford has recently 
demonstrated in its decision to focus on cars that combine fuel efficiency with muscle124.  
In modern venture capitalism, green is not just sexy, it is profitable.  A popular neologism 
in modern high-tech circles is “Viridian Design”, an adjective describing a movement 
which lauds itself as a “deeper” version of “Green”125.  Basically these people are greens 
that seek to use consumerism of the modern industrial society for good and not for evil – 
their vision is that of a new high-tech sector whose products are nor only environmentally 
friendly in themselves, but which encourage a deeper state of environmental awareness 
on the part of their user126. 
Businesses across the world are recognizing that it is possible to do well by doing 
good, and that nature, as a vital resource of irreplaceable complexity, is too valuable for a 
capital-aware firm to destroy through short-term profiteering from an externality.  On the 
contrary, money is being spent today to preserve ecosystems in order to harvest the 
natural capital they generate to the benefit of both the firm and the ecosystem. 
3.1.4 Ecological Modernizer 
Classification 
The Ecological Modernizer discourse stands in sharp contrast to the three 
discourses discussed here so far.  Administrative Rationalism, Democratic Pragmatism, 
and Economic Rationalism are all classified by Dryzek under the larger discourse of 
Environmental Problem-Solving.  They are all Reformist discourses (they do not wish to 
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break with the modern industrial paradigm, merely to change it so it would address 
environmental concerns as well) who espouse Prosaic solutions (they wish to address 
environmental concerns using policy approaches that have already been used in other 
arenas, whether these approaches emphasize the bureaucracy, the voting public, or the 
market.) 
On the other hand, Ecological Modernism represents an Imaginative Reformist 
discourse: it still does not seek to depart from the basic mode of social and economic 
organization implicit in modern industrialism, but the changes it believes to be necessary 
are enacted through policies unlike those used in modern industrial society before.  While 
some of these policies have a clear root in an ideology known as corporatism (as shall be 
shown in the section on Ecological Modernism’s intellectual pedigree), when considered 
overall, Ecological Modernism shows an approach to reform and growth that is often 
completely contradictory to corporatist instincts and principles.  In short, it seeks to 
change the basic paradigm of industrialism only a little, but to accomplish this change 
using a radical departure in the means governments have traditionally employed. 
 
Intellectual Pedigree 
As has been mentioned before, one strong root of Ecological Modernism lies in 
the corporatist discourse.  This is clearly seen when we note that the nations that were the 
first to employ Ecologically Modernist policies are those where corporatism has been the 
most successful: Germany, Sweden, Japan, and partly the Netherlands.  While many 
other nations have experimented with alternative solutions after the “implementation 
gap” between Administrative Rationalist policy and actual results became apparent, it is 
in the most corporatist of these that the Ecological Modernist discourse became 
dominant.  So, if we are to make any progress in understanding Ecological Modernism, 
an excursion into corporatism is in order. 
Corporatism in its original incarnation was intended to deal with the problem of 
class struggle, particularly with labor unrest.  As the economic and social elites of nations 
recognized that this unrest represented a significant threat to their privilege, at the same 
time they also recognized that an attempt to repress it by force was doomed to be counter-
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productive.  At the same time, observing the societies where social mobility and 
economic freedom were both greater, these elites could not fail to recognize that such 
societies enjoyed prosperous economies, political power abroad, and that their social 
unrest was channeled into relatively benign channels.  This last seemed most important to 
societies where socialism was looking increasingly attractive to the lower classes.  In 
short, the elites wanted the benefits of democracy without the chaos, and the benefits of 
social stability without such bogeymen as independent labor unions running loose on the 
streets. 
Corporatism eventually took shape as a state that enfolded every recognized 
stakeholder in the social drama to its bosom like a mother hen.  A strong labor union 
usually existed, organized into hierarchies of skilled and unskilled, industrial and service, 
physical and sedentary labor.  All labor organizations in the nation were strongly 
encouraged to belong to the hierarchy; the encouragement took different forms based on 
what the mores of the time would consider acceptable.  Representatives from the labor 
hierarchy were regularly invited to meet with the business, industry, and political elite, 
particularly the leadership of every party in the government and the opposition.  The 
political, industry, business and labor leaders would sit down and discuss how much of 
what each side was prepared to grant the others.  The workers would usually receive a 
pension plan, health insurance and affordable housing, the business leaders would in turn 
receive freedom from concern over strikes and enough government contracts to prevent 
the need to let workers go in lean years, and the government would receive the 
knowledge that tomorrow won’t bring with it a sudden crisis or conflict, a general strike 
or a demand for new elections.  In this manner, no one gave away more than they could, 
and everyone could be certain of getting something in return. 
Eventually the process came to include professionals such as lawyers and doctors, 
leaders of the nation’s largest religious denomination, the rural landowners and/or 
smallholder class, and any other social group loud enough that the government decided 
that Lyndon Johnson’s maxim about tents should be applied.  This made the society more 
stable, more predictable, and less dependent on such untrustworthy novelties as elections 
– since whichever party was elected, to remain in power it would have to assume roughly 
the same obligations to the bankers, the farmers, the workers, the railroads, and so forth 
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as its predecessor in office. 
There are obviously variations on this theme.  The early corporatist states were 
fascist, like Mussolini’s Italy, Japan after WWII emerged into a quiet police state where 
sometimes it seemed that only the good taste of the people involved prevented anything 
so crass as gulags and palace coups.  On the other hand, corporatist Sweden evolved into 
a social democracy, where no government would dare to draft a bill without giving the 
radical feminist lobby, or the animal rights groups, a chance to debate any parts they 
might find objectionable.  The European corporatist states saw a consensus with the labor 
unions as a necessity of good government, while Japan included just about every major 
business clique, from financiers to construction firms in its decision-making, but left the 
workers out in the cold.  But these were details.  Overall, the discourse of corporatism 
was clear: consensus and stability above all, stakeholders summoned to work with the 
government in working out a plan acceptable to all, and the deals to determine who 
would give and get what to be made before the electoral campaigns even begin.  
And of course there was the central authority of the public servant supporting the 
whole construction, serving as a guarantor of good faith between the stakeholders and 
making sure no one demanded any concession too staggering for the consensus to 
support.  While no stakeholder was barred from contributing to policy and making a 
demand for concessions, it was made clear to all participants that the goodies were to be 
distributed by the government, and while asking for what is obviously a fair share would 
usually result in the request being granted, demanding more than what you are entitled to 
would be an excellent way for all the other stakeholders to join forces against you. 
It is needless to say that when vocal and determined environmentalist movements 
appeared in nations organized on the corporatist model, the state, optimized for economic 
growth and a consensus income distribution, met their demands with fear and hostility: 
the consensus that the state had worked so hard to establish might now be disrupted by 
these socially irresponsible youngsters!  Dryzek says that in corporatist West Germany, 
“environmentalists long battled a seemingly unyielding corporate state”127.  In Japan the 
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situation was little better, as witness the government’s efforts to hush up the Minamata 
mercury poisoning outbreak128.  But as the environmentalists, and the issues that brought 
up, steadily refused to go away, and as the effects of pollution upon health and quality of 
life grew increasingly obvious to the population of these nations, it became clear to the 
policy-makers that the environmentalists were a stakeholder group like any other, and if 
stability-threatening scandals were to be avoided, they needed to be brought in on the 
consensus-making.  This was not Ecological Modernism yet, but it was a necessary 
precursor. 
At about this time, the “implementation gap” between Administrative Rationalist 
regulation of pollution sources and the actual release of pollution into the environment 
started becoming obvious.  In a corporatist society, getting the industry to participate in 
its own control was the natural solution, but, as in the case of the labor disputes, 
something needed to be offered to the industry in return if the cooperation was to become 
more than just a hollow façade for external imposition of hated regulations.  As policy-
makers were studying this problem, the solution became clear to them.  Industry could be 
offered the chance to grow unimpeded if the industrialists undertook to reform their 
operations so as not to produce waste in the first place!  This conceptual shift was of 
extreme importance: not only did it shift the emphasis of control from “out-of-pipe” to 
“into-the-pipe” from emission to production of waste, but it also hit on the realization that 
industries could not merely be permitted to continue growing if the stopped producing 
waste – they could grow faster and better by not wasting their resources on waste 
generation! 
Naturally this opened up possibilities.  It appeared that, properly defined, 
ecological measures would actually drive growth forward at increased rates, leaving 
behind only greener woods, clearer water and bluer skies – not to mention employed 
workforces and cheaper consumer prices.  Corporatist policy makers were going beyond 
simply offering industry an incentive to satisfy the environmentalists: they were 
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discovering a way to beat such problems as unemployment and inflation, which were 
already emerging as a serious concern at least in West Germany.  At this point, some of 
the former adherents of corporatism abandoned it altogether.  Instead of advocating a 
discourse that sought stability and predictability, they came to value change – a 
restructuring of the entire economy on still industrial-capitalist, but now ecologically 
sound lines129. 
The new discourse inherited the concept of consensus-building, and the emphasis 
on distributing concessions to satisfy each shareholder, from the corporatist discourse.  It 
also inherited a belief in the guiding role of the central government from the same source, 
but in Ecological Modernism, this trope underwent a metamorphosis.  Rather than the 
government serving mostly as an honest arbiter and an enforcer of fairness – which it still 
does, to a degree – the Ecological Modernist government also served as a visionary.  It 
reviewed environmental data and collected information from numerous branches of 
economic and scientific activity.  Then its panels of experts would analyze the data as in 
Administrative Rationalism, but rather than issue regulations based upon their 
conclusions, they drafted detailed plans, for rationalization of production and elimination 
of waste and pollution -- plans to be implemented by every stakeholder working together, 
but mostly by the industry in whose hands money and professional skill still remained.  
The industry would make necessary changes in production and pricing, while the 
government, in exchange, would get off the industry’s back and allowed free markets 
sufficient rein for the required transformation to happen flexibly and painlessly.  Of 
course other stakeholders, not just the industry, would have to be satisfied which meant 
that the government could not leave off regulation altogether, but it would now regulate 
in an enlightened manner, appealing to the industry’s self-interest to get the CEOs to 
cooperate and enacting only minimal restrictions on market operations.  Or so the theory 
went130. 
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After Ecological Modernism established itself as the dominant discourse in such 
economical powerhouses as Germany and Japan and so came to global prominence, the 
main thinkers driving its further evolution have been Peter Christoff of Australia, 
Maarten A. Hajer of the Netherlands, and Ulrich Beck of Germany131. 
Beck (1992) argues that Ecological Modernism represents the fulfillment of the 
original promise of modernization.  Modernization, in Beck’s opinion, means the use of 
rationality to improve the quality of human life – something that he argues was only half-
done by the evolution of modern industrial society, making it not modern but rather 
“semi-modern”.  The new society that Beck envisions will be a “risk society” which deals 
with environmental risks and uses rational planning to eliminate them the same way 
(argues Beck) that the industrial society in its “semi-modern” form has eliminated most 
class conflict. Beck envisions a replacement of the old hierarchies of semi-modern 
industrialism, including the hierarchy of experts and knowledge workers, with “networks 
that should cross over the traditional boundaries of the state, economy, and society.”132 
Hajer (1995), on the other hand, embraces the expertise that Beck rejects as “risk 
apology”.  He argues that expertise is necessary for a “reflexive” process of ecological 
modernization, which would drive the evolution of institutions and policies based on the 
critical self-awareness of policy-makers – and in order to criticize their own actions 
intelligently, writes Hajer, constant monitoring of consequences is necessary.  For this, 
the hierarchy of experts and knowledge workers is indispensable, though Hajer does 
concede that it should never be controlled by any one particular elite, social or political.  
Rather it should provide testimony that could be used either by defense or by prosecution 
as the elites are called upon to justify their actions before the scrutiny of the various 
stakeholders.  The role of the expert is to provide information so that criticism can be 
applied in the light of reason.  Hajer is indeed critical of the “mediocre naturalist 
environmentalism”, which fails the environment, he claims, because it refuses to present 
environmental questions in terms of real social and economic reform: since we still need 
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modernity and economic growth, argues Hajer, the question should be “how should the 
stakeholders cooperate with the state (but not necessarily with the political elite of that 
state) in achieving it in the most environmentally benign manner?”  In this sense, Beck 
falls short, since by portraying scientists and experts as the apologists of the inexcusable, 
willing to offer their knowledge to the highest bidder, he can offer nothing as an 
alternative but a stated need for some sort of alternative “network” of institutions to form, 
which Beck readily concedes he cannot describe and leaves it at that.  Hajer does not 
describe his forum of reflexive inquiry in detail, but he does outline the traits that this 
forum must possess to be effective, and provides a prototype in the famous Berger 
Inquiry of the 1970’s, which examined a proposition to run an oil pipeline through the 
wilderness of Canada.  His emphasis on the Berger Inquiry makes Hajer close in spirit 
with the Democratic Pragmatists as well as Ecological Modernizers. 
Christoff (1996) argues that Ecological Modernism can exist in a “weak” and a 
“strong” form.  Weak Ecological Modernism basically cedes decision-making to a 
technocratic/corporatist agglomeration of systems managers from the different interest 
groups: business, government, science, and so forth.  These experts modify the activity of 
businesses and state institutions to cut down on waste and pollution and improve 
efficiency but they restrict these developments to the first world: in effect just those 
countries where the business and government elites are both sophisticated enough, and 
the system of scientific think-tanks and consultancy groups developed enough that this 
sort of close, voluntary cooperation is possible.  The easiest way to do this, argues 
Christoff, would be to simply shift the polluting industries over to the developing nations, 
in the sense of corporatist Japan, which invests heavily in pollution control and sets land 
aside for endangered species habitats, and then allows its investors to go make Pacific 
islands over into golf resorts, or patronizes poacher timber companies that operate in the 
supposedly protected national forests of Indonesia.  Christoff contrasts this type of 
thinking with “strong” Economic rationalism, which changes the economy in 
fundamental and radical ways so that rape of nature, either at home or abroad is not 
rewarded, and that allows non-technocratic solutions to emerge where appropriate, and 
does not insist upon the imposition of a uniform techno-corporatist framework on all 
societies that choose it. 
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Ontology, Relationships, Actors and Metaphors 
 
An Ecological Modernizer believes that if a problem, such as excessive carbon 
emissions output, exists in a given society, it is because this society’s entire mode of 
operation in the sector in question is organized inefficiently.  The people participate in 
harmful activities because they fail to see the “big picture.”  This is reminiscent of the 
Administrative Rationalist in the emphasis on informed decision-making, but unlike the 
Administrative Rationalist, the Ecological Modernizer believes in changing the whole 
organization rather than merely using policy to optimize the working of the existing one. 
The Ecological Modernizers are also not unlike the Democratic Pragmatists in 
that they have less faith in hierarchies of control, but they also have less faith in the 
grassroots level. Their ideal is to bring all interested parties together, so that the policy 
expert from above will have to receive information from the small business owner below, 
but once the operation of the sector is redesigned in accord with this new consensus, it is 
to be binding for all levels of society, and not a gradual “bottom-up” process that the 
Democratic Pragmatist believes in. 
According to Dryzek, the ontology of Ecological Modernism recognizes systems, 
rather than conceptual atoms, as the basic entities of its ontology.  The plans drafted by 
the government, approved by the stakeholders and implemented by industry have their 
foundation in systems theory, and no individual factor exists otherwise than as part of a 
system.  In fact its interactions with the rest of the system and its role therein are what 
give this factor its individual identity; in this respect, Ecological Modernism is very 
Buddhist. 
Dryzek says that “Ecological Modernism’s embrace of the systems concept is 
incomplete, for it still can view natural systems in limited terms, as mere adjuncts to the 
human economy.” 133  He continues: “Denied are any notions that nature might spring 
surprises on us, deny human management, have its own intrinsic value and its own open-
                                               
 
133
 Dryzek (1997) page 144. 
 Electric Power and Social Attitudes - 131 - Naiman, Bollinger, Waldron 
 
ended developmental pathways.”134  While Dryzek appears to be playing devil’s advocate 
and examining Ecological Modernism from the hypothetical point of view of a Green 
Romanticist, he still seems to be needlessly harsh.  After all, if humans are part of the 
system, it is certainly permissible for them to see intrinsic value in their own pursuit of 
happiness, and according to the Ecological Modernist, the modern industrial society, for 
all its alleged flaws, still afford them the best chance of succeeding at this pursuit.  Nature 
may very well have intrinsic value, but since the whole premise of the discourse lies in 
using what nature provides as part of a renewable cycle, the discourse seems to take more 
care than most in making sure that this value is not violated while still managing not to 
deny that human happiness has an intrinsic value as well.  In that respect at least, 
Ecological Modernism is hardly a suitable target for opprobrium, unless the accuser 
believes (as Dryzek most likely does not) that the pursuit of human happiness apart from 
that achieved in communion with nature is in itself worthy of reproach. 
Dryzek also points out that the concept of carrying-capacity limits on human 
economic growth is “not so much denied as ignored” in his Ecological Modernizer 
discourse.  Since the Ecological Modernizers believe that pollution and resource 
depletion are both symptoms of inefficiency, and that an efficient capitalist economy 
generates more natural capital than it consumes, theoretically this means that the efficient 
sort of economic growth can go on forever, only making the environment healthier and 
more robust as economic growth removes more and more polluting inefficiencies. 
This discourse recognizes the capitalist system among others, and promotes the 
advantages of competition in removing inefficiencies.  On the other hand, the discourse is 
very statist: the government is recognized as the central hub connecting the economic 
system with the natural world through its superior knowledge and insight into the 
processes that goes on within the various systems.  It is up to the state to recognize 
scientists and technological pioneers with valuable insights, to make the connection 
between different areas of knowledge or economic activity where discoveries and 
inventions can act in synergy with each other, to form comprehensive and holistic waste-
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and-pollution reduction plans with input from all the stakeholder groups involved in the 
various separate issues, and finally to convince the private sector and all the other 
interested groups to cooperate as the plan is implemented. 
Without the benevolent intervention of the state, it is presumed that potentially 
transformative information will never reach the people who could have used it best, that 
the various interest groups will never cooperate – at least not on the foundation of a grant 
transformative plan that recognizes their competing interests and reconciles them so that 
all sides may benefit – and that whatever change does occur will consist of piecemeal, 
haphazard, and inadequate measures that will fall short of the desired results even if the 
participants recognize the systemic nature of their task, simply because only the state can 
possess such a wide-reaching network of information channels and levers of influence, 
with such a critical mass of resources necessary to hire the experts and enforce the new 
rules against would-be cheaters and manipulators. 
The natural relationship assumed by this discourse is one of mutually beneficial 
labor enlightened by benevolent guidance.  Dryzek writes that the question of whether or 
not the relationship is characterized by hierarchy is an open one.135  On the one hand, the 
answer appears to be positive, given the clearly dominant role of the state; on the other 
hand, the dominant role is based not upon an a priori assumption of superiority, but upon 
a consensus constructed among key players in the light of the information that the state 
provides them.  Whatever the case might be in practice, the assumptions of the discourse 
explicitly reject the old Administrative Rationalist prescriptive hierarchy, although there 
are Ecological Modernizers who favor a hierarchy of systems managers over all other 
agents, independently of whether the systems manager is employed in the government, 
industry, or an activist think tank.  Others assert that the entire premise of systems lies in 
the postulate that no one agent in the system can act independently of the others, and 
favor a more egalitarian relationship between stakeholders, with the systems managers 
providing the necessary information, but always being ready to modify their plan to 
address the concerns of a particular stakeholder group, so that the plan evolves as the 
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consensus takes more and more points of view into account.  The best way to describe 
this system would be as voluntarily hierarchical: everybody subordinates to the central 
authority not because they are made to do so, but because they are invited and offered a 
profit to share in. 
A second assumed relationship is that between healthy environment and the 
economic prosperity of society, as well as of individual businesses in it.  The recognized 
necessity of a clean environment for economic efficiency is what gives the central 
authority, typically the state, and its legitimacy in the plans it drafts, and the limits it 
imposes on the demands of a particular interest group.  The group demands no more than 
what the state-promoted consensus is willing to grant it, because it perceives the 
existence of this consensus, and the reform plan it is promoting, as more necessary to its 
goals than any particular concession.  The environmentalists focus on making the 
industrialists clean up their operations, while the industrialists focus on the profits 
cleaning up their operation will bring them, so that the two sides emphasize different 
aspects of the environment-economy relationship, but both see the need for a consensus 
between them if their particular goals are to be met.  Thus, even though the concessions 
of the state to each group might be lower than the group might have wished, or made in 
areas other than the group might have liked, as long as all the groups involved believe 
that their goals of ecology and profit are tightly connected, and that the state’s plan of 
reform will bring about a better state of both, they become more willing to tolerate what 
they perceive as inadequate concessions to themselves and excessive concessions granted 
to the other side.  This is all worth it, they tell themselves, for the sake of a radical 
reduction in waste/pollution that the plan will generate. 
The key agents in both relationships are stakeholders – businesses, governments, 
scientists, engineers, systems analysts and managers, and environmental activist groups.  
Their motivation is twofold: to make their concerns known to the consensus in order to 
include their concerns and goals in the continuing evolution of the main plan, and to 
benefit the public, including their former ideological opponents, by bringing about a 
reform that achieves the goals of all involved interest groups simultaneously.  Their 
agency consists of working with the other agents in providing the input on which these 
reforms depend, but also of carrying out their part in the plan they finally approve, even if 
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some of these tasks involve the surrender of certain objectives for which they have 
struggled in the past.  For example a car-maker might be forced to accept more stringent 
vehicle emissions standards in return for lower taxes, and an environmentalist group to 
abandon their opposition to genetic modification of crops in exchange for a more 
stringent environmental-impact code on real estate developers.  In short, agents are not 
only out for themselves: they also work for the reform plan that the state develops and 
promotes, aware that it has come to be what it is today by addressing their concerns 
during the consensus sessions. 
Among the key metaphors of this discourse is that of the tidy household.  Just as 
our words for economy and ecology spring from the Greek root οικωσ, meaning 
household, the Ecological Modernizers use parallels from the quotidian experience of 
keeping a livable, tidy house, to advocate reforms that, in their opinion, will result in a 
clean, well-run planet Earth136.  A common laconic statement that purports to convey the 
essence of this discourse involves an assertion that we should not produce waste on a 
planet we live on, just as we do not excrete where we eat or go to bed.  The metaphor is 
not particularly apt in a literal sense, since we do not have anywhere else to put the waste 
of our factories, while most houses do come equipped with highly specialized plumbing.  
The difference is one between disposing of waste properly and never making it to begin 
with.  On the other hand, this metaphor is a powerful common-sense appeal to get our 
environmental affairs in order, since it is both a very strong and very succinct illustration 
of the absurdity of a polluting lifestyle, and an implied assertion that it is quite possible to 
live without messing our planet up with our presence.  Moreover, it presents ecological 
reform as simple common sense rather than as a high-flown idealist wish list that ignores 
the necessities of daily living. 
Another key Ecological Modernizer metaphor is closely tied to the “Modernizer” 
half of its tag, and that is the metaphor of social progress.  Few people would object to 
capitalism today because a hundred or a hundred and fifty years ago it created such 
hellish conditions for the working class as we read about in the works of Dickens and 
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Engels.  We tell ourselves that that hell was merely a stage in the development of 
capitalism, regrettable but necessary – as if that thought could have made the cholera, the 
hunger, the child funerals, the alcoholism, the appalling street crime, and the horrible 
maimings in unsafe factory machinery any easier for the workers to bear at the time – and 
move on to admiring the well-lit and automated factories, the cheap consumer goods, the 
high salaries and relatively clean and safe cities that the workforce of developed nations 
enjoys today. 
In the same manner, the metaphor of social progress applied to environmental 
issues makes it easier for us to dismiss the reports of ecological disasters, mass 
extinctions, climate change and escaped toxic products that we hear about today.  “It is 
merely a stage” we tell ourselves.  “A stage in our journey towards a brighter, cleaner, 
wealthier, greener, and ever closer tomorrow.”  That is well and good if it turns out that 
the promises of Ecological Modernism are indeed valid, but that is not the issue – the 
point is that the metaphor of progress is used to make the modern industrial-consumerist 
society more palatable to people who would otherwise be outraged against it.  The 
metaphor of social progress serves as a sort of social contract between the industrial 
economy and the concerned citizen, or between the lover of nature and the product of a 
consumerist culture in our own hearts.  “Pollute for now, if you absolutely cannot avoid it 
in your trade” says the nature lover to the industrialist.  “But you better show us some 
pretty good evidence that your practices are going to turn greener in the future and twenty 
years from now we will be able to laugh at our fears of extinctions and global warming as 
we inhale the fresh and crisp spring breezes of Manhattan and Kyoto to the sound of 
singing birds and whispering cars.”  In this manner, aside from whatever validity the 
metaphor contains, in and of itself it serves as a peacemaker between the 
environmentalist and the consumer. 
The third and the fourth key metaphors of Ecological Modernizer discourse are 
closely related to each other: they are the metaphor of win-win game and that of the 
Amish barn raising.  The discourse is at pains to emphasize that the success of one 
interest group produces opportunities for the other to succeed – the growth of industry 
can create surpluses permitting a society to set aside wilderness and preserve it forever 
wild, the use of GM crops can increase yields to the point where much of the farmland 
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being cultivated today can be reverted to a natural state, and, conversely, higher standards 
for vehicle emissions can drive the development of more efficient motor engines that 
drive down the cost of transportation and deliveries, pushing costs of operation down 
across the economy. 
Of course in order to take full advantage of a win-win game, the conditions that 
make it possible have to be created actively.  This means that any interest group that is 
not working together with other is hurting itself the most – think of the Amish coming 
together to raise a barn for any one of them that needs one.  When an Amish farmer helps 
others, he knows that this will mean he is guaranteed never to go without a barn.  If he 
ignores the needs of his neighbors, he will have the disadvantages of operating without 
any help they might offer.  In other words, since a state of the industrial economy where 
waste is not generated and the environment remains unpolluted is good for everyone 
involved, it is irrational for the interest groups not to come together and actively work 
towards a common interest by bringing about favorable circumstances on the path to such 
a state.  Which interest group this benefits in the short term is immaterial – it’s a win-win 
game after all!  The only problem is: how can the participants know in advance that the 
cooperation will indeed benefit everyone in the long run, and isn’t just a scam instigated 
by whichever group needs its barn raised? 
From this metaphor, it naturally follows that it is equally irrational for the interest 
groups to resist when an institution with a superior ability to put two and two together, 
such as the state, lets them know when such a situation might arise and how the number 
of such situations which present opportunities for mutually beneficial action, can be 
maximized.  In other words, these metaphors not only stress the virtues of working for a 
common benefit, they also imply the desirability of a visionary planner with the resources 
and the wide networks to assemble information with, who can provide the different 
groups with a plan of cooperation that will make the final mutually beneficial outcome 
likely enough to justify the intermediate steps.   
Ecological Modernism in Practice 
As mentioned above, the first nations, and the most successful ones, to use 
Ecological Modernizer discourse as a dominant paradigm of policy-making were the 
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corporatist societies of Germany, Japan, Sweden and the Netherlands.  Its success in 
these nations has been exemplary. 
Sweden became the first nation on Earth to develop a comprehensive program of 
waste reduction that included waste emitted in all three media of water, air and soil.  In 
the section on Administrative Rationalism, it is described what difficulty governments 
encounter when they attempt to force a factory to reduce emissions – waste that used to 
be discharged into the rive is now burned, when the factory is prohibited from burning it, 
the waste is condensed into sludge and buried, and so on.  The separate departments of 
the Administrative Rationalist bureaucracy, each tied to supervising a separate medium, 
have historically discovered great difficulty in keeping up with these changes, and 
various attempts to establish an integrated form of supervision have historically ran into 
great organizational difficulties – except the Swedish effort, which works by consulting 
with the owners and managers of the factory itself. 
The factory is asked to submit a plan whereby it could reduce the total waste it 
generates and the amount of waste emitted, taking the media of air, water, and soil into 
consideration while planning; if the integrated pollution control plan is found acceptable, 
the factory is given a license to operate under it.  The end result has been a marked and 
steady reduction in pollution emissions across all media137.  Unsurprisingly, it turns out 
that the people already running the factory are better at keeping track of their waste than 
bureaucrats from a government agency – all they needed was a reason to start caring138. 
Germany has its problems with regard to such issues as acid rain and the wasteful, 
highly emissive industries of its disadvantaged Eastern provinces, but there is no denying 
that it is able to muster the public consensus to tackle issues that have caused years of 
acrimonious debate and deadlock in Britain and the United States, such as CO2 
emissions, chlorofluorocarbons, energy efficiency, and many others139.  Japan has stood 
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out among industrialized nations for the massive commitment of its industry to pollution 
control and energy efficiency, reaching lower emission levels than the vast majority of 
First World nations.  The successes of the Netherlands in the environmental sphere have 
been discussed in the Economic Rationalist section, but here it must be mention that in 
exchange for the economic deregulation, the business community of this nation agreed to 
a major National Environmental Policy plan, adopted in 1989, which required them to 
“identify and change the activities that cause pollution.”140  In that sense, both Economic 
Rationalists and Ecological Modernizers can claim the Netherlands as their own success 
story: the Ecological Modernizers saying that the environmental success story is due to 
the careful planning of the systems managers in the government, and the Economic 
Rationalists countering that the business and industry leaders would never have agreed to 
the plan if they had not received more freedom from taxes and regulation in exchange, 
and moreover would never have been able to afford the changes agreed upon if it had not 
been for the economic growth deregulation made possible. 
Another success story of this discourse is Norway, which has incorporated 
environmentalist groups into its policy-making process to the point where it is as 
horrifying for a Norwegian minister to draft policy without the participation of the 
environmentalist groups as it is for his Swedish equivalent to do so without consulting the 
upper tier of the labor-union hierarchy, or for a Japanese minister to do anything without 
first receiving input from the leaders of finance and industry.  Norway is home to Gro 
Harlem Brundtland, a former Minister for Environmental Affairs, two-term Prime 
Minister, and leader of the Labor Party who is known throughout environmentalist circles 
as the “Sultana of Sustainable Development” and to this day remains one of the world’s 
leading voices pleading the possibility of environmentally benign growth on a global 
scale141.  As a Norwegian celebrity, Gro Brundtland has had a great influence on that 
society’s environmentalist culture, as well as on the culture of the government’s response 
to it.  The modern policy-making of Norway emphasizes active and aggressive pursuit of 
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economic growth, but revenue from this growth is carefully channeled toward 
environmental health programs and the preservation of wilderness, and all enterprises, 
whether controlled by private capital or by the state, are required to show steady 
commitment to reducing pollution through greater efficiency.  In the developed world, 
Norway’s levels of CO2 emissions are higher only than Sweden’s and Switzerland’s142. 
The success of Ecological Modernism in cultures where corporatism is a social 
and political tradition is not in doubt, even though, as has been mentioned above, 
Ecological Modernizers sometimes frighten corporatists by pursuing a policy of active 
change and seeking to re-invent the very premise of industrial capitalism.  Ecological 
Modernizers have successfully reduced emissions, effectively promoted the voluntary 
adoption of cleaner environmental practices on the part of private capital, and above all, 
have actually managed to produce social, economic, and political consensus on dealing 
with environmental issues.  It may be significant that of all the societies shown so far in 
this section, only Netherlands has shown substantial economic growth during the two 
decades since the Ecological Modernizer discourse became dominant among policy-
makers, while the least free-market-based of them, such as Sweden and Japan, have 
suffered substantial economic setbacks143.  But it is true that though the economic 
promise of Ecological Modernism remains elusive, as a method of actually improving 
environmental health Ecological Modernism appears consistently superior to 
Administrative Rationalism (though Switzerland, the only First World nation with lower 
emissions rate than Sweden, is committed to the Democratic Pragmatist approach, and 
Netherlands can be claimed by both Ecological Modernizers and Economic Rationalists.  
In addition, proponents of libertarian environmentalism and eco-capitalism would assert 
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that their approaches have not yet been tried on a society-wide scale.)   
The Ecological Modernizer discourse has faced greater challenges as it attempted 
to spread to nations who do not have a tradition of corporatist policy.  Britain flirted with 
Ecological Modernization in the early 1980’s, but gave it up in favor of its current 
Environmental Problem Solving approach144.  The ideas of Ecological Modernism slowly 
penetrated British and European thought over the next two decades, but grafting it onto a 
non-corporatist society has proved a challenging task.  The basic assumption of 
corporatism is that the government concedes a certain measure of each group’s goals to 
this group, and these groups in their turn do not press for more than they are given.  
Ecological Modernism sweetens the deal with the promise of a fundamental 
transformation of the economy that will improve productivity and efficiency, making all 
sides wealthier, as well as the environment, making nature and nature-lovers happier as 
well.  But this requires everyone to trust the government as an honest arbiter, and to find 
the prospect of seeking conflict and perhaps winning a complete victory less attractive 
than accepting a consensus and a partial concession.  In both requirements, advocates of 
Ecological Modernism have faced significant cultural opposition. 
Critics of the discourse use the works of Hayek and Popper to argue that the 
government cannot possibly know enough about the real state of the economy to draft a 
workable plan of reforming it, and that the various stakeholder groups it consults are 
unable to communicate this information to the government in a form that preserves the 
context – and without the context, it is impossible for the government’s systems 
managers to appreciate the information’s true significance.  The only way a reform plan 
can truly produce improvements in economic efficiency, argue these critics, would be 
through establishing a faint outline of desirable goals and letting the free market/free 
public debate carry them out – and if the government’s information was truly flawed, 
argued they, what need for the government to dictate to interest groups who got what and 
what path the economy should take? 
The proper way to reform, argued such people, would be by trusting to the 
                                               
 
144
 Dryzek (1997) page 145. 
 Electric Power and Social Attitudes - 141 - Naiman, Bollinger, Waldron 
 
information conveyed by market signals, or the unhindered public forums.  Both the 
Economic Rationalists and the Democratic Pragmatists saw meetings of co-opted elites 
behind closed doors as a poor way to make policy, and the system of all-around 
concessions through which each group got a chance to shape policy as a way for the 
government to legitimize its dominant role and keep each group silent while the 
government imposed a plan of reform designed by committee. 
Under such circumstances, argued the critics, there was nothing particularly 
valuable in building a consensus, either.  Truth, they argued, is born in debate, not 
consensus -- and while the Ecological Modernizer discourse did produce a remarkable 
degree of public commitment to environmental policy, it did not necessarily produce a 
commitment to the right sort of policy, but merely an illusion on the part of the public 
that the power elites will take care of them.  Such people argued that while this sort of 
consensus was indeed superior to a bureaucratic impasse that characterized 
Administrative Rationalism, the successes of Ecological Modernizers in corporatist 
societies could all be explained using the conceptual toolbox of the critics’ own discourse 
or discourses. 
Japan, for example, could be argued as having achieved its high energy efficiency 
because, being on a chain of islands, it needs to import all the fossil fuels it uses, so the 
economy was driven towards efficiency through sheer market forces.  Norway, they 
argued, enjoyed the blessings of immense oil and natural gas wealth, high hydroelectric 
power potential so that more of the oil and gas could be sold to pollute air abroad, low 
population density so that GDP growth rapidly produced affluence and eliminated the 
citizens’ concern for immediate pecuniary gratification, and a high degree of cultural 
attachment to the natural world that made the Norwegian people psychologically inclined 
to care about pollution more than most cultures.  Sweden was seen as another example of 
low population density plus an economy that depended on the highest degree of 
efficiency to stay competitive in the global marketplace under the restriction of the 
Swedish socialist state. Eliminating waste, they argued, was as much a priority for 
Sweden as energy efficiency for Japan, and explainable through simple market signals 
once again.  Netherlands they saw as a victory for Economic Rationalism instead, and 
Germany as proof that even with the best consensus in the world, an economy with 9% 
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unemployment still cannot afford to remodel its polluting factories. 
Nevertheless, as the discourse that has been most consistently successful at ending 
the feuds between interest groups, and as an ideology that retains an active role for the 
state while still making use of the natural flexibility that the free market can offer, 
Ecological Modernism has continued to win itself followers in nations without a 
corporatist tradition. 
The modern form of the Ecological Modernizer discourse in the United States 
seems to have developed as a response to the ideological left-right split that has become 
increasingly more pronounced in the US society since the election of Ronald Reagan to 
the White House.  The Ecological Modernizer view sought to transcend these differences, 
and so enjoyed a significant measure of success all through the 90’s as people turned to 
these usually well-educated and very articulate people to get things done in the midst of a 
partisan deadlock.  The prosperity of the nation during this period appeared to have 
validated the principles of this discourse, at least until the troubles began with the 
election of 2000, the subsequent recession, and the cataclysm of September the 11th.  The 
discourse is still very influential across the nation, and (excepting the much less powerful 
Democratic Pragmatist discourse) the only one among the major five that has managed to 
span both significant political parties, with such prominent adherents as Al Gore of the 
Democrats and Pete Wilson of the Republicans. 
The Ecological Modernizer’s attitude of forming a plan, receiving input, and 
delivering the verdict is often justified by adherents of this discourse through references 
to the well-known compromises of the Constitutional Convention, which created the 
modern federal system under which the United States operates to this day.  On the other 
hand, the Constitutional Convention had been a participatory effort by many 
“stakeholders” to create a better system: the idea was not for a central body to listen to 
everyone and then incorporate these points of view into a single plan, but for persons of 
diverse interests and inclinations to bargain with each other freely, until the plan emerged 
after numerous “horse trades” had made the delegates of very different colonies feel that 
the final document would genuinely make them better off than any likely alternative.  
Any of the colonies involved were free to make the system come crashing down by 
refusing to participate further, and so even the efforts of such visionaries as James 
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Madison and Alexander Hamilton consisted more on selling their plan to their dubious 
counterparts in other delegations than of “receiving input and forging a compromise” the 
way policy makers in positions of authority so often find themselves tempted to do today. 
3.1.4 The Green Romanticist 
Classification 
 
Green Romanticist is classified by Dryzek as both Radical and Imaginative.  As 
such, this discourse rejects the very foundation of the dilemma that occupies the Problem-
Solving Discourses and Ecological Modernism.  Instead of seeking for ways to reconcile 
modern industrialism with the natural world, they seek to purge the assumptions of 
modernity and the addiction to industrial society’s supposed amenities from the human 
soul, like the 19th century Romantics rebelling against the stifling rationalism of the 
Enlightenment145.  The ultimate goal is to return humanity to its originally intended state 
as a single component in a complex and diverse ecology, aware of its non-exclusive 
status and delighting in being a part of the natural world rather than trapped in an 
unnatural technocratic existence as Nature’s orphan.  A Green Romanticist seeks to 
abandon ambitions of technological dominance, and to accept the natural abundance that 
Nature provides for us all.  Green Romanticists do not seek to dominate or manipulate, 
but rather to experience and to worship. 
 
Ideological Pedigree 
 
 Green Romanticism has evolved out of such literary Romantic authors as 
Wordsworth, Keats and Southey, with perhaps a little of Willian Blake.  As Romanticism 
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developed through the 19th and early 20th century, such authors as John Muir offered 
them a vision of nature that was everything they were trying to find, and the antonym of 
everything they sought to escape.  Nature was wild, spontaneous, mysterious, nurturing, 
unique in the heart of every individual who experienced it, and most of all, even in its 
most savage instantiations, it was peaceful, peaceful to a degree unmatched anywhere in 
the vain, conformist, sterile and regimented world of industrial civilization.  As cities got 
larger and noisier, jobs more pointless and monotonous, and relationships more jaded and 
alienated, next to the cities of milling humanity mystery and delight still burst forth fresh 
every spring, and life teemed and grew and struggled and died and teemed again in an 
eternal cycle of renewal. 
 As the 20th century went on, the Romanticists recognized that nature was 
not as invulnerable as it seemed; the urge to return to Nature fused with the need to save 
her from ourselves, and this naturally brought about meditations on what sort of living 
beings we were that Nature needed saving from us out of all her children.  At that point 
Aldo Leopold and Rachel Carson were left behind by the new generation of 
environmental thinkers, who now drew inspiration from Edward Abbey, Murray 
Bookchin, and David Foreman, or Pentti Linkola and Arne Naess in other nations.  
Instead of merely enjoying nature as an aesthetic experience, or delighting in it as a 
spiritual experience, Green Romanticists used what they learned from nature to challenge 
the fundamental assumptions of human culture – no longer merely content with seeking 
to escape industrial society; they realized it would follow them wherever they went.  Now 
they sought to cast it down.  Most often, they recognized the futility of violence: there 
was no point in being driven over by the bulldozer of industry.  The trick, most Green 
Romanticists decided, was to convince the driver to step out and join them in the woods. 
 
Ontology, Relationships, Actors and Metaphors 
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Adherents of a “deep ecology” world view146 that sees capital-N Nature as far 
more important than our single upstarts species, and regards our species consumerist 
culture that leads us to consume so much power in the first place as something akin to the 
unchecked replication of cancer cells within a body.  If we had only sought spiritual 
enrichment from a communion with the beauty of nature, rather than “natural resources” 
for our own enrichment, argue the Green Romanticists, we would never have placed a 
greater burden upon the planet than it can bear, and would have had an infinitely superior 
quality of life than our worship of material possessions can bring us.  It might seem like 
poetic moonshine to a, say, Economic Rationalist, but to a Green Romanticist, it is a truth 
of fundamental importance.  Nature, says his discourse, is sacrosanct.  We have no right 
to treat it as something to be managed, exploited and manipulated for our petty human 
desires. 
Even such radical reforms as those proposed by the Ecological Modernizer totally 
miss the point when dealing with the problems that concern the Green Romanticist.  The 
Ecological Modernizer seeks to preserve nature in order to harvest resources from it in a 
sustainable manner – and as the Green Romanticist sees it, this sort of “management” 
only invites further alienation of the human spirit from the community of all living beings 
on Earth, and ultimately leads to other abuses in the future.  At best, the Ecological 
Modernizer appears to be offering to reduce wild nature to the status of a farm crop, to be 
kept fenced off, managed, and used for the benefit of its despoilers.  The alternatives 
offered by the other three discourses appear to the Green Romanticist to be worse still – 
even the Democratic Pragmatist version, which would be regarded by the Green 
Romanticist as the option of a sellout, who allows the short-term interests of despoilers to 
determine future policy. 
Aside from the basic entity which gives rise to all the others – that is to say, 
Nature – Green Romanticism recognizes the individual and that individual’s inner 
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world147.  The goal of the individual is seen to be in achieving harmony with nature so as 
to actualize their own inner nature in the relationship that nurtures it best: at peace, a part 
of the immense interlinked whole which allows the individual to stand outside his or her 
narrow human perceptions.  The precise nature of that whole differs – deep ecologists 
who are happy to observe the Darwinian cycle of creative destruction would not see 
themselves as part of the same nature as an eco-feminist, or an eco-Christian.  This 
subjectivity is part of the non-conformity that Green Romanticists treasure about their 
experience: what, they ask could be more conformist than the same reality in which 
everyone has to live? 
 
Green Romanticism in Practice 
 
A problem with this discourse is that it does not allow for an organized action on 
a larger scale: the Green Romanticist distrusts both the hierarchy of experts as “beholden 
to the interests of consumerist society” and the action of the grassroots as “leaving the 
decision to persons whose consumerist lifestyle blinds them to the nature of the 
question.”  A small minority of Green Romanticists turns to violence; many more stage 
peaceful protests, or stunts such as chaining themselves to trees, voluntarily exposing 
themselves to dangerous waste, etc.  Many other seek for an internal victory, seeking to 
transform their own lives to live in proper harmony with nature, and hoping that if they 
make a sufficiently happy and harmonious example of themselves, their anti-consumerist 
lifestyle shall attract others to live like that too. 
The archetypical Green Romanticist is the Finnish philosopher Pennti Linkola, 
who has retired from his job, earns his living as a fisherman in a boat he rows himself, 
and lives off the money he makes selling the fish door-to-door using a horse, while 
continuing to write books and articles in which he blasts industrialism and overpopulation 
and sings paeans to the natural beauty of lakes and birds.  Some pursue a green lifestyle 
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in the city, eating vegan food and taking short showers, some take up jobs that involve 
conservation or education, yet others start small ecologically sound businesses raising 
organic food or dying cloth with natural fibers.  All try to live a life that sets an example. 
3.1.6 Likely Roles of the Discourses 
Table 2 lists the positions that the discourses may be most common. This able is 
based on our idea of what the discourses look like. The table was also created through 
using Dryzek’s examples of the discourses in practice. Table 3 gives some hypothesized 
answers to questions we felt were important in policy making according to each of the 
discourses. 
 
Table 2: likely roles of different discourse holders in the deregulation process 
Discourse Likely Social Role Opinion on Government 
Control 
Opinion on Markets 
Administrative 
Rationalist 
Bureaucrat, Regulator, 
Scientist 
Positive Good Markets based on 
incomplete information; 
Non-experts do not 
know enough to make 
good buying decisions.  
Democratic Pragmatist Politician, Grassroots 
Activist 
Skeptical; People should 
control government 
Markets must serve 
local communities, 
empower, not suppress, 
community spirit 
Economic Rationalist Business owner, 
Economist, Politician, 
Lobbyist 
Necessary evil; 
Government to enforce 
property rights; prevent 
fraud, violence, etc, but 
otherwise to stay out. 
Markets resolve all 
problems: if bad effects 
are felt, demand arises 
for their rectification, 
which the markets 
satisfy 
Ecological Modernizer Politician, Engineer, 
Scientist, Regulator 
Positive good, but with 
reservations; 
Government as 
mediator, but when 
decision is made, 
government must 
constrain resistors to 
obey it. 
Markets subordinate to 
policy, but must be used 
for their virtues as a 
signaling system, within 
a properly organized 
society. 
Green Romanticist Grassroots Activist, 
Scientist 
Necessary evil; 
Government restrains 
greed, promotes 
awareness, sponsors 
research in global 
warming, biodiversity, 
ecology, etc. 
Markets are expressions 
of people’s inner state: 
in a consumer culture, 
markets reward taking 
instead of giving, 
promote further 
consumerist behavior 
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Table 3: answers to governing questions in electricity policy making 
Discourse How Is 
Behavior 
Modified? 
What Limits 
Resources? 
How Urgent Is Reform? Who Should Be In 
Ultimate Control? 
What should be the 
ultimate goal of policy 
decisions?  
Administrative 
Rationalist 
Statutory Laws 
created by the 
governing body 
Combination of 
two factors: 
Physical 
Availability and 
the User’s 
Access to 
Information 
Urgent to begin 
implementing the 
hierarchy now and 
proceed as gradually or as 
rapidly as incoming 
information warrants  
Hierarchy of 
Information-
Collectors and 
Information-
Integrators; Experts 
making reports to 
professional 
administrators 
trained in 
management and 
policy 
Stability.  The 
consumers should be 
served by a consistent 
and well-informed 
decision-making body 
whose duty is to provide 
affordable rates, as long 
as the consumers do not 
demand more electricity 
than the economic and 
environmental situation 
warrants. 
Democratic 
Pragmatist 
Initiative of 
individuals 
coming together 
in a grassroots 
movement. 
The degree to 
which use of 
these resources 
benefits 
individuals and 
their 
communities 
As urgent as the citizens 
feel after the information 
is made available to them 
Citizens coming 
together to discuss 
common interests 
The goal is to empower 
individual communities, 
whose citizens will meet 
to make all the choices.   
Economic 
Rationalist 
When problems 
arise, the 
demand for 
their solution 
creates supply 
The degree to 
which markets 
are free to 
create them 
It is urgent to unshackle 
the mechanism of supply 
and demand before 
constraints on this 
mechanism allow current 
problems to grow into a 
crisis 
The consumers 
demanding goods 
and services and the 
businesses providing 
them, coexisting in a 
mutually profitable 
symbiosis 
To empower businesses 
and entrepreneurs, 
mostly through 
subtracting all distortions 
on the pure free market. 
Ecological 
Modernizer 
Plan of reform 
is drafted by 
interaction 
between policy 
makers and all 
interest groups, 
and then 
implemented 
from the center. 
The degree to 
which society is 
rationally 
organized 
Urgent: irrationality of 
current arrangements 
produces irrationality 
down the road 
Control should 
remain with a center 
of planners, but it 
should not be 
“ultimate,” all 
decisions should 
receive input from 
every interest group 
affected. 
To rationalize decision 
making so that the 
interests of every group 
are served to everyone's 
mutual advantage. 
Green 
Romanticist 
Change through 
the example of 
individual 
lifestyle, 
education and 
government 
statutes 
stopping 
outright ecocide 
Nature should 
not be viewed 
as resources in 
the first place.  
As part of a 
stable ecology, 
humanity would 
receive enough 
to survive as 
long as it gives 
back equally 
Every moment our 
relationship with Earth is 
distorted is a catastrophe, 
but to change society 
through personal example 
takes time.  Changes 
should begin at once for 
an individual, but their 
effects will be seen only 
when everyone learns to 
value Nature through 
example 
Control should 
remain with the 
natural processes of 
ecological feedback 
that have kept nature 
balanced for eons 
before humans 
rejected them. 
To prevent human greed 
and alienation from 
utterly destroying the 
natural world before the 
example of harmonious 
living converts a 
sufficient number of 
people. 
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3.2 Electric Sector History and Deregulation Reform 
This section talks about the history of the electric industry and how deregulation 
has occurred in the past few years. The history of the industry gives an account as to how 
different forms of power generation have entered the market over the years and attests to 
how different generations viewed the impact the industry has on the environment. After 
the history of the industry, we examine 4 major deregulation models: California, 
Pennsylvania, Texas and Massachusetts. We look at what discourses dominated their 
creation and set up, and we look at the results each model has had. Finally we discuss the 
Massachusetts Technology collaborative and what is being done to promote a more 
environmentally sustainable electric power industry. 
3.2.1 History of the Industry148 
The first phase of the Electric Power Industry was started in the early 1880’s by 
Thomas Edison. He started this first company on September 4, 1882 to generate 
electricity mostly at night for those that had started using his concurrent invention of the 
light bulb. His business started with only 59 customers and a price of $0.24 per kilowatt 
hour, much higher than we are used to today. The use of electricity began to spread, 
along with the demand of electric motors. Soon many other electric power companies 
began springing up in order to meet the demand. However, these companies were all 
local to the places where their electricity was actually used. It wasn’t until 1896, when 
George Westinghouse created a hydroelectric development in Niagara Falls, and 
provided electricity to Buffalo, New York. Soon electric power companies had spread 
throughout the U.S. and had also began creating more efficient use of coal. 
The 1900’s began an era of privately owned electric power generation. It also 
began the beginnings of state regulation of electricity. Georgia, New York, and 
Wisconsin were the first to practice regulation, which began in 1907, and the other states 
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soon followed. The growing economy accelerated the increase in electrical power usage 
and production, jumping from the teens to about 67% in urban household use by 1932. 
The idea of having municipal power production had been introduced, however, 94% of 
all power came from the private sector. 
In 1933 a change occurred in regulation. The federal government saw electricity 
as something that needed to be regulated on a federal scale and so it began to pass its own 
regulations on the industry. The federal and state government also began to see the 
importance of municipal electricity at this time and began to increase the public sector of 
the industry. World War II further aided the electric power industry. Electricity prices 
began falling faster until they had reached $0.03 per kilowatt hour. This period also aided 
the spread of electricity, which had begun to spread to rural areas. After WWII, rural 
housing with electricity had risen from 50% to 80%. 
After WWII a new type of electrical power generation was discovered: nuclear 
power. The influx of nuclear power technology caused a 1% change in the type of 
generation distribution, but soon it will turn stagnant due to issues from nuclear testing 
and disposal and the “3 Mile Island” incident. However, during this time period, 
environmental protection started to become an issue. Up until 1970, the industry was 
increasing in generation. However after the 1960’s people began to notice the increase in 
cost due to environmental requirements, also, the blackouts of 1965 caused concern in the 
reliability of the industry. 
In the years following 1970, the power industry was even more hit. Issues such as 
inflation, fossil-fuel prices, environmental protection and issues concerning nuclear 
power made it hard for companies to generate a profit therefore stunting growth and price 
decreases. Another problem for the industry developed when conservation laws were 
passed to prevent most companies from turning to petroleum and natural gas. And in the 
1980’s, there was even less growth and spreading. Finally, in the 1990’s, many changes 
have taken place in the industry. Environmental concern is now a big issue in production. 
In addition, non-utility companies began generating there own power, causing the 
industry to lose a large portion of its market. And finally, the Clean Air Act was amended 
and signed by Congress in an attempt to reduce the amount of sulfur dioxide in the 
atmosphere in April, 1993. This act caused many companies to reform to even stricter 
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pollution regulations set by the Act, and many feared they would not be able to meet the 
standards. 
3.2.2 Major Deregulation Models 
Now that the history of industry has been taken care of, we reintroduce the 
discourse theory into the policies in 4 of the major deregulation models. Each model (CA, 
TX, PA and MA) has a different version of deregulation and the discourses that apply to 
each model. 
A brief explanation of the California Energy Crisis can be found in Appendix A. 
California 
Ecological Modernizer 
Deregulation was approved in 1996, implemented in 1998, and ended in 2001 as 
the whole system crashed and burned.  Currently there is heated debate within the 
Schwarzenegger administration on whether to try again. 
Under deregulation rules, all wholesale power was to be traded in the PX (power 
exchange) market.  Bilateral long-term contracts between generator and utility were 
forbidden, and all trading contracts were to cover no longer than a 24-hour period in the 
future.  The highest bid on the PX market became the “market clearing” price, and all 
units of power were sold at that price for that hour.  This last measure was an effort to 
encourage generation. 
Now, let us discuss how the discourses enter the picture. The attitude taken by 
California’s government reflected the discourse that, in the last 15 years, had come to 
dominate not merely that state but a very large fraction of the United States’ 
policymaking culture.  It is a discourse of people usually educated both in the sciences 
and the humanities (but less often in economics and finance) who wish to resolve the old 
inefficiencies without sacrificing “the good parts” of any particular system or sector, or 
the useful knowledge that people in that system or sector have accumulated. 
  Unfortunately the philosophy of the Ecological Modernizer is based on listening 
to every stakeholder in the process, and seeking to reach a consensus acceptable to all, 
but then turning around and keeping only those parts of the stakeholders’ suggestions that 
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do not conflict with the policy maker’s visionary plan.  The stakeholders’ role is not that 
of active participants, but that of a sounding board for details of the plan’s 
implementation; and the Modernizer seeks to control the agenda of any given stakeholder 
or group of stakeholders by precipitating a confrontation between these stakeholders and 
others who hold the opposite point of view.  The Ecological Modernizer can then emerge 
as a mediator, proposing a plan that the groups can pressure each other to agree on even if 
it did not satisfy any one of them, dissenters being castigated for demanding more than 
their “fair share.” Under such circumstances, a lot of the participants settle for what the 
other groups will let them have, rather than for what they know they truly need to be able 
to operate under the new circumstances. 
In the case of California, Pete Wilson’s government consulted numerous 
stakeholders in the fields of power generation and distribution, environment protection, 
online trading, public policy, and economists.  Under such circumstances, it is curious 
how unsatisfied all parties remained with the consensus they supposedly worked out, 
before the pricing crisis.  Environmentalists claimed that in the excitement of 
deregulation the state neglected its once extremely effective programs to encourage 
demand-side efficiency in energy use.  Utility managers and economists decried the 
state’s numerous restrictions on the construction of new generation assets and oil 
refineries to power them, which made the importation of electric power purchased from 
outside wholesalers so indispensable, even though these were often the same people who 
loudly proclaimed just a few years ago that the new market would make old concerns 
about dependence on imported energy as obsolete as last year’s computer model. 
In short, the vaunted consensus of stakeholders that approved the deregulation 
seemed to have consisted of people who knew they were not going to get what they 
wanted right now, and so settled for what the new plan was willing to give them, hoping 
that Pete Wilson’s grand vision would provide the fresh opportunities he promised.  
Absurdities like the PX market were papered over with such universally acknowledged 
truisms as the assertion that the presence of a market would certainly make for more 
competition, and thus lower prices, than the absence of a market!  Exactly what this 
“market” would be and how its price signals would be transmitted was ignored, because 
digging into such questions would not be “fair”, or so said the supporters of deregulation. 
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The proponents of free markets were already given a forum in which buyers could 
negotiate with sellers: asking for more would not make for proper consensus!  The same 
reasoning applied to utilities, environmentalists and everyone else: anybody who 
accepted the goodies which the new consensus handed out was thereby implicitly bound 
to silence on any flaws they might otherwise have seen in the main plan. 
Pennsylvania 
Economic Rationalist with Administrative Rationalist undercurrent 
Deregulation was approved in 1996, implemented in 1998.  Pennsylvania is 
considered a model deregulation “success story” due to its success at reducing costs and 
creating a free market for electricity generation.  In the first year of deregulation alone, 
electric power prices had fallen by 17%, and by 2001, 24% of all electricity consumed in 
the state was bought from competitive suppliers!  Ironically, one of the main reasons for 
this drop has been the great inefficiency of the State’s previous electric production and 
distribution system, which resulted in some of the highest electric rates and transmission 
tariffs in the United States – about 15% higher than the national average.  The high prices 
obviously attracted more competing providers to the region than would have chosen to 
enter the market otherwise. 
In addition, while California faced the stormy seas of price fluctuations alone, 
Pennsylvania is part of a five-state common electricity market.  The bigger the market, 
the more competitors it attracts, while Pennsylvania’s status as a member of the common 
market gives it greater bargaining clout in negotiating with wholesalers.149  Pennsylvania 
generates 95% of its own electric power, and uses cheap coal and nuclear power plants, 
after a massive program to expand the state’s generating capacity.  It certainly imported 
much more before the crisis.  33% of California’s electric power is generated by natural 
gas, which can be much more efficient per thermal unit depending on sales, and much 
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better for the environment in terms of emissions than coal would be, but is unfortunately 
a great deal more expensive.  Moreover, Pennsylvania’s laws regulating the construction 
of new electric power plants were much more lax than pre-crisis California’s. 
A PX market was not required as the only venue for power purchases in 
Pennsylvania, and state utilities were allowed to divest their assets or not as they saw fit 
(though a separation of generation assets from transmission and distribution ones was 
indeed required.)  They were also given the option of bargaining with wholesale 
providers for long-term bilateral contracts to hedge against volatile prices in the future. 
Retail rates were frozen until 2010 with one adjustment allowed in 2005.  The 
longer freeze period is intended to spread the recovery of stranded costs over a longer 
period.  Instead of a “market clearing price” to encourage generation, Pennsylvania has a 
“shopping credit,” which is financed through the same rate freeze used to recover 
stranded costs.  It is about 15%-20% of the old provider’s rate, and it is given to all 
customers who switch their electricity providers, allowing them to “shop around” for the 
one they like best.  The new rate, augmented by the “shopping credit” so that it is, in 
some cases, greater than the current market price, becomes the price that competing 
power providers seek to underbid.  This could attract more wholesalers into the market, 
generating bidding wars between them that might eventually drive wholesale rates down. 
While deregulation was a success compared to the disaster of California, very 
little advantage was taken of this success to promote green energy generation.  Incentives 
for new green installation, particularly those for smaller generators, were nowhere near as 
aggressive as those of Texas or Massachusetts.  This situation has kept improving 
through 2003 and 2004, but Pennsylvania is still not using its wind power resources the 
way Texas, New York or Montana are using theirs. 
Unfortunately Pennsylvania’s version of deregulation suffered from other 
problems besides its lack of emphasis on green power production.  No effort was made to 
diversify the market, meaning that even after deregulation came into force, the old 
utilities still controlled 82% of the state’s generation capacity.  An additional problem lay 
in the inefficiency of the local grid, which had been designed for a smaller load.  This 
made it too expensive for startup companies to import electricity from outside the state, 
meaning that until and if those startups came to own their own generation assets, they 
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were required to buy their electricity right from the old utilities, which not only owned 
most of the assets, but also competed with the newcomers directly, since five of the six 
old utilities still retained their retail arms. 
The PJM (Pennsylvania, Jersey, Maryland) Interconnection system operator, 
which runs the electricity transaction markets across eight states and the District of 
Columbia, requires all companies serving customers in the region to maintain an 
electricity reserve for emergencies, regardless of what it costs them – a regulation which 
obviously stacks the deck in favor of the large utilities, despite the fact that a smaller 
company would not be expected to provide a region’s emergency power supply in any 
event.  Since electric power cannot be stored, the electricity reserve rule forces small 
companies that do not have enough generating assets to purchase the reserve from the 
large utilities with sufficient generating capacity, essentially taxing the newcomers in 
favor of the incumbent. 
Finally there is the problem of the “shopping credit” extended by the 
Pennsylvania government to the customers who make the switch.  The purpose of the 
shopping credit was to attract more competition to the sector, but given the advantages 
provided by incumbency, the lure of the shopping credit is often negated.  On the other 
hand, it is financed by a cap on retail prices – prices which otherwise could have already 
spiked, brought the new suppliers in all by themselves, and then come down to below 
their previous levels due to the real increase in competition that a spike would have 
brought.  At least that is the assertion of many Economic Rationalists today – and 
according to these people, the long period of capped prices is costing millions to the 
Pennsylvania ratepayers. 
These problems have led to a major readjustment of the deregulated market in the 
years 2001-2002.  Originally, 10% of all residential consumers in Pennsylvania had 
switched to an alternative provider (20% of these to a “green” provider);150 by 2002, 44% 
of these switched back – not necessarily because they wanted to, but because the 
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difficulties listed above have driven nearly half the startup companies that entered the 
market before 2001 out of Pennsylvania.151  Those that remained have been forced to 
pass the costs of their competitors’ incumbency advantage on to their consumers.  The 
savings are still there, but often so miniscule, on the order of 2-to-3% that many 
Pennsylvania consumers no longer bother switching. 
On the other hand, it pays to remember that the reason there is little difference 
between utility and newcomer offers in Pennsylvania today was because, among other 
things, the initial surge in the demand for alternative providers just after deregulation had 
frightened the large utilities to the point where they had to drop their own rates by 20%.  
Pennsylvania consumers no longer suffer from the notoriously high rates that afflicted 
them before the deregulation, so that in this sense, deregulation worked.  We believe it 
would have worked much better had something like the Texan model been adopted. 
Texas 
Economic Rationalist with input from Democratic Pragmatist and Ecological 
Modernizer 
Deregulation was approved in 1999 in Texas, implemented in 2002.152  The 
success of the 1999 deregulation proposal made Texas the largest state (land-wise) to 
deregulate its electric power generation. One unique feature of Texas makes its pre-
reform situation very different from that of any other state.  Long ago, the power 
producers united under the umbrella of ERCOT (Electric Reliability Council of Texas) all 
signed pledges not to export the electric power they generate outside Texas’ own borders, 
which had the curious effect of making Texas the only state whose energy sector is not 
regulated by FERC.153  This exempted Texas generators from at least some of the 
restrictions imposed by Washington, but unfortunately led to a severe underutilization of 
Texas’ electric power production capacity, which could have been an export resource 
                                               
 
151
 Benjamin Y. Lowe, (2002) Philadelphia Inquirer, May 19th. ‘No Savings From Power 
Competition”, available at: http://www.philly.com/mld/inquirer/3294099.htm   
152
  
153
  
 Electric Power and Social Attitudes - 157 - Naiman, Bollinger, Waldron 
 
with great revenue potential. 
The underutilization of capacity this electric sector autarky had caused eventually 
resulted in massive government efforts to boost consumption within the state, making 
Texas government the bogeyman of energy-efficiency activists everywhere.  The burden 
of additional capacity that the utilities could neither use nor divest in turn caused an 
increase in the costs of electricity production, while the government efforts to boost 
electricity use caused an artificial increase in market size – yet not a sufficiently large one 
to get all the utilities’ capacity excess spinning and producing revenue.  End result: the 
cost of maintaining the unused generator machinery is passed down to the consumer, 
making Texas retail rates much higher than they should have been in the middle of all 
that oil and gas.  Before deregulation, Texas was near the middle in the rankings of US 
states with respect to electricity rates -- the average revenue per kWh stood at 6.07 cents, 
which placed Texas in 25th place. 
This inefficiency of pricing was something that the extremely pro-business 
government and popular attitude could not long tolerate. Not surprisingly, the biggest 
push for deregulation came from the industry, where factories often generated their own 
electricity but could not interest their usually already overproducing local utility in 
buying up any excess they produced.  To them, deregulation was a chance to sell power 
that, thanks to their co-generation practices, they already produced more efficiently than 
the large central plants. 
The first proposal for restructuring was made before the Texas legislature in 1995, 
and resulted in the Public Utility Regulatory Act passed in that year, which established an 
ISO (Independent System Operator) to control the day-to-day operation of electricity 
generation and distribution.  The ISO, established by ERCOT, is not like most ISO’s just 
like ERCOT was so unlike most associations of utility governors.  It “does not participate 
in generation dispatch, in power exchanges, in providing ancillary services, or in 
establishing prices other than determining the cost of any redispatch needed to allow 
transactions to occur.”  In other words, the ERCOT ISO acts more as a maintenance 
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service than as a firm directing the distribution of energy.154 
In 1996, a statement published by the Texas Public Utility Commission (PUC) 
made clear the requirements under which the 1995 law was to be implemented, and the 
ISO was to begin operations.  Among the rules there was a provision requiring all 
transmission-owning utilities in the state to provide open access to their electric power 
delivery networks and for all ancillary services that came with accessing the network.  
The rule also required the separation of generation, transmission, and distribution costs 
and rates, so that each customer could calculate the exact amount he or she was paying 
for each aspect of the service.  Most importantly, Texas would finally bring its power 
plants in compliance with FERC regulations (although to this day ERCOT does not have 
transmission lines that cross state boundaries). 
Actual legislation mandating competition in the retail electric power sector was 
passed in 1999, in a statute known as Senate Bill 7.  With three years given to utilities for 
re-organization, 2002 was set as the date on which the “Pilot Program” of introducing 
customer choice across the state was to take effect.  The rules of transition were designed 
to bring consumers the benefits of market competition as fast as possible while still 
giving the government a chance to pull back if they saw any disasters in the making.  
Transmission and distribution services would become open to competition by 2004.  
Utilities directly owned by municipalities or electric cooperatives are given the option of 
not participating in the new competitive market, in which case they would be allowed to 
hold on to their old territories until such time as they do decide to engage in competition. 
Hedging through bilateral contracts is highly encouraged.  Utilities are not 
required to divest assets, but rather to “unbundle” them, separating into separate 
companies for generation, transmission, retail, etc.  These separate companies can then 
enjoy the advantages of being one company through signing bilateral contracts with each 
other, or they can deal with other companies if they wish. Those utilities that do not so 
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split are required to put 15% of their generation assets up for auction every year for 5 
years.  In an effort to prevent control of the market by an oligopoly, the law mandates 
that no single provider can control more than a 20% share of the state’s total generation 
market, but of course firms are given the option of unbundling the excess generation 
capacity into separate companies as well. 
Retail rates are allowed to readjust twice a year, based on the market situation at 
the time;155 they become totally unconstrained either after 3 years have passed since the 
first day of the Pilot Program, or when 40% of a utility’s customers have chosen an 
independent provider – whichever comes first.  At that 40% point, those utilities that 
chose not to split into a generation, transmission and distribution companies are no longer 
required to divest their assets.  Even if the requisite five years have not yet passed, it is 
presumed that by this point, the other 60% of the customers have an alternate provider to 
rescue them from any iniquities the utility may seek to perpetrate, and provided the utility 
is not breaking the 20% rule, it no longer becomes the government’s business whether it 
has unbundled or divested.  The retail rates of the first three years do carry a surcharge to 
recover stranded costs, but the surcharge is re-adjustable with the rest of the retail rate, 
subject to negotiation with the Texas PUC and the retailer’s desire to hold on to 
customers in a deregulated market. 
The State of Texas undertakes to supply each area with a POLR (provider of last 
resort) if during the restructuring some consumers are left unsupplied.  In order to 
encourage newcomers to generation, the regulations for building new power plants have 
been simplified to a very great degree.  Texas law, like most states, before deregulation 
required all utilities to build sufficient generation capacity to meet demand reliability.  
Among other provisions of the restructuring law, 2 giga-watts of additional “green” 
energy capacity (i.e., “green” capacity that did not exist when the law was passed) must 
be in place and online by 2009.  The construction requirements are staggered according 
to a rigid schedule: 400 of these new megawatts must be in place and available for 
distribution to consumers by 2003, an additional 450 by 2005, another 550 MW by 2007 
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and 600 more MW by 2009.  Again, this is easier for Texas than in most other states, 
since even before deregulation, Texas, with its plentiful open-prairie wind and clear, 
sunny weather had more renewable energy resources than any other state, California 
alone excepted. 
Competition is encouraged through posting a “price to beat” every time rates are 
re-adjusted: providers fight to underbid the price and induce the customer to switch.  This 
is not the same as the Pennsylvania “shopping credit,” since it is not given to the 
consumer to encourage shopping for a new provider; rather it is based on the cost of 
service plus sufficient profit “headroom” to allow what the Texas PUC thinks is a 
sufficient inducement to competition. 
The Texas experiment in deregulation remained undeterred by the California 
crisis of 2001, with numerous officials stating publicly that “it can’t happen here."156  The 
confidence appears to have not been misplaced: by 2001 the PUC had already certified 
the first alternative providers, and on January 1st of 2002, retail choice became available 
to small commercial customers without creating any runaway price growth.  Residential 
customers followed on June 1st of the same year, although under the state’s Pilot Program 
for deregulation, only 5% of all residential customers were offered that choice on that 
first day, with the remainder being given the option of switching providers in staggered 
fractions over the subsequent 12 month period. 
Since then, energy prices have generally declined, and the new electric power 
market has attracted numerous investors, including those from outside the state.  Even the 
spectacular downfall of Enron, a firm which at one point almost came to symbolize the 
new and liberated energy market, could not do much to dampen this new market’s 
exuberance.  The number of residents choosing alternative providers has continued to 
increase since 2002, and about 6% of those that choose an alternative provider choose to 
purchase their power exclusively from renewable energy sources.  Some problems with 
consumer education continue to persist, but overall, among deregulated state markets for 
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electric power, Texas is generally considered a success story.157  Of course advocates of 
economic liberty are not entirely comfortable with the heavy-handed approach it took 
towards the large power utilities in requiring them to either divest or unbundle. 
Massachusetts 
Ecological Modernizer plus Democratic Pragmatist 
In December of 1993, Governor William Weld convened a group of electric 
power industry stakeholders, co-chaired by the Division of Electric Resources (DOER) 
Chairman and the Department of Public Utilities Chairman to study possible 
modifications of the existing system, with electricity rate cost reduction as the group’s 
primary goal.  In July 1994, the report of the group included a set of principles called 
“Rules for the Wires,” which introduced the suggestion of competition among electric 
power generators.  February of 1995 saw the establishment of a commission to look into 
how electric power sector restructuring promotes competition, economic efficiency, and 
consumer benefits.  In November of the same year, a set of “Negotiated Principles” was 
published, in which environmental, industry, utility, consumer protection, and other 
stakeholder groups stated their concerns with the deregulation process and the conditions 
under which they were willing to lend their support to it.  The Principles were seen as a 
guide to the introduction of competition and consumer choice to retail electric markets.  
In December of 1995, a report called “A Prescription for Competition: The 
Restructuring of the Electric Industry” was published by the Massachusetts Senate 
Committee on Post Audit and Oversight.  It was written in response to the DPU 
(Department of Public Utilities) order 95-30, published in August of 1995, which 
specified seven principles of the future restructured industry and five further principles to 
guide the transition to that restructured industry.  The order also required public utilities 
to submit restructuring proposals by February of 1996.  The Senate Committee’s 
December report addressed the DPU order from the legislative point of view, listing 
numerous legislative actions required to implement the DPU’s principles.  It also made 
                                               
 
157
  
 Electric Power and Social Attitudes - 162 - Naiman, Bollinger, Waldron 
 
some additional recommendations on policy.  
The year 1996 was mainly spent in the analysis of the five restructuring plans 
submitted by Massachusetts’ electric utilities in accordance with the requirements of 
order 95-30.  These plans were submitted in February of 1996, detailing the proposals of 
the Boston Edison Co, Eastern Edison Co, Massachusetts Electric Co, and Western 
Massachusetts Electric Co.  The fifth plan was submitted by DOER as an alternative to 
the other four.  In March of 1996, an inquiry designated D.P.U. 96-100 was opened for 
the purpose of comparing the five plans and selecting the best features of each for the 
final recommendation.  This was published in May “to serve as reference point and to 
generate response and discussion.”  In October of 1996, the utilities filed new 
restructuring plans that took account of the May report, and in December of that year, the 
DPU presented Governor William Weld with a hopefully final “Electric Industry 
Restructuring Plan: Model Rules and Legislative Proposal," which formed the basis for 
the legislation the governor took before the State House in February of 1997.158 
Deregulation was approved in November of 1997, and finally implemented in 
1998.  The Massachusetts deregulation model has continued to evolve since then, 
particularly during the period after 2001, when the spectacular failure of California’s 
attempt at deregulation triggered tempestuous debate in state legislatures across the 
nation.  Evidence suggests that the two defining characteristics in the evolution of the 
Massachusetts restructuring plan in the years since the California energy crisis have been 
a very deliberate cautiousness with respect to changes in standard offer rates and a greater 
willingness to consider the rights of individuals and small communities, which may or 
may not reflect a holdover from the traditional New England culture of participatory 
democracy.  
Bilateral contracts between retailers and wholesalers are permitted, and there is no 
“market clearing price,” bringing Massachusetts closer to the Pennsylvania model.  10% 
of the pre-reform retail rate was cut starting in 1998, with an additional retail rate cut of 
5% starting in 1999.  Utilities are allowed to recover stranded costs through a surcharge, 
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but only after all reasonable steps, including divestiture, have been taken to minimize 
these stranded costs.  In other words, unless the utility could convince the State of 
Massachusetts that the divestiture would not help it recover any stranded costs at all, it 
was expected to divest of its generation assets before it can recover stranded costs 
through surcharges.  As stranded costs are being recovered, the surcharge was expected 
to decrease in proportion, and at the same time, the standard offer retail rates, available 
through 2005 as an alternative to the competitive market service, would be allowed to 
creep slowly up, making the competitive retail rates increasingly more advantageous to 
the consumer.  After 2, 5, and 10 years have passed since deregulation, the value of the 
utilities’ stranded costs would be re-evaluated in accordance with market changes.  The 
Massachusetts accountants have calculated (assuming low inflation) that this process 
would result in a final equilibrium of rates below those of 1996.  
ISO New England is established to take care of the distribution.  It allows 
wholesalers to offer electricity for sale to retailers throughout the New England states.  
The idea is to promote competition among wholesalers, helping retailers stay profitable 
even with the rate cuts. A “standard offer service” is offered to those consumers who do 
not wish to buy power directly from a retailer throughout the transition period, after 
which those who do not pick a retailer will be supplied directly by the distribution 
company, at what could be higher than the market rate (distribution companies base their 
default service rates on the cost of wholesale price bids, but the retailers often make a 
better deal with the wholesale power traders than the distribution company, which is, 
after all, mainly in a different line of business.)  In addition, the standard offer rate slowly 
increases through the transition period, weaning the consumer away.  During the 
transition period, any consumer frustrated with the retailer he or she has chosen can 
return to the standard offer service within 120 days after joining up with the retailer, or 
within 180 days after joining an aggregation (aggregation is a co-operative of many 
consumers, whether organized by community or otherwise, who purchase electric power 
as a group in a bid to secure a lower rate.)  After the specified period is over, the 
consumer can switch to another retailer or get the default service from the distribution 
company, but cannot get the standard offer service again.  After 2005, the standard offer 
service will no longer be available. 
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The Massachusetts deregulation experience can generally be characterized as 
positive but slow, at least as far as the residential customers are concerned.  In July of the 
year 2000, the Commonwealth made an effort to increase the speed of transition by tying 
the standard offer more closely to wholesale prices, but the general effect on the rate of 
customer participation has been negligible.  The main problem seems to lie with the 
glacial speed at which the standard offer is growing.  A lot of venture capitalists seeking 
to invest in the electric power sector look at Massachusetts and decide it just isn’t worth 
the capital outlay. 
3.2.3 Massachusetts Technology Collaborative 
Here we describe the programs of the Massachusetts Technology Collaborative 
(MTC) and how they create environmental sustainability. The MTC is a good example of 
the Ecological Modernization discourse since they are very in favor of business, they 
move around large amounts of money and favor market forces, they also work toward a 
more sustainable industry 
The MTC is a state development agency working for renewable energy and 
innovation economy.  The MTC deals with avenues of activity which cover 25% of all 
jobs in Massachusetts.  It administers the John Adams Institute (a policy think tank) and 
the Renewable Energy Trust. 
The MTC is an important part of the deregulation process in MA since it allows 
the government a small amount of influence over the way the industry is moving through 
policy development. The MTC allows for moving towards a more environmentally 
sustainable future and hopes to help the citizens of Massachusetts understand the 
deregulation process better through education. 
 
Renewable Energy Trust 
The Renewable Energy Trust is set up by the Massachusetts Technology 
Collaborative to support the following four programs discussed below: 
• Clean Energy Program: This sub-project seeks to increase the demand for, and the 
supply of, renewable electric power. 
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• Industry Support Program: The purpose of this sub-project is to accelerate job 
growth in the renewable energy industry. 
• Green Buildings and Infrastructure Program: Promotes renewable energy 
technology in buildings. 
• Policy Unit: Addresses market and regulatory barriers to renewable energy. 
Projects funded by the Renewable Energy Trust are included in Appendix 1 
 
Clean Energy Choice 
The crux of the Clean Energy Program is the Clean Energy Choice (CEC) 
initiative, which seeks to mobilize public demand for green consumerism which is 
accomplished through the following ways: 
 
1. A consumer signs up for CEC.  They must now purchase their electricity 
according to a plan where at least 15% of the energy is renewable, supplied by 
a certified renewable power generation facility.  The facility can subdivide its 
certification into multiple Renewable Energy Certificates, so that each 
certificate covers a certain number of KWh.  Some or all of the certificates 
can then be sold separately from the electricity, so that a facility which uses 
only fossil fuels can, if the management wishes it, be certified as a renewable 
energy generator if it purchases enough Renewable Energy Certificates 
(RECs) from generators that uses wind, hydro, or biomass power.  This 
provides the industry tax, or financial, benefits. 
2. The cost difference between the renewable energy and the equivalent number 
of KWh in a fossil-fuel package is listed separately on the CEC participant’s 
electricity bill as a REC premium.  Usually the difference amounts to between 
5 and 15 dollars monthly. 
3. For every dollar on the REC premium, up to a dollar is donated out of a 
special subsidy fund to the consumer’s local municipality to be used for 
purposes of boosting renewable-source energy (this is called a Matching 
Grant).  At the same time, another donation, also up to a dollar on every dollar 
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of the REC premium, is made to a similar project that benefits Massachusetts’ 
low-income residents. 
4. Provided at least 25% of the energy in CEC participant’s electric power 
portfolio is generated through renewable means, the REC premium also 
becomes deductible from the participant’s Federal taxes.  This rule is similar 
to that for generators, in effect providing benefits to anyone who owns or buys 
electric power 25% or above of which is produced in REC certified 
generators. 
5. As customers purchase the power covered by a REC, that REC is taken out of 
circulation on the certificate market – it is considered “purchased” through the 
premium the customer pays for green energy over and above the fossil-fuel 
costs.  Because of this, fossil fuel generators are forced to compete with 
individual consumers for RECs. 
6. Beginning June 30th, 2005, in municipalities where 3% or above of 
households participate in the CEC program, for every household that bought 
at least 50 dollars’ worth of RECs, an additional one-time grant will be given 
to the municipality for energy improvement projects. 
7. The fraction of the money spent on REC that is matched with a grant from the 
Renewable Energy Trust is determined by how much of the REC premium of 
a participant goes to pay for a new REC, defined as generation capacity that 
had not existed before deregulation, and, conversely, how much of the 
premium goes to remove pre-deregulation renewable generation capacity off 
the REC market instead.  Thus, a participant who only buys old, pre-
deregulation RECs will still get some of the premium matched by the Trust 
grant, and is still eligible for tax deduction, but the more of the RECs he or 
she has purchased are new, the closer the fraction covered by the Matching 
Grant of the premium will come to 100%.  Fossil-fuel using generators who 
purchase RECs can re-sell them to customers if they wish, but the public will 
know that unless the RECs come from a post-deregulation expansion of 
renewable generators, a smaller fraction of their value will be eligible for the 
Matching Grant.  Because of this, an REC from a newly added green 
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generation capacity will presumably enjoy greater demand from CEC 
participants than a resold REC. 
Massachusetts deregulation law requires all generators to purchase new RECs 
covering at least up to 1.5% of their generation capacity.  Since this requirement cannot 
be met simply by buying up old RECs that existed before deregulation, it means that, 
effectively, renewable energy facilities now have the demand to expand their capacity up 
to at least 1.5% of all energy generated in Massachusetts.  Any generation firm failing to 
meet this requirement for REC ownership is fined, and the fine money is paid into a fund 
to promote innovative green-energy technologies.  The percent of total output which the 
law requires a generator to produce using renewable power sources is expected to 
increase steadily in the future, reaching 2% by 2005.  This will obviously create excellent 
capital-raising opportunities for renewable power generators; any banker to whom they 
apply for a loan will be certain that the demand for their output will increase in the near 
future. 
Since every purchase of a REC removes it off market, the more new RECs Clean 
Energy Choice participants purchase directly, the more new green-energy generation 
capacity fossil-fuel using generators are forced to pay for, so that, unless the generators 
prefer to simply pay the noncompliance fine, the actual number of new certified green-
energy power plants in the state of Massachusetts actually rises beyond the minimum 
required by the Renewable Portfolio Standard.  This, of course, makes renewable energy 
more widely available and increases the opportunity for a customer to buy it.  The 
Commonwealth hopes to create a “virtuous cycle” of participation, which would draw in 
R&D money from private sources as the demand for more green electricity creates 
increased competition among the generators. 
3.3 R&D, Efficiency, and Retail Prices 
Participating in the Clean Energy Choice initiative is intended to serve as a 
morale boost for the participant, providing a satisfaction similar to that of donating to a 
charity.  This will make it more likely that the participant will not perceive the added 
costs of buying green electricity as a burden.  In addition, participation in the program 
serves as a multiplier of the certified generator’s profit, doubling the income of a green 
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electricity provider and making it easier for its owners to raise funds and meet their 
financial obligations.  Even though the Matching Grant money does not go directly to the 
generating firm but rather to the municipality where the CEC participant resides or is 
based, the generating firm is still aided by it, since participation of customers in Clean 
Energy Choice increases demand on the part of fossil-fuel using generators for new RECs 
to replace those removed from the market by participating customers. 
It is clear that in its profit-multiplier capacity, the Clean Energy Choice is a 
distortion on the market, intended to make investment in renewable energy seem more 
profitable than it would be in a purely unsubsidized environment.  This can have the 
effect of increasing the rate of R&D investment in new and more efficient green-
generation technologies, since potential investors will likely perceive them to be more 
profitable than they would in a free market situation.  On the other hand, providers of 
green generation technology could potentially spend less on R&D under the conditions of 
the CEC program, considering that even with a less efficient generation of equipment 
they would still be getting profits higher than the current market value of their product 
warrants. 
This last possibility is a particular concern, since the owners of renewable power 
facilities know that Massachusetts deregulation plan requires the Renewable Portfolio 
Standard to grow through the years, assuring the REC certified providers a sort of 
“captive market.” Also, the size of the payout the municipalities receive from the 
Matching Grant depends on the premium which the Clean Energy Choice participant 
agrees to pay. Since the municipalities receive the money for the stated purpose of 
boosting green electricity generation, which means that eventually it will still find a way 
to green electricity providers, this creates a potentially dangerous situation when the more 
renewably generated electricity costs in comparison to fossil-fuel generated electricity, 
the easier it is for REC certified electricity providers to obtain funds for new projects.   
Thus it could be said that the Renewable Energy Trust is creating a disincentive for the 
REC certified facilities to make their power cheaper, or at least to sell it cheaper.  This 
could create a lag between the efficiency-driven decrease in the price of electricity 
generation in a green power plant, and a corresponding decrease in retail prices.  Under 
some circumstances, it might be possible that this discrepancy may cause growth in 
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customer acceptance of green electric power to plateau, or even decrease. 
This last scenario is not very likely, however.  Great social demand for investment 
in green technology R&D (much greater than the economic demand for green energy 
itself) is definitely present in the Massachusetts population, and strong government 
incentives to improve efficiency are likely to remain a fundamental cornerstone of the 
Commonwealth’s green-energy policy for the near future.  As an example, the same 
deregulation program that mandates a 1.5% green energy component in a provider’s 
power source portfolio also provides tax incentives for REC certified facilities, intended 
to spur R&D investment in generation efficiency.  The desire for tax breaks will be 
further augmented by capital from large energy trading concerns, which remain 
economically motivated to invest into more efficient R&D generation technology as a 
hedge against the volatility of fossil fuel prices.  Such hedging is not a large fraction of 
their current expenses, and it might prove an energy concern’s lifesaver on the day when 
renewable generation may no longer be an environmentalist luxury but rather a vital tool 
of economic survival.  Such investment in technological innovation is likely to result in a 
decrease of green energy generation prices whether or not the Clean Energy Choice 
program itself provides a disincentive to decrease them. 
Due to these factors, the efficiency side of renewable generation will continue to 
improve.  If at least some of the capital flows and tax savings are re-channeled into 
designing, building and installing a new generation of equipment, as they likely will be, 
the price of generating a kilowatt-hour of green electricity will decline as a direct 
consequence of the increased efficiency.  As for the retail prices paid by the green 
electricity user, in a deregulated environment such as Massachusetts is becoming, where 
competitors constantly seek to undercut each other, the retail price of green electricity 
will likely follow the decrease in generation costs.  As costs of generation go down, one 
green electricity provider will lower prices, trying to gain its competitors’ customer base 
and forcing others to follow suit.  This will keep the RET premium increasingly more 
likely to decrease than to maintain its levels or rise. 
Ironically, even with the incentives provided by the Renewable Energy Trust and 
the tax deducibility, at present most Massachusetts consumers do not feel that paying 5 to 
15 extra dollars a month for electricity is worth it in their particular case, no matter how 
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much they might approve of the principle in particular.  Because of this, the perception 
within the renewable-energy business community is still very much that of an uphill 
struggle that they are facing in competing with fossil fuels: the “captive market” provided 
by the Renewable Portfolio Standard required in the Massachusetts deregulation code is 
accurately perceived as inadequate by the economic rationalists (though a great 
improvement on the previous situation). 
Some businesspeople in the green electric power community even perceive the 
RPS as a handicap in the industry’s efforts to attract retail customers, because it gives 
consumers the false impression that green energy generation is an artificially sustained 
technology that would not be able to survive at all without the constant maintenance of 
state-imposed “hothouse conditions.”  This prejudicial perception dissuades retail 
consumers from trusting a technology that they consider experimental and unreliable.  
Aware of this negative perception of their sector, green electricity generators seem to 
realize very well that without being able to compete with fossil fuels dollar to dollar, 
discounting outside support from the government, green electricity won’t penetrate the 
market to any significant degree. 
 
Industry Support Program 
In partnership with a Brookline, MA venture capital firm, Commons Capital, the 
Industry Support program of MTC manages a $15 million Green Energy Fund, which 
invests equity venture capital into Massachusetts renewable energy generators.  
Commons Capital provides a financial perspective on the fund’s ventures, determining 
which investments are most likely to justify the resources spent upon them by growing 
and thriving, while MTC assesses the project’s likely benefits to the efficiency, 
penetration, and consumer acceptance of renewable electric power generation. 
Another project, named Sustainable Energy Economic Development (SEED), 
seeks to find undeveloped technologies for the Renewable Energy Trust to invest in and 
assist in getting to the marketplace.  The candidate company competing for a SEED 
award must have an intellectual property or a technology that is key to more efficient and 
economic renewable electricity generation, but must somehow be unable to attract 
sufficient venture capital on its own.  Seed capital is awarded on a competitive basis, in 
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the form of a convertible loan, in amounts ranging up to $500,000; all awards are given 
for the development of this particular technological product, helping its realization past 
the critical stage between the laboratory-focused R&D and the finished product which the 
company can offer to the customers.  Debt service on SEED funds is deferred until such 
time as the company begins to earn product revenues. MTC expects the recipient to 
secure the matching amount of investment funds within 270 days after appealing for the 
award, and all matching funds must be used specifically for the development of the 
product specified in the MTC award. 
 
3.4 Interview Analysis 
We interviewed seven subjects in the course of this project.  As stated in the 
Methodology, each subject was asked a series of questions, and then was encouraged to 
elaborate.  After tabulating the responses to the questions in the five discourse categories, 
correlations and non-correlations were observed.  The subjects’ identities will remain 
confidential, only a general description of their job titles will be given. Herein each 
interviewee will be referred to as subject1-subject7.   
The first subject is a government administrator who managed the process of 
writing the regulations for the Renewable Portfolio Standard; the second is a Teacher 
who is a political organizer for the libertarian party; the third is a Clean Energy advocate; 
the forth has a management position in a state office and deals with environmental 
impact; the fifth is a retired teacher, businessman and inventor; the sixth is an engineer in 
the electric power sector; the seventh is an advocate who works to decrease electric usage 
through demand-side-management. We chose these subjects for there diversity of life 
experience so that we would get a breath of opinion.  Due to time constraints we were 
only able to interview seven subjects. 
Throughout the interviews one point that kept coming up was whether the subject 
believed that government action should be taken to improve the current lack of renewable 
generation capacity.  Subject 1, the government administrator, stated that he thought that 
more government involvement was prudent (AR).  He believed that the government 
needs show better leadership in promoting more environmentally and economically 
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sustainable energy and that there needs to be a supervision plan in place to insure that the 
policies that already exist work (EM).  Also he believes that the government needs to 
have a clear message when it comes to the importance of renewable energy.  Subject 2, 
the teacher and political organizer for the Libertarian party, takes an opposite view.  He 
believes in the privatization of government (ER).  He stated without the government 
meddling in the production and distribution of electricity, supply and demand will take 
care of the problem.  Subject 3, the Clean Energy advocate, believes that the federal 
government currently doesn’t have a stand on the issue and it should.  She would like to 
see more support of research and development and of renewable energy generation (EM).  
It was mentioned that she thinks that the city of Worcester should be more serious about 
energy conservation and believes that the city should purchase a portion of there energy 
from renewable generators.  Subject 4, the manager dealing with environmental impact, 
takes the position that competition in the electric power sector needs to be enforced by 
the government (EM).  Subject 5, the retiree, believes that a government regulated 
monopoly is in the public’s best interest because electricity isn’t a commodity (AR).  
Meaning that there needs to be a relationship between the supplier and the costumer in 
the electric power sector because if companies treated electric power as a commodity and 
charged what the market could support then lower income households wouldn’t be able 
to afford it.  Subject 6, the engineer, believes that National Grid could better compensate 
for changes in energy demand before deregulation (AR).  Subject 7, the demand-side-
management advocate, believes that the government should invest in technology that is 
almost ready for “prime time” (EM).  She also thinks that government regulation has a 
positive effect on companies’ resourcefulness.   
On the topic of public support for renewable energy, Subject 1 feels very strongly.  
He is frustrated and thinks that citizens should do more to improve the current lack of 
renewable energy (DP).  He states that it is misleading when people say that they would 
be willing to pay more for renewable energy in surveys.  Subject 1 also commented that it 
is easy for people to agree to support in a survey, but it is much harder actually getting 
them to sign up for it.  He mentions that it is a lot of work for the private citizen to find a 
renewable energy provider (ER).  Subject 3 strongly believes in public support for 
renewable energy.  In her career she is actively approaching private citizens in order to 
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promote buying energy from renewable energy providers (DM).  Subject 7 believes in the 
ingenuity of consumers.  She cites an example about how Californians independently cut 
their usage of electricity during the energy crisis (DM). 
Three of the seven subjects mention that a partnership between government and 
industry is beneficial.  Subject 1 talked about a solar company that could not raise the 
necessary funds to bring efficient low cost solar cells to market.  He said that they were 
able to get the money that they needed from a government grant (EM). He describe the 
solar company’s and the government’s partnership as important. When asked, Subject 3 
agreed that it is beneficial.   
All but subject 5 believed that competition in the electric power market helps in 
promoting the renewable energy market (ER).  Subject 1 gave an example that some 
large companies have become interested in wind generation because they appreciate the 
absence of large price fluctuations of the kind that happened with fossil fuels (ER).  He 
also stated that vertically integrated monopolies will only do what is needed to comply 
with regulations, but a company that is competing for retail customers might have an 
incentive to do better in order to get more of a market share (ER).  As a libertarian 
Subject 2 believes that direct competition is the best way to improve problems with the 
system.  He said that one of the reasons for the California energy crisis was that energy 
was purchased from the highest bidder instead of the lowest.  In that system, he said, the 
natural forces of supply and demand weren’t aloud to function properly (ER).  Subject 3 
thinks that renewable energy has a better chance of success under deregulation.  She 
believes that it is economically sound because being renewable it has the advantage of 
price stability (ER).  Subject 4 stated his belief that the government is limited in its ability 
to solve the problem of green energy.  He stated that “deregulated market is working”, 
although “newcomers are not coming in as aggressively as we’d like them to.” (ER)  
Subject 5 disagrees.  He believes that a regulated monopoly would be better than in open 
market (AR).  Subject 6 states that if the government let the price of energy to spike then 
new suppliers would come in and stabilize it at a lower level than prior to deregulation 
(ER).  Subject 7 said that consumer demand needs to be created to solve environmental 
problems (EM).  She said that the generation of electricity is much more subject to 
market forces after deregulation.  She believes that the new system is better (ER). 
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Four of the seven subjects state the importance of educating the population about 
renewables.  Subject 1 stated the need to increase people’s involvement in renewable 
energy.  The only way to get the word out about renewables is by educating the 
population.  Subject 3 stated that education is important.  Subject 7 educates people on 
the advantages in demand-side-management in her career. 
Subjects 1, 3, 5 and 7 all have comments that fall in all five discourses.  Subject 6 
has comments that fall in only the categories of Administrative Rationalist and Economic 
Rationalist. Subject 1, 3, 4 and 7 are all in favor of competition, yet the majority of their 
comments are not contained in the Economic Rationalist section.  Subject 2 is clearly a 
pure Economic Rationalist, Subject 5 an Administrative Rationalist/Ecological 
Modernizer (he talked extensively about the ability of less wasteful technologies to solve 
the emissions problem, but favors the regulation of regional monopoly utilities over the 
current deregulated system.)  The responses of Subjects 1 and 4 shows the general profile 
of the Ecological Modernizer, those of Subject 3 are split evenly between the Ecological 
Modernizer/Economic Rationalist discourses, and those of Subject 7 trend toward 
Democratic Pragmatism.  Subject 6 appears to be an Economic Rationalist in those 
responses that deal with the current state of deregulation, but he seemed an 
Administrative Rationalist when he talked about his job on the old regulated energy grid. 
Subjects 1, 2, 4 and 6 all showed great frustration with the deficiencies of the 
current deregulation scheme in matching supply to demand and the distortions imposed 
on the emerging electric power market from the outside.  Subjects 1 and 4 both talked 
about the difficulty of obtaining site approval interfering with the ability of wind 
generation projects to attract investors. Subject 2 said that deregulation is often merely an 
excuse to implement a different type of regulation that benefits only special interest 
groups but creates no true market.  Subject 6 also bemoans the inability of green power 
projects to attract investors.  Subject 7 talks about the opportunities to educate the public 
about energy conservation that are often abandoned when deregulation plans are 
approved, and the inability or unwillingness of the private sector to take steps towards 
more efficiency and cleanliness even after environmental problems do arise.  Subject 3 
expressed frustration with the private sector’s irresponsible mismanagement of natural 
resources.  She expressed regret that private companies do not wish to be known for 
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green innovation, since this earns them negative publicity if they fall short of their 
leadership position later.  Subject 5 complained about the complicated nature of the 
current deregulated market, saying that it was too much effort for people to decide.  It is 
interesting to note that Subjects 1, 2, 4, and 6 complained mostly about the difficulties of 
the current market under its present constraints, while 3, 5 and 7 complained most about 
the shortcomings of the private sector. 
 
4 Conclusion 
There are three separate issues discussed in the conclusion and one is how 
everyone is part of the same puzzle and although they have disagreeing points of view 
they usually have common goals in life. It is important that every person does not just 
adhere to one discourse but they adhere to multiple discourses, so people can have a 
common ground with which to stand on in talking to others. Another point to our 
conclusion is the solution to having the discourses working together and an example or 
two on how this can be done and the benefits of doing so. 
4.1 Policy and Discourse Conclusions 
After analyzing Massachusetts policy and the events that occurred in California, 
we have compiled our conclusions on how each discourse can be better suited by working 
together in the electric power industry and policy making regarding said industry. First, 
we discuss policy decisions and what they need to work, how the legislation regarding 
deregulation is insufficient, and policy decisions that do work. Next we talk about how 
green energy is being held back and what defines a successful victory, meaning one that 
will be long lasting and satisfies each discourse. Next we discuss each discourse and what 
we think they need to do in order to join together with all the other discourses in order to 
make a more environmentally sustainable future. 
4.1.1 Policy Decisions That Work 
From our research into the successful and the not-so-successful electric power 
deregulation policies pursued by Massachusetts, California, and various other states, and 
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from the interviews we have conducted with an assortment of subjects, we have come to 
a set of certain conclusions specific to the Massachusetts situation, namely: 
 
4.1.2 Legislating Deregulation Is Insufficient 
Legislative plans and statutes mandating deregulation are only part of the required 
reforms.  In Massachusetts, different parties we have interviewed have all expressed a 
degree of frustration with the initial promise of a deregulated generation market 
compared to the final outcome.  A common theme in subject responses has been the lack 
of residential consumers sufficiently motivated to make the switch to alternative electric 
power providers, even when 70% of people being surveyed have stated on at least one 
survey159 that they would be willing to pay an extra premium for the use of 
environmentally sustainable energy sources.  It appears that either the information on 
green energy choices is not getting through to most consumers, or their motivation to 
make the switch is lacking: the consumers do not appear willing to make the effort to 
locate green energy providers and make the required arrangements (even when these 
arrangements are simple to those engaged with the issue.)  In either case, whether it is the 
lack of information or the lack of motivation, or both, the slow rate of consumer 
switchover from the standard offer has shown that the problem needs to be tackled across 
a wider field than simple legislative statutes. 
Green Energy Is Held Back By Financing And Siting Bottlenecks, Which In 
Turn Stem From A Perceived Lack Of Short-Term Benefits. 
The customers, the business community, the local municipal governments and 
city councils, and institutions of education and public recreation all need to be involved if 
the deregulation plan is to produce lasting changes, and if the new “green power” 
                                               
 
159
 Synapse Energy Economics with the Mass Energy Consumer Alliance, 
available on: www.synapse-energy.com  
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technologies are to achieve greater penetration of the Massachusetts markets.  A large 
amount of information sent out by agencies, whether government or volunteer, who 
advocate sustainable power, goes to people already interested enough in renewable 
energy to seek out the information: in effect, preaching to the choir.  Moreover, 
renewable energy generation projects in the planning stage continue to depend on state 
grants and subsidies to be carried through: a bottleneck which limits the amount of choice 
available to consumers and increases the number of bureaucratic obstacles that lie 
between a proposal and a successful company.  Even though the requirement of the 
Commonwealth government has produced a new market for renewable energy 
certificates, the major financing institutions are reluctant to invest money in renewable 
energy, reasoning that what the government gave, the government can take away, and not 
wishing to bear the risk of the certificate market vanishing.  This, in turn, reinforces the 
aforementioned dependency on grants from the Commonwealth.  In the end, there are 
fewer projects, they take longer to build, cost more (and thus recoup the costs slower) and 
are less visible to the average consumer. 
A Successful Policy  
A successful policy will be perceived as a victory by all five dominant discourses. 
The solution to the vicious circle described above is greater involvement by all the 
communities mentioned above.  Culturally, we believe, on the basis of the interviews we 
conducted, that most of the people involved in electric power sector restructuring in the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts are more inclined to the Ecological Modernizer 
discourse than to any other; this often results in arguments and plans that appeal to the 
adherents of this discourse, but not the other major four.  A successful deregulation 
policy, one that involves the businesses, the volunteer organizations, the municipalities, 
the schools and the town meetings to get through to the consumer, needs to appeal to all 
five major discourses, and to provide tangible benefits to consumers who adhere to any of 
the five.  In other words, any successful plan for the creation of a new, competitive, green 
power market needs to be so worded and so structured that the adherents of all five major 
discourses can interpret it as a victory for their side. 
Economic Rationalists Need To See Recoupability 
In order for green power to gain greater acceptance from financing institutions, 
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the two major discourses that need to come on board are the Economic Rationalists and 
the Democratic Pragmatists.  The current position of Economic Rationalists is one of 
distrust: they see the market for renewable energy certificates as having been artificially 
created by government decree, and remain unwilling to advance funds to new renewable-
generation projects for fear of that market vanishing when and if the government policy 
might change. 
This distrust could vanish if it could be shown to the financiers’ satisfaction that 
the new installations can produce not only green energy certificates (a product demand 
for which depends on the government requirements for firms to comply with Renewable 
Portfolio Standard mandates) in addition to an affordable and reliable supply of electric 
power, delivering it to the market at rates consumers are willing to pay for.  This would 
mean that renewable generation would no longer carry the label of intrinsic risk for 
investors.  Instead, it would draw Economic Rationalists, who will now be free to 
appreciate the public relations capital that support of renewable generation projects will 
bring their backer, the low operating costs of such an investment, and the stability against 
fluctuating fossil fuel prices that can be provided by having even a small section of a 
firm’s generating assets operate independently of fossil fuel supply. 
To convince financiers of this proposition, the business community must be 
involved in the implementation of energy policy at every level, so that people with real 
education in economics and finance, who wield real influence in investment and banking 
circles will have a chance to see for themselves that the technology can be profitable as it 
is, or as it will shortly become.  A number of proposals seeking such an outcome will be 
discussed in the later sections but just to provide one example, the businesses operating in 
a given community could be allowed to underwrite the green energy premiums on the 
electric bills of local citizens who agree to switch to green energy providers.  In exchange 
for this sponsorship, the businesses would be able to use this fact in advertising, not just 
in this particular community, but throughout Massachusetts, presenting themselves to the 
public as leaders of the sustainability movement.  The public relations capital the 
businesses will gain through such a coup may very well outweigh the costs of 
underwriting the premiums, since the PR benefits will extend across Massachusetts while 
the underwriting of green energy premiums only needs to happen in one particular 
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community (of course the government can provide further incentives, such as tax breaks, 
to businesses who underwrite more premiums than others.) 
In addition, the Commonwealth tax structure should favor banks that provide 
loans to new and sustainable generation projects.  An equitable scheme should be worked 
out whereby a new generator can gain access to the distribution grid in return for a simple 
fee paid per month, with the costs of providing that generator with grid access to be 
financed in the long term by loans made by various banks.  The interest rates on such 
loans would be managed by the Commonwealth government permitting banks to deduct 
these loans off their taxes if the interest was sufficiently low. 
The Democratic Pragmatist Discourse Would Gain From Empowered 
Communities. 
In turn, a scheme that involves communities in generating renewable energy to 
power that community’s schools, churches, community centers, municipal offices, the 
local Boys and Girls Club, and other such local lynchpins of community identity, can 
attract Democratic Pragmatists seeking to empower their communities against outside 
control.  Any electric power in excess of that needed locally could be sold to the grid and 
the profits used in achieving some project the community votes on: since it is more 
efficient to run a large turbine than a small one, we can expect the availability of such 
excess electric power for sale to be not infrequent.  Potentially, the effect of such a 
project, involving the community on many levels to achieve a goal of common benefit, 
will make the participants realize that green generation project is an immediate help to all 
of them.  The success of the project will become a priority for people who formerly could 
not care less: everyone will now be a stakeholder.  Since the revenues of a town or city 
are largely credit-worthy, it will be easier for a town to gain access to private funding 
than it would be for a startup business – and since whatever municipal moneys are 
allocated for the project will need to be recouped, communities that try these projects will 
likely seek out in the latest technologies and most efficient sites to maximize the chances 
of success.  The participation of citizens, assembled directly in a town-hall style meeting, 
will also effectively resolve the various protests and objections of the sort currently used 
by pressure groups to prolong the bureaucratic wrangling when a new generation project 
must be approved. 
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Such a scheme can also aid in demonstrating the potential efficiency of renewable 
generation to Economic Rationalist investors: if a town can generate power in a 
renewable way, supply its local needs, and make money by selling the excess onto the 
larger grid, this would demonstrate renewable power’s commercial viability, encouraging 
financial firms to advance funds to private entrepreneurs interested in doing the same.  Of 
course if many communities become green power producers, this will have a double 
effect.  First, it will diversify the Massachusetts energy market – perhaps by encouraging 
aggregation firms to form, which would purchase the excess power generated by many 
different communities, pool it together, and sell the power to industrial and residential 
consumers elsewhere.  In addition, the adoption of this plan by a number of communities 
throughout Massachusetts will have the effect of increasing the number of green energy 
providers available to consumers elsewhere to choose from.  Demand for photovoltaic 
panels, biomass converters, small-hydro and wind turbines, wave-power gyroscopes, and 
other such technology is expected to increase under such circumstances, which is likely 
to lead to improved designs and lower costs. 
The Green Romanticist Discourse Enjoys the Increased Public Awareness of 
Sustainability 
The community-based approach described above will necessarily involve public 
discussion; it will also involve the community on a basic level, ranging from the local 
middle school’s wind turbine being used by the teachers in the school’s physics and earth 
science) lessons, to individual citizens researching the best photovoltaic panels 
manufacturer to propose buying from them at the next town meeting.  This degree of 
individual involvement will gratify the Green Romanticist point of view, since it will 
finally make the public aware of the advantages of green electric power on a grassroots 
level, something adherents of the Green Romanticist discourse have been trying to 
achieve for decades.  The public awareness of sustainability issues that the individuals 
involved would gain in the field of electric power consumption will often lead these 
people to re-examine their lives with respect to other matters – if a person sees himself or 
herself as an proponent of clean electric power, this person will likely find it 
psychologically difficult to reconcile such behavior with, say, driving a gas-guzzling 
vehicle. 
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The Administrative Rationalist Will Be Gratified By the Active Role of 
Government 
Although the government will seek to empower competitive free markets as much 
as possible, and encourage the emergence of new generators and the active participation 
of the business and venture capital community in the financing of further sustainable 
generation projects, it will take an active role in the matter, taking deliberate steps to 
modify tax structures and providing incentives for municipalities and private firms to 
reach a clearly delineated goal.  This will assuage opponents of deregulation, such as 
those adherents of the Administrative Rationalist discourse who assert that by removing 
the government from control over generation of electricity, the Commonwealth is losing 
a vital restraint against human greed and short-sightedness.  By letting these people know 
that the role of the government in shaping the future of electricity market is still 
pervasive, and that though the government is now using free-market competition to 
achieve its goals, the staff of experts working for the government are still guiding the 
economy to achieve maximum sustainability, the Ecological Modernizers implementing 
the deregulation will at least give the Administrative Rationalists a chance to make peace 
with the new reality. 
4.2 Example of a Solution 
In this section we discuss one possibility of a solution that could be used by the 
electric power industry. First we discuss the events occurring now in the electric power 
industry with respect to generation distribution and its effects it has been having on the 
economy. Then we introduce our new distribution system for generation. We discuss the 
environmental impact of this solution, the social impact of this solution, individual 
attitudes towards this solution and finally we express additional arguments for this new 
distributed type of generation. Lastly, we discuss the way each discourse would see this 
new type of generation and how it would be beneficial to each discourse. 
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4.2.1 Assumptions of the Regional Monopoly Paradigm 
Originally, electricity was believed to be a typical example of what is known as 
an economy of scale.160  The belief was not as obvious at it seemed to the people who 
held it: from a modern perspective it is clearly derived from a set of some very specific 
assumptions. 
The first assumption was that of fungibility.  According to the supporters of this 
view, since one electron is very much like another, and since any electric current, no 
matter how it is generated, can drive an electric motor provided it has the amperage and 
the voltage to do so, this means that electricity produced in any one context is 
qualitatively indistinguishable from that produced in any other.  The social, 
environmental, economic, and other effects of producing this particular electricity, as 
opposed to any of the possible alternatives, were mostly not so much ignored as rather 
sadly discounted at the time -- although to us today, it is obvious they are as much a 
product of the generating activity as electricity itself.  Electricity was considered to be a 
fungible good, and as such it made sense to reduce the costs of producing it as much as 
possible by reducing the overhead. 
The second assumption dealt with ways of reducing this overhead.  Essentially, 
the electric power generators of the time were all based on Faraday’s dynamo principle: 
by spinning a coiled wire wrapped around a ring past a magnet, magnetism is 
transformed into electricity and the electrons begin to flow down the wire.  In other 
words, the efficiency of the electric generator is limited by (among other things) the 
efficiency of the rotation.161 
                                               
 
160
 A phenomenon which encourages the production of larger volumes of a commodity to 
reduce its unit cost by distributing fixed costs over a greater quantity. 
161
 It’s obvious that when dealing with a rotating body, its main source of inefficiency is the 
energy lost through friction.  The phenomenon is analogous to the rolling friction of a wheel on the ground, 
and its coefficient of friction is µr, with the formula for the energy of friction being: F = (µr) / (r*N). Where 
r is the radius of the rotor and N is the force normal to the direction of friction (in other words, the force of 
the surface against which the wheel is rubbing pushing back on it.)  F operates from the center of the rotor 
and in a direction opposite that of rotation.   
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Because of friction considerations, a smaller generator would not be as efficient in 
its rotation as a larger one, and so it made sense to have generators built as large as 
possible.  In addition, of course, the advantage of having one very large generator as 
opposed to many small generators is in the manufacturing cost: it is easier to build only 
one of something.  This made engineers and power plant stockholders seek to improve 
the efficiency of their generators by expanding their size. 
Since electric power cannot be stored effectively (at least not as electric power), 
this meant finding use for all the power generated by these large machines required very 
large markets.  This in turn led to the perception that, given that electricity was fungible 
anyway, and it was impossible for one producer to make the electricity coming from their 
generators intrinsically better than the amperes coming from their competitor’s, it would 
be most efficient simply to divide the regions between producers, granting each a state-
supervised monopoly in a particular area.  This development set in the electric industry’s 
subsequent pattern of very high starting costs and extremely low variable costs (once the 
giant generators are spinning, they can pretty much go on spinning, and all alterations in 
their regular regime are avoided as much as possible.) 
The emergence of regional monopolies was not predetermined by the nature of 
electric generation but resulted from some very specific assumptions made by the persons 
deciding federal, state, and company policy during this period.  The rise of the utilities 
model came from the cross-fertilization of the fungibility assumption with the assumption 
that the most important part of generator efficiency was the avoidance of friction losses. 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Rotational friction is less than sliding friction because a large fraction of the friction force  
vector gets re-directed by the shifting position of the wheel.  (Think wind vector pushing on a sail; 
then think of a shroud line snapping so the sail goes in the direction wind is pushing.  The amount of force 
that is distributed to the forward motion of the ship is nonzero, but very small.  The same thing happens to 
the frictional force pushing on a rotating wheel). 
If we assume that each revolution of the wire coil equals a certain amount of energy lost to 
friction, since a very large generator will have a single point on its surface make fewer complete circles per 
unit time, this would imply that it experiences less friction – and given the same amount of energy used to 
spin the two generators, it is obviously more efficient to spin a large one fewer times that a small one more.   
 
 Electric Power and Social Attitudes - 184 - Naiman, Bollinger, Waldron 
 
 
4.2.2 The Inaccuracies of the Regional Monopoly Paradigm. 
The first inaccuracy to consider is that the only way to reduce friction-caused 
inefficiency is through up-scaling the generator to be slower and more ponderous in its 
rotation.  There are actually a substantial number of ways to avoid friction-related energy 
loss -- ways that are actually made easier if the generator is smaller in dimensions than 
the typical utility behemoth. 
1. The first technique lies in simply reusing the heat of friction, so that it is 
not lost, and is thus counted as an asset and a benefit instead of a waste. 
If the electricity is being generated with a gas turbine as a prime mover (as 
most new thermal power plants are), the heat energy can be used to run the gas 
compressors for the turbine cycle (a combined cycle), allowing efficiencies of up 
to 60%.  If the electricity is generated on-site at a factory, or some other 
installation that needs heat for some other useful process (for example a school 
that needs both electric light and central heating), the efficiency of the total co-
generational process can reach as much as 90%.  This spike in efficiency can 
enable a factory to beat the giant power plant at its own game: generate the 
electric power it needs on-site, and then sell the surplus onto the grid at cheaper, 
advantageous retail rates, since it does not have to worry about recouping much of 
the giant plant’s friction losses.  In fact, recent advances in microturbine 
technology for power generation have created manufacturing lines of turbines that 
need no lubricants, have so few moving parts that they can run unattended for 
months on end, and, when used as dual generators of electricity and useable heat, 
achieve nearly the theoretical maximum of thermal efficiency allowed by the 
nature of the technology. 
 
2. The second technique of beating friction-derived inefficiency is through 
the use of modern materials and computer-aided design in the initial construction of the 
turbine. 
Certain modern materials – one of them, under certain circumstances, is 
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the ubiquitous and cheap graphite -- possess a recently discovered property 
known as “super-lubricity,” which means they are all but immune to the effects of 
friction as exhibited in most other materials: as far as it is possible to determine 
by modern measuring methods, their coefficient of friction is 0.  An additional 
number of various materials are not exactly at that level, but their friction is still 
very low compared to common metals that go to make up a generator.  Such 
substances can be used as coatings on any rotating machine parts, vastly reducing 
energy loss due to friction – of course some energy loss will remain, but it will be 
so miniscule that the size of the generator will make no significant difference. 
Naturally, we must realize that a generator half the size of those preferred 
in the days of regional monopoly will need a smaller amount of this anti-friction 
coating, saving its installer initial costs without sacrificing long-term efficiency.  
Under such circumstances, if the coating itself is sufficiently costly; it may be 
more profitable to have a smaller generator which takes more revolutions than a 
large one that takes up more coating costs.  Under such circumstances, the old 
size considerations no longer apply: it may very well be just as efficient for a 
plant owner to have three smaller generators running in parallel, whose total area 
to be coated is equal to the size of one large one! 
 Another way for turbine-driven generators to beat friction is 
through innovative turbine design.  In the past half-century, the modern science of 
computational fluid dynamics has advanced far beyond the simplifying formulas 
used by classical mechanics to design turbines.  This has revolutionized turbine 
design over the past forty years.  As is usual in such cases, the efficiency of a 
modern turbine depends on the extreme precision not only of the calculations, but 
of manufacturing as well.  Any error in the slope of a surface curve would be 
magnified on a larger object, leading to greater deviation from the computer 
model’s predictions of flow behavior.  This would mean that the precision 
requirements for a larger turbine would be paradoxically greater than for a turbine 
slightly smaller (like half the size.)  Greater need for machine precision implies a 
greater expense in manufacturing per unit of turbine surface area.  If the savings 
in efficiency that comes from computer-aided turbine design are great enough, it 
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might be again be cheaper to build two smaller turbines than a single larger one, 
and have each turbine drive a smaller generator.  
 
3. Finally, there is the consideration of efficiency that goes beyond the 
turbine.  Particularly burning questions in electric power efficiency are load management 
and optimization of transmission and distribution. 
A large power plant needs to have its baseline generators constantly 
spinning, even in the dead of night when the power they generate is greater than 
the total immediate demand.  If the baseline generators ever had to stop, the costs 
of doing so and then starting them up again and bringing them up to required 
speeds would be greater than the losses the power plant takes from leaving them 
spinning when the electricity goes unused.  There are indeed additional tiers of 
temporary generators, -- the intermediate load and the peak load tier of generators 
-- which the large plants often use to meet hours of mounting demand in the 
morning and afternoon.  But even when the peak and then the intermediate load 
generators are taken off-line during the trough in demand that comes after most 
potential users are in bed, the baseline generators must still produce power 
whether anyone uses it or not.  Adding the intermediate and then the peak load 
temporary generators on-line and then removing them is inherently an inefficient 
solution, though of course it prevents the greater inefficiency of running the 
baseline machines at the afternoon levels of demand.  But aside from the 
inefficiency of switching the intermediate and then the peak tiers on and off, the 
baseline generators must still maintain a supply greater than demand all through 
the night.  Any generating company would welcome the chance to try a solution 
that matched supply to demand more closely, which is a reason why natural 
monopolies also grew. 
Regional monopolies also have trouble with the transmission side of the 
electric power market.  A transmission grid is optimized to deliver power to the 
consumer in the most efficient and least costly way achievable.  It is obvious that 
this priority faces a serious constraint when the only way the grid can draw on 
electric power is through a few point sources, and the supply to large areas full of 
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consumers must depend on the long connection to the central plant, which may 
contain a long and tortuous chain of switches, bifurcations, and transformations, 
to remain uninterrupted.  There are many potential failure points along that path, 
as the power outage that struck New York City in the summer of 2003 so clearly 
warned us. 
If such a system of central generation nubs, high-voltage main lines, and 
transformation towers to damp the current down to retail consumption level is 
optimized according to the methods of old utility grids, the optimization is a rigid 
one where one particular way is clearly more cost-efficient and reliable than the 
others, meaning they are only designed to work in a specific direction.  That type 
of optimization leaves the system with major problems when, say, one of the 
power plants wheeling its power through it needs to shut down in order to upgrade 
its generator technology to something that was not designed 70 years ago.  
Because of this, the central-hub sort of optimization has quite possibly held the 
installation of modern gas turbines in the industry back by decades.  It is to the 
rigid paucity of possible optimums, and to the infamous if-it-ain’t-broke-don’t-
fix-it mentality it nurtures in the regional power companies, that we still owe the 
continued operation of those old coal-firing plants that still chug along in the 
Midwest, plaguing the EPA offices of every state downwind from them.  The cost 
of re-calculating all the optimizations and redesigning the distribution network 
must be added to the cost of actually upgrading the plant, retiring the old steam 
turbines, and installing the new gas-powered ones.  Very often, the regional 
utilities put up a determined struggle against all outsiders that seek to force them 
into making such changes. 
 
4. Of course when considering electric power, we must step away from the 
fungibility assumption, and consider the other products of the system that produces this 
electric power – namely the power’s sociological, economic, and environmental effects. 
The old central-station paradigm was really very similar to the medieval 
Chinese system of governing provinces.  The utility is assigned a region where 
only the utility can sell electric power, much like a Chinese mandarin was 
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assigned a territory where his word would be law.  The utility holds the monopoly 
on the sufferance of a higher authority, to which it must justify its actions, from a 
change in rates to the number of people in the region who have no electric power, 
the same way a Mandarin ideally had to justify his behavior and success in 
governing to the Emperor.  The utility usually maintained a good relationship 
with the people to whom it provided its services, a relationship that often lasted 
decades and resulted in mutual respect and courtesy on both sides; the poor 
people who could not afford to pay for electric power were often provided that 
power anyway, at least enough to stay warm in winter and have their basic 
appliances running.  Some of the people now living under the modern, recently 
deregulated system, with generation assets rapidly becoming more and more 
distributed, often speak of the old utility system with nostalgia for the old power 
company, which recognized that what they were selling is a service and a 
relationship, and not a commodity. 
But there was a reverse side to that coin.  After the cost of fossil fuels 
jumped in the early 1970’s and the federal government passed numerous acts to 
combat air pollution throughout the 1960’s and 70’s, the costs and, 
correspondingly, the rates of producing electric power grew steadily.  But without 
the benefits of a competitive market to drive innovation in operations, 
management, and technology, there was nothing to bring either these costs or 
these rates down again; up they climbed and stayed up, until they climbed even 
higher.  The continuing explosion in suburban sprawl meant that more and more 
Americans were living a lifestyle that maximized their electricity consumption. 
And because one of the side effects of the power companies’ regional-monopoly 
paternalism was to disempower the individual communities of their buying 
choices, and to make conditions of electric power service allegedly uniform 
throughout the monopoly region, the resulting effect contributed its part to the 
atomization of America’s urban population.  More suburbs grew, uniform, 
inefficient, and, in any but the wealthiest society on the planet, insanely expensive 
in terms of energy requirements.  Even for the wealthiest society, they represented 
a considerable net loss that kept on growing from year to year. 
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Since the demand for electric power kept on increasing, since the 
prevailing paradigm of power generation believed only in constructing large 
power plants to take advantage of the economy of scale that lay at the heart of 
policymakers’ assumptions regarding the industry, and since the construction of 
those power plants was now made more troublesome by the new environmental 
impact regulations, demand often outstripped supply, nudging the retail rates ever 
upwards.  As mentioned before, once they went up, the rate tended to stay there. 
This was also due to a success in conservative efforts, partly due to sure capital 
costs. 
Finally, as the demand continued to climb, increased strain was placed 
upon the distribution network, as the engineers maintaining it struggled to find 
ways to wheel power over to regions of highest demand through connections not 
designed for the post-urban-sprawl conditions in which the system now had to 
operate.  The tariff costs – that is to say, the costs of transmitting and distributing 
electric power to consumers half a state or more away – grew to the point that in 
some states, the consumers were paying as much for distribution and delivery as 
they were paying for the actual energy. 
The regional monopoly system was still acceptable to most residential 
consumers, since the overall generation process was so efficient that even with the 
rate and tariff increases, they did not truly feel they were paying an outrageous 
price.  But the industrial power users, who used enough electric power that the 
new increases added up to some substantial operating costs for them, were 
growing restless.  They felt that a new paradigm was necessary, which would cut 
costs for users and make electric power more reliable and less dependent on 
bureaucratic regulation. 
4.2.3 Distributed Generation 
Distributed generation assumes that, unlike the old days of central and immense 
power stations servicing a region assigned to them by a public authority (usually the state 
government), electricity can be more efficiently generated by distributing smaller but 
more modern generational assets across the region.  A related, but not identical concept is 
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that of market deregulation: the belief that anyone who can physically produce electricity 
at a cost people are willing to pay should be able to get on the common grid and sell it on 
a free market. 
The second idea follows from the first: since electricity is no longer seen as 
something best produced by an economy of scale, the most important argument for 
regional monopolies falls away, and it becomes harder to justify the actions of state 
government in granting customer blocks out to the energy firms it patronizes.  Thus, 
although the distributed generation paradigm does not have to be used as an argument for 
deregulation, in the United States it mostly is.  Since the whole point of distributed 
generation is for non-profit companies and local communities to make electric power as 
they need it (although there are many other advocates of distributed generation that hope 
it will energize small businesses) and then sell the excess back to the grid, it makes a 
more sense for a factory or the resident with some extra capacity in their gas turbine or 
wind generator to sell the energy to whomever they want.  Usually the excesses sold by 
many small producers are pooled, or aggregated together before they are resold, a move 
that is necessary to cut the transaction costs of bargaining for energy.  Because of this 
economic requirement, there is, in fact, an alternative to deregulation: the small producers 
can sell their excess only to the local utility, which would then pool the energy and sell it 
to some other consumer.  But obviously this would bring up the issue of trade monopoly, 
which the United States society is much less willing to tolerate than a “natural” monopoly 
in production.  Because of this, in those regions where distributed generation is 
widespread, the electric power industry is usually also deregulated, and the pooling is 
usually done by an independent aggregator company. 
The details of how the access to the grid is to be financed for these multiple 
energy providers remains a topic to be discussed, and even the need for other providers 
than the regional utility may be debated, so in its pure form, the distributed generation 
paradigm consists of a purely geographical description.  Rather than a small number of 
central hubs with spokes of high-voltage wires radiating out from them to branch into a 
web of smaller residential wire services, we see a distributed network of generating plants 
located all across the region, each plant small compared to the old leviathans but more 
efficient thanks to their quicker adoption of new technologies.  This pattern of generation 
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enjoys numerous advantages over the old system of mammoth central installations.  Since 
a corresponding fraction of a region’s total generating power is present in every part of 
the region, such a distribution network could both be extremely flexible in the face of 
unexpected need for grid repairs, and much better suited to the task of matching supply 
with demand at any given hour of day or night. 
Because the generators involved would be smaller, even if load management were 
handled simply by shutting down some of them when not needed, the size (that is, the 
mass) difference alone would result in a better match between demand and supply and 
provide for lower costs of warming the generators up and cooling them down.  It is easier 
to achieve a match between two values if the units of power you add or subtract are on 
the order of 500 kilowatts rather than 50 megawatts.  The main obstacle to the large 
power plants seeking to start and stop their generators to match demand is the thermal 
stresses it puts on the generators.  But because the smaller turbines of the distributed-
generation paradigm are more similar to the peak-load generators than they are to the 
base-load generators, and can thus better withstand thermal stresses; this gives them an 
advantage in being able to switch on and off at less cost to the operator. 
But of course the distributed generation paradigm makes more elegant options 
much easier, with only the local demand to consider. For example, since a giant power 
plant must account for the demand of many different locales, while under distributed 
generation, each of those locales will have the power to make its own electricity; it would 
be much easier for a single community to determine exactly how much electricity it 
should produce during off-peak hours.  No matter how thorough the central utility’s 
surveys might be, as long as some of them have the proper training, or the assistance of 
people with such training, the residents of any given locale can estimate their individual 
community’s needs more accurately if only because they do not need to lump many 
communities together in one giant estimate.  Any emergency reserve generated above 
that local demand mark would be much easier to store that it would be if it was a giant 
reserve generated for many communities at a central location – with the local provider 
aiming to supply only a limited pool of potential local consumers, the total amount of 
kilowatt-hours to be stored would be much smaller, and this smaller power pool would be 
more amenable to storage in the form of potential, chemical, or heat energy. 
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And finally, with each individual community where this generation asset is 
located seeking to maximize its use, it would be much easier for local demand to change 
itself in order to better fit the supply.  This would occur for at least two reasons.  Firstly, 
any electric power produced by the generation asset but not used and not wheeled 
elsewhere would represent a potential energy benefit that local businesses would compete 
to gain.  And in addition, if we assume the most likely case, where generation assets are 
not only distributed geographically but also deregulated economically, we will have a 
situation where, unlike a larger utility controlled by regulator approval, the smaller 
provider is free to set its retail rates to reflect the disparity in loads more accurately, 
charging extra for peak rates of use and providing lucrative discounts for off-peak hours.  
The improved price signaling would cause a growth in energy storage technology, some 
of which (storing electricity as heat, for example) are already very accessible, but not 
much in demand.  The new rate regime would boost the rate at which customers decide 
that energy storage is something they are willing to pay for, giving market penetration a 
boost. 
Here, it is also important to consider the role played by the distributed generation 
paradigm in the increased penetrating power of “green” generating technologies. 
A very popular explanation for the failure of so many energy firms to adopt 
photovoltaics and wind power for primary energy production is the “natural” small scale 
of these two generating methods.  The photovoltaic panels are limited in size by 
production costs and by the space they need to function profitably.  Large wind-powered 
turbines are also limited in size, in this case by the stresses which the rotation of a large 
turbine’s immense blades puts on that turbine’s hub, as the rotational energy of the 
turbine is multiplied by the long blade acting as a lever.  The resulting installations might 
have been enough to power a single residence or business, perhaps a municipal building.  
But in order to produce power in bulk and sell it to many different consumers, very large 
areas need to be set aside for photovoltaic projects, and a large number of wind turbine 
towers have to be constructed, with a single small turbine mounted atop each tower and 
each small turbine being wired to pool the generated power into a larger block – all of 
these factors adding greatly to the installation’s construction costs.  In addition to the 
construction costs, the problems of simply obtaining sufficient open space was nothing to 
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take lightly – there was usually quite a number of developers competing for the real 
estate required, the profits of using this real estate for any number of other purposes 
would be likely to recoup the developer’s money in a much shorter time, and the costs 
that a power industry investor would need to incur in order to secure the space for a solar 
power plant or a wind farm would make the project quite prohibitive. 
Because of this, when photovoltaics and wind power have been adopted in the 
days of old central stations, it was usually done, and most certainly usually perceived as 
being done, mainly for reasons of environmental concern, and not for such sound 
business reasons as the increased stability such projects would provide a generating 
enterprise against fossil fuel price fluctuations.  Since most solar and wind installations 
were believed to be best suited for powering an individual small business or residence, 
most of the potential large-scale investors believed that these methods of generating 
power were uneconomical and inefficient.  Even given the incentives which federal and 
state governments provided to utilities that invested in progressive methods of electric 
power generation, the response of utilities to these incentives had often been lackluster: 
they simply failed to see where the demand would come from, given the fact that most 
people were less than concerned about emissions or unable to express that concern 
effectively in policy or consumer decisions. 
But if the electric power generation in a particular region switches over to a 
distributed generation paradigm, the former immense energy market that central power 
stations needed to serve is instead converted to many smaller, local markets, each of 
which can be served by a multitude of generating facilities.  If we also assume 
deregulation, we have competition between the owners of these facilities added in, with 
each owner seeking to gain market share.  Under such circumstances, gaining a measure 
of stability against volatile fossil fuel prices is particularly attractive, aiding the 
penetration of green energy.  But even if we do not assume complete deregulation, but 
instead postulate a somewhat less likely situation where multiple power producers sell 
their excess power to the utility at predetermined rates, we still have a situation where 
there are many small generating assets spread out across the land. 
Some of these small power producers would arguably become an “in-between” 
market for photovoltaics and wind turbines.  After all, following the distribution (with or 
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without deregulation), the total amount of electricity one of the smaller installations 
might produce is now small enough that adding a block of “green” power, even if that 
block would have been much too small for a large central station to bother with, would 
make a real difference in the generating capacity of the smaller installation.  The starting 
costs would still be high at first, but even so, making 30% of a particular generating 
enterprise’s production capacity independent of fossil fuels would be a significantly 
different proposition than making independent .1% of a larger station’s capacity.  
Photovoltaics and wind farms can now be considered on their own merits, and upscaled 
to a significant fraction of an installation’s output if the economics warrant doing so – 
and many very clever people can now go to work figuring out ways to make economics 
warrant it, because having a significant generation asset which you never have to fuel is 
always attractive.  Thus the number of photovoltaic and wind-powered installations 
which produce enough power to supply several households or businesses at once, or even 
a whole community, can be expected to increase under a distributed generation pattern of 
electric power production. 
Once photovoltaics and wind power are no longer seen as being fit only to power 
individual buildings, this change would increase the amount of resources the society 
allocates to solving the scale problems that plague these methods.  With better materials, 
the size of a single wind turbine would keep on increasing – it is no accident that wind 
farms of 5MW per windmill are now in development.  Considering continued progress in 
materials, there is no reason to assume the upscaling of wind turbines will stop there.  
With the increased demand for photovoltaic panels, the costs of manufacturing a panel 
would continue to decrease, and the efficiency of a square meter of photovoltaic surface 
would keep on increasing.  
To summarize, under the old paradigm, the central power stations would have 
provided enough power in such immense chunks that large green installations weren’t 
seriously considered, but with distributed generation, the chunks are broken up, and as a 
result some of them are now small enough that scaled-up installations of wind and solar 
power can actually compete.  This may seem a paradoxical conclusion at first, since 
obviously the larger power plants would have much larger budgets available to install 
green power facilities should their boards choose to do so.  But their fiscal obligations 
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would usually be correspondingly large, while the rewards of making a green installation 
work would be much larger for the smaller electricity producer.  Other potential “green” 
methods which could benefit from this redistribution in the size of an average generation 
block include small hydro projects, and developing technologies seeking to harness the 
power of tides and waves. 
 
4.2.4 Potential Effects of Distributed Generation 
Besides the benefits distributed generation provides in load management, 
improved market penetration for “green” generation technologies, and, in cases of 
deregulated distributed generation, an increased market for power storage devices, 
combined with more accurate price signaling, there are additional benefits to be derived 
from this new paradigm.  These are the benefits that the engineers and business majors 
that make most of the policy decisions in the electric power sector have unfortunately 
ignored unless forced to consider them by an outside agency – until now.  The business 
community is currently recognizing the importance of these issues to economic and 
efficiency considerations, and it appears that this wider context is here to stay. 
 
4.2.5 Emissions 
First of all, there are the environmental considerations.  Aside from the fact that 
distributed generation would, as was mentioned above, help energy storage devices and 
“green” generating technology gain a wider hold on the economy, we must consider the 
ability of this new arrangement to comply with environmental regulations.  Since the new 
co-generational microturbines and miniturbines (the biggest single component of 
distributed generation after wind and solar power) would mostly be located at various 
installations that can use the heat as well as the electricity, it would usually mean 
industrial plants, or perhaps very large residential buildings or office parks that would 
ordinarily spend a lot of money on central heating.  Such factories and buildings are 
already subject to stringent emissions regulation, and because they order new equipment 
more often then power plants in any case, they have more experience in making sure that 
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any new technology new technology they install fits the relevant parts of the emissions 
code.  It would be easier for them to order a little extra equipment to sequester the 
emissions from their microturbine – after all, they will know that they will still save 
money with all the tariff costs of electric energy that they will now avoid, in addition to 
the money they will gain from selling their excess back onto the grid for a tidy sum.  
Moreover, a large central plant, whose board is aware that it is the only source of electric 
power for millions of people, might choose to bargain the regulators down to reach a 
lower standard.  Smaller producers, used to meeting requirements for low emissions, and 
aware that no single one of them is irreplaceable to the local economy, would choose 
instead to give regulators no reason to find fault with them. There are still significant 
knowledge and inertia barriers to co-generation however. 
Besides that, there is the issue of the physical capacity of a generating entity to 
sequester its emissions.  Under distributed generation, the microturbine’s and 
miniturbine’s spread across a region would all produce their emissions in smaller 
amounts at any one emission point, compared with a situation when all emissions are 
concentrated at a single point of generation represented by a mammoth central station 
with frequently obsolete machinery.  This reduction in emissions at any given location of 
production can allow for easier and more successful sequestration of these emissions than 
the old central-station paradigm would allow. Given the easier time which the owners of 
each distributed asset would have in purchasing more efficient machinery, very likely the 
total sum of emissions their facilities produce all across the region would also be smaller 
than that produced by a single central station. 
A central power plant may produce so much CO2 at once, not to mention other 
gases and particulate matter, that even with the best of intentions and the best equipment 
it may be difficult to capture all of it before some of the waste escapes to wreak havoc on 
the air quality of anything downwind.  Even if the technology to sequester all those 
emissions at once is available, it may be difficult for a large central plant, with its 
multitude of financial obligations, to afford the necessary equipment.  But under 
distributed generation, both the emissions, and the economic responsibility for them are 
distributed more equally through the economy.  The many smaller turbines, all of which 
together would produce the same amount of power as a larger central station, can each be 
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fitted with its own set of sequestering devices in its own time, as each turbine is added 
onto the grid.  Though this piecemeal installation may or may not cost more in the 
aggregate than installing the corresponding sequestration equipment on a central station, 
the important thing is that it will also be financed turbine by turbine instead of all at once. 
The burden of each particular financing operation will also fall on a different economic 
entity rather than lying on the shoulders of the same power utility (and, indirectly, its 
ratepayers, but since the utility is regulated, historically it hasn’t been able to raise its 
rates fast enough to compensate for the added burdens.)  This will finally make it possible 
to finance an overhaul of the electric power sector to meet the standards of sustainability 
without imposing additional burdens on either the provision of necessary services or the 
rank-and-file ratepayers.  The extra money will come from the increased efficiency of the 
renewable energy assets operating under the distributed generation paradigm. 
 
4.2.6 Communities 
Another important variable to consider is the set of social consequences stemming 
from the implementation of the new paradigm.  Before, the regional monopoly paradigm 
meant that any community which found itself within that customer block had to buy from 
a particular utility.  Any change in favor of distributed generation gives buying power 
back to the individual communities: a community that wishes to make a statement in 
favor of air quality or sustainability can now vote with its pocketbook by buying electric 
power from the most environmentally-friendly providers.  If the extra costs still attached 
to green energy concern the local town meeting, they can still buy electric power from 
operators of gas turbines who meet more stringent emissions standards than the old 
central power plants manage to meet. 
Moreover, since under the new paradigm, anyone can become an energy 
producer, local communities can get in on the action, generating electric power for their 
own municipal buildings, schools, the local Boys and Girls Club, or anything else that the 
city believes to need electricity.  The generating plants can be run through a [program 
designed to maximize the participation of citizens: for example, a school could put up its 
own wind turbine and some solar panels and use these various aspects of these devices in 
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action to instruct students in physics, math, earth science, economics, social sciences, 
metal shop, accounting, and so forth.  A children’s club could put up a solar panel, sell 
the electricity and then have the students of the local after-school program vote what to 
spend the money on.  This can be applicable on a larger scale: any excess power 
produced can be sold into the grid to raise money for some project the community votes 
to fund with the proceeds.  Local businesses can subsidize the added costs on the bills of 
any citizens who choose to buy green power, or make the purchase of solar panels or 
wind turbines for private households easier.  In exchange, the city can give businesses 
that choose to participate in this program free advertisement in public spaces and breaks 
on any municipal tax.  This sort of civic involvement can be channeled into any number 
of useful fields, from the reclamation of urban blight to making the city more attractive to 
outside investors. 
Any communities that adopt this sort of active participation in the new electricity 
market will likely undergo a marked change in their relationship with their citizens.  The 
city will stop being just a general designation to write on a billing address, and will now 
become a work in progress by its every citizen.  The inexorable process of human 
atomization, a process which virtually defined late 20th century in North American 
suburbia, can now be at least partially reversed, with individual citizens coming together 
to make their places of residence into real communities.  In turn this rise in community 
spirit can reverberate in the state legislature and even on the federal level, as elected 
officials take note of their voters’ new orientation.  Of course it would be naïve to 
suppose that a mere change in the electricity-buying patterns of some few municipalities 
would precipitate any sort of social revolution.  Social inertia is a more stubborn beast 
than that.  But, even if more changes than that would be needed to transform society to 
any great degree, a more involved participation of small and large communities in the 
production of electric power can still be a major force for the good in a former fiefdom of 
the power utilities, both with regard to the environment and with regard to the individual 
citizens’ environmental awareness and civic spirit. This sort of collective decision 
making is fundamental to the democratic pragmatist. 
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4.2.7 Individual Attitudes 
In addition to the empowerment that a paradigm of distributed electric power 
generation will bring to the community, it can also serve as a way to empower the 
individual.  As the pattern of producing electric power in a region becomes more and 
more distributed, the number of privately owned wind turbines and solar panels will 
continue to increase.  There are locales that are ill-suited to the installation of solar panels 
or wind turbines due to prevailing weather conditions, but the increased adoption of the 
distributed generation paradigm has led to a surge in the development of microturbines, 
which can be installed anywhere, and micro hydro installations, which can be installed in 
most places where water comes down from a higher feature of the landscape.  The 
increased penetration of technologies like these into millions of individual lives could 
have numerous effects. An example would be the fuel cell, once manufacturing becomes 
common, most people will rely on this energy. 
In many cases people will find it profitable to buy and install various generation 
assets for their private use.  Even in cases when they would not be producing enough of 
an excess to sell to an aggregator, they would still make back the initial costs of 
installation, accumulating the money they save every month on transmission tariff rates.  
As generators, they would now be subject to whatever regulations the society has in place 
to control emissions: the users of wind, micro hydro, and solar power would find their 
production of clean energy encouraged by tax breaks and, in some cases, a guaranteed 
market provided by the state and municipal governments for green energy, while the 
users of microturbines would come under pressure to use their new devices in the most 
efficient way -- one that maximizes the amount of energy usefully extracted from any 
given volume of fuel and minimizes the emissions. 
Those microturbine owners that pay for the latest models,(whose emissions now 
meet California standards for motor vehicles, and install the latest sequestration 
technology to capture the emissions that are produced, would be rewarded in our system 
by the tax code in direct proportion to the money spent on preventing emissions and the 
effectiveness of the measures taken.  Those that opt to install microturbines that are less 
emissions-efficient per kW-hour than a central station’s generators could have been 
would instead suffer appropriate penalties on their taxes.  If the state in question has a 
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certificate system in place, such microturbine owners would be able to get out of the tax 
penalties by purchasing green energy certificates on the open market, in effect instituting 
a carbon trading system for distributed producers – something that would run into all 
sorts of legislative, legal, and lobbying obstacles if attempted on the scale of large central 
power stations.  Since it is very difficult for a small turbine to be as fuel-efficient as a 
large one, this would encourage the further adoption of wind, micro hydro, and 
photovoltaic power, as well as further refinements in turbine emissions sequestration. 
In the aggregate, all these outcomes will lead to widespread literacy in green 
power issues, not merely among activists or educated specialists, but at the grassroots 
level, where the resource allocation – that is to say, the decision to buy a new home 
generator – will take place.  Not only will the owners of distributed assets themselves 
become better informed, but simply by being present among their neighbors, discussing 
their solar panels at the water cooler in the office or talking to the neighbor about what 
they bought with their new source of income, the new owners will reinforce a positive 
image of green electric generation as practical and profitable.  Combined with the new 
paradigm’s effect on communities described above, the introduction of the distributed 
generation paradigm would create a public awareness (that is to say, millions of instances 
of personal awareness) at least equal to that enjoyed by populations of such Nordic 
nations as Denmark and Finland.  The awareness those countries enjoy of issues related 
to their environment derives to a large extent from the strong sense of community, and 
active membership therein, enjoyed by resident of a Danish or Finnish population. 
Neither of these two nations has been afflicted by the suburbia blight nearly to the 
extent to which it plagues the United States, and so their citizens still see the town they 
live in, whether large or small, as something more than a mailing address.  When a Dane 
or a Finn takes part in community life it is for reasons ranging from a desire for personal 
expression to psychological conformism to perhaps a simple wish to enjoy a pleasant 
neighborhood together with good neighbors.  But in any case, community plays a much 
greater role in his or her daily living – and because of this, the Finn or Dane is much 
more likely to care about issues that affect that community, a concern which then 
expands by a sort of psychological transference, spreading to include issues which do not 
affect the community yet but might affect it one day. 
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To put it simply, citizens see a reason to get informed today about something that 
may happen tomorrow, because they have built up the general habit of making 
themselves informed through community participation.  If distributed generation takes 
hold here, the spreading out of participation in energy policy that will follow on the heels 
of a spreading out of generation assets is therefore likely to build that habit among United 
States citizens, eventually creating a culture of active participation in the modern “edge 
city.” 
 
4.2.8 Argument for Distributed Generation 
Given the description of all the potential benefits distributed generation can bring 
to the investor, the consumer, the environment, the community, and the individual 
resident of that community, it is only fair to ask: why, if this paradigm has been more or 
less around for 20 years now, did so many of these projected benefits simply fail to 
materialize?  The answer, as with technology (which is not surprising, since the two 
subjects are so obviously related) lies in the reluctance of large segments of the 
population in general, and of policymakers in particular to commit fully to distributed 
generation.  In the absence of action, the old regional monopoly paradigm continues to 
trudge along by inertia, even in regions where the large central stations no longer enjoy a 
regional monopoly.  In such regions distributed generation has indeed enjoyed some 
success, since in the absence of a regional monopoly a certain degree of distribution 
among generation assets tends to emerge spontaneously, but such successes have largely 
been piecemeal: scattered and largely unnoticed by the general public. 
Indeed the public’s attitude toward the whole affair is characterized by an odd 
duality.  The various drawbacks of the old central-station paradigm are widely perceived 
as inconveniences, but tolerated for fear that either the effort of changing the system 
would lead to greater problems still, or that the new changes are in some way an effort by 
“special interests” to defraud the public.  Often the people simply do not demand change 
because they do not see any of the alternatives as viable, and after all, the old system still 
works well enough to keep electric power affordable, reliable and plentiful – most of the 
time. 
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But how can we make the distributed generation future possible? What is needed 
to change the industry is pressure from any one of the discourses in the right direction. 
Below, we discuss, in greater detail what the best course of action is for each discourse. 
The best course of action offers the discourse a more environmentally sustainable future 
in the electric power industry without having it compromise the ideals it stands for. 
4.2.9 Administrative Rationalist 
An Administrative Rationalist sees the world in terms of rewards and 
punishments that a central planning agency must distribute in order to get the situation 
into a state that the agency’s experts pronounce optimal for the agency’s goals.  From this 
point of view, distributed generation is the natural outcome of the new knowledge, 
particularly technological knowledge, which allows producers to generate electricity at 
high efficiency without the need for a centralized regional monopoly.  Clearly, if a 
technology is more efficient, all alternatives to it are wasteful, and so the pattern of 
spreading generation assets across the region must be favored by the controlling agency.  
This distribution in turn leads to deregulation and the introduction of multiple 
competitors.  The logic of deregulation is straightforward: as the economy of scale ceases 
to be as important as it once was, the special privilege granted to regional utilities 
becomes unfair and unearned; a clear case of preferential treatment and, now that it is no 
longer justified by economic expediency, also a case of political patronage of a business 
by the government.  As such, it is subject to the anti-trust regulations that exist on both 
state and federal statute books.  As someone to whom the rule of law is of paramount 
importance, the Administrative Rationalist feels an obligation to repeal the regional 
monopoly paradigm. 
 One of the most pestiferous annoyances in the life of an adherent to the 
Administrative Rationalist discourse lies in the constant interference of outside factors 
that make various subjects of the administrator’s regulations unable to meet them.  If the 
subject is important enough, like the electric power industry, that often forces the 
administrator to make the best of a bad bargain and allow the subject leeway – and if this 
situation lasts long enough, it becomes part of the new status quo, with a new generation 
of bureaucrats finding all sorts of irregularities and inconveniences in any attempt to 
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change it.  Today, we have situations when coal-fired electric power plants, which supply 
millions of people with cheap electricity, are allowed to dump toxic substances and 
greenhouse gases into the atmosphere with near impunity, emitting them in amounts that 
would have led to an immediate cease-and-desist court order if a nonessential factory 
attempted to get away with causing such pollution. 
Under distributed generation, there are many electric power producers supplying 
any given region, some inside that region and some outside it.  None of them are 
indispensable, and so whatever regulations the bureaucracies decide to impose upon the 
electric power industry under the new paradigm, those regulations will finally have teeth.  
The new producers of electric power will no longer be able to swing a state legislature or 
a governor’s office into granting an exemption.  Instead of being the potential opponents 
of the local regulatory body in the struggle for influence, the new power generators will 
see their best interests as lying in peaceful cooperation with the authorities.  Even if they 
come together and pool their influence, that alliance of competitors is likely to be a great 
deal weaker than the board of directors in an old regional-monopoly monolith. 
As described above, a region deriving its electric power from distributed 
generation is likely to find it easier to carry the regulations out.  The efficiency of the new 
micro- and miniturbines, combined with the lower cost of fitting them with sequestration 
technology, will make it easier for the producers of electric power to comply with 
regulation, and so the regulator’s pronouncements and actual reality will now correspond 
much better.  Finally, under a distributed generation paradigm it will be possible to pass 
emissions regulations likely to have a meaningful effect.  Before, a regulatory agency had 
to be realistic: an immense power plant with rotating generators bigger than a house 
would need to burn coal if only to make its operating costs affordable.  With mini- and 
microturbines, on the other hand, we have installations that are quite capable of running 
on natural gas, or even biomass.  It is this quality combined with the efficiency of using 
the turbine as a double heat and electricity source that makes it economically practical to 
build turbines no more polluting than the average sedan under California’s latest 
emissions law. 
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4.2.10 Democratic Pragmatist 
To Democratic Pragmatists, the ability of people to govern themselves, as 
opposed to having their decisions forced on them by an impersonal outside agent, 
whether a corporation, a state legislature, or a federal law, is the paramount principle.  
This requires a community to make all major decisions on the local level, so that free 
individuals can participate in the democratic process in the most direct way possible.  
This focus on community is not a contradiction in a discourse that emphasizes the 
democratic empowerment of the individual.  The community is seen as an empowering 
principle, an eternal work in progress where each participant can make his or her wishes 
known, and many individuals can each bring their vision of the future to fruition by 
working together for the benefit of all.  Seen in that sense, it is the lack of a strong 
community to support and nurture that individuality that makes possible the atomization 
of modern Americans into the anonymous sterility of the suburb, or the merciless 
anonymity of the decaying inner city, subduing their individual personalities to the 
conformity imposed by outside forces, whether that force consists of the government, the 
Board of Directors, or the neighborhood gang.  It is possible to argue for or against this 
assertion, but that is the primary focus of the Democratic Pragmatist’s efforts.  The will 
of the people is paramount. 
With regards to distributed generation, the Democratic Pragmatist sees the old 
paradigm as a process of taking decision-making power away from either individuals or 
the communities they live in.  Under the mercy of the utility which was granted a 
regional monopoly, with uniform rates, tariffs, and conditions of service imposed upon 
every resident of every local community from the outside, the place where any one of 
them lives become scarcely more important than a postage address, and the people lose 
yet another connection to a living community spirit. 
Just because a community might have once chosen to do so, granting the utility a 
contract to serve it, does not make such a situation desirable today, when its ill effects can 
be seen more clearly.  Though the will of the people is paramount, many people can err 
just easily as one person can, and true democracy requires the opportunity to rectify past 
mistakes.  If the people of a community wish for an alternative to the utility with which 
this community signed a contract years ago, it is the people’s right to have such an option 
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available.  For advocates of the people’s power of informed choice, it is always important 
to remember that whatever efforts the utility makes to turn the service it renders into a 
relationship with the local residents, does not change the fact that it is a relationship 
where some power is held by the utility, some by the state regulatory agencies that set the 
conditions under which the utility rules its domain, but no power is left to the residents 
themselves, nor to the communities they live in.  The utility and its outside patron-
regulators set the rules of the game.  Once it becomes clear that the centralization of 
electric power production is not necessary for efficiency, and may even interfere with 
reliability of service, no excuse remains for communities to tolerate such a grievous 
limitation upon their buying power.’ 
The distributed generation paradigm allows communities and the individuals 
whose interests those communities represent through those individuals’ direct 
participation in the democratic process, to gain greater bargaining power through 
negotiations with many competing providers. This bargaining power is known as public 
power. It allows the communities to express their approval or disapproval of a generating 
firm’s environmental, social, or any other practice by threatening to take their business 
elsewhere.  It allows them to free themselves of tariff costs altogether by generating their 
own electric power, and to gain additional sources of revenue by selling the excess onto 
the grid.  And, what is even more important to a Democratic Pragmatist, distributed 
generation can serve as a tool that the modern community can use to revive the civic 
spirit of its residents, to make them full participants in the direct democratic process 
rather than just population statistics.  A community can make residents aware of a 
common goal and a common promise by giving them a selection of green energy 
programs to participate in, everyplace from school to the local park to the office building. 
Given all the possible advantages that the issues they advocate are likely to obtain 
from greater acceptance of the distributed generation paradigm, a conclusion becomes 
clear.  It would be an unpardonable waste – in fact it would be a failure to recognize the 
rarest and most rewarding opportunity in a century -- for adherents of the Democratic 
Pragmatist discourse in the United States to falter in their support for distributed 
generation. 
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4.2.11 Economic Rationalist 
To an Economic Rationalist, the question might seem to be straightforward 
enough.  Can investors gain a real profit – a profit based on the presence of customers 
willing to pay for the product, and not on any support from the government -- from the 
generation of electric power in many small plants rather than in just a few central 
installations?  Can projects seeking to build such smaller power plants attract venture 
capital?  Do they manage to recoup the initial investment – and if so, how quickly and by 
what margin?  If the margin of profit is large enough to satisfy investors, and the time it 
takes to recoup the investment is short enough that they don’t find it more profitable to 
channel their capital into other venues, more investors will support the next distributed 
generation project that comes along -- and the government should certainly not be 
permitted to stand in their way. 
If, on the other hand, investors are reluctant to commit money to startups that 
propose to generate, sell, or distribute electric power on the open market, and if, provided 
they do commit that money, the public does not wish to pay enough for the service to 
allow the startups to recoup, in such a case the natural operation of the marketplace 
would spontaneously lead to regional utilities, complete with a monopoly on the region 
they service.  In either case, there is no need for the government to do anything; in 
particular, says the Economic Rationalist, there seems little point in granting regional 
monopolies to utilities if these monopolies are allegedly so natural.  Draw back, says the 
Economic Rationalist.  Let the market sort it out. 
In one sense, this point of view makes adherents of the Economic Rationalist 
discourse the natural allies of anyone who wishes to end the old system of state patronage 
and supervision of utility companies, which granted a utility regional monopoly in 
exchange for having all changes in rates, tariffs, or generation capacity subject to a board 
review from a regulatory commission.  Such a system obviously violates the operation of 
the free markets: down with it!  In that sense, Economic Rationalists are big fans of 
distributed generation. 
On the other hand, any attempt by the government to impose another paradigm on 
the industry, as opposed to having this paradigm evolve spontaneously through market 
forces, will meet with stern and determined criticism from people claiming this to be 
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nothing more than new government patronage of new special interests, such as the 
renewable power lobby.  If adherents of the Economic Rationalist discourse see that the 
startups attempting to gain market share in the newly de-monopolized region have trouble 
attracting venture capital on their own, they will assert, with good reason, that forcing 
capital into such undertakings amounts to involuntary expropriation of that capital from 
banks and venture firms, which would otherwise have chosen what they would judge to 
be better projects which to entrust with their funds. 
Of course this portrayal of this discourse is a simplification, and any Economic 
Rationalists that seek to draw a strict line between profitable and unprofitable proposals 
are guilty of a serious oversimplification themselves.  Very often investors approach 
some phenomenon that appears inherently unprofitable and create a market for it where 
none existed once.  Some good examples would be railroads, aviation, cable TV, or 
cellular phones.  Modern venture capitalists have gotten very good at pinpointing avenues 
of investment that are unprofitable as they now are but that can become goldmines with 
some judicious development.  No real student of the market can fail to recognize these 
facts. 
But this does not change the gist of the Economic Rationalist worldview: if it is 
profitable, well and good.  If it isn’t, it either can or cannot be made profitable.  In either 
case, the question of developing it is between the venture capitalist, the people with the 
original proposal for a startup, and the customers, with no need for the government to do 
more than enforce contracts and safeguard private rights to property. 
On the other hand, most Economic Rationalists would not be averse to the 
introduction of a healthier climate of competition in a sector that is currently constrained 
by a legacy of old externalities.  This creates a paradox: the Economic Rationalist sees all 
government intervention as a distortion of market principles, but if these principles have 
already been distorted by decades of previous intervention, preventing the government 
from interfering will result in the old distortions persisting longer, while market forces 
struggle to build up the momentum to overcome the old system’s inertia! 
In a situation like that which has developed in the Untied States under the regional 
monopoly paradigm, energy prices are much higher than they would otherwise be, for 
reasons stated above.  Mostly these reasons sum up to the inability of the generation and 
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transmission infrastructure to keep up with growing demand, plus the absence of 
competition, which means the absence of the impetus behind the lowering of prices in 
other economic sectors.  For fifty to sixty years, the technology and the infrastructure 
have developed with the regional monopoly system in the implicit assumption of all 
designers, which means that very often newcomers have to solve numerous engineering 
challenges before they can generate their own electricity profitably or sell it over the 
regional grid.  Because the transmission and distribution system was optimized for 
current flow from a few central nodes, even if the exclusive right of the utilities to service 
a region is removed, newcomers would still have a difficult time so much as getting the 
electricity they produce flowing to potential buyers, much less competing against a utility 
which owns the transmission grid and decides who gets on and who doesn’t! Even under 
open access there will be distribution problems that would have to be dealt with, due to 
this initial, centralized generation system. 
It is also important to remember that the same utility, besides owning the grid, 
also possesses massive generational assets in areas where deregulation has not occurred, 
which sometimes produce thousands of megawatts each.  Most of these generating 
installations have long ago repaid their capital costs, while the newcomer must first order 
and install bulky and expensive equipment, and then set rates that would at least pay for 
these initial expenses.  Under such circumstances, the only way the newcomer company 
can undercut the utility’s rates is if it has some advantage that the utility cannot have by 
its nature as a utility: for example if it uses cogeneration to save on fuel costs, or if it only 
services the building to which it is connected directly and so does not have to pay to use 
the utility’s transmission grid.  These would indeed help a startup out in some small 
individual cases, but such solutions also inherently limit such companies’ size and the 
size of the area they can service, which means the bulk of the market is still left to the 
giants. 
In general, the deck is stacked against any attempt by the newcomer to win a large 
share of the electric power market, which, of course, prevents competition from bidding 
down the prices nearly as much as it could have.  There is no doubt, from the point of 
view of the Economic Rationalist, that the effects of competition would be salutary for 
the industry and the consumer, but how can the benefits of a competing market be 
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brought to a system that is dominated by giants who refuse to allow a newcomer to gain 
hold? 
According to theorists like Hayek, Rothbard, and Milton Friedman, such 
circumstances would lead to a re-adjustment as consumers find a way to get around the 
giants and obtain the product without the costs of dealing with them.  Co-generation 
companies might get together and sell their excess to a middleman company that pools it 
and distributes it, which means that any given co-generation plant might now reach a 
wider market giving it more incentive to expand. Utility companies from outside the 
region serviced by one of the giants might seek to invade by extending their own 
transmission wires into the former monopoly’s territory.  The existence of multiple 
companies seeking to supply the same region might very well make the distribution 
business so chaotic that the utilities involved might choose to spin their transmission (or 
generation) assets off to form an independent power pool – an outcome which would in 
turn give aggregator companies more incentive to buy up the output of small co-
generators.  Fuel cells and other energy storage devices would expand, and the price of 
wind turbines and the efficiency of photovoltaics would continue to approach a point 
when they can compete with gas, and eventually with coal nuclear and large hydro 
installations. 
All of that would be well and good, but given the technological, engineering and 
financial obstacles to these changes, not even the most optimistic of the libertarian 
theorists can claim that the process would not be a gradual one.  The fact that electric 
power prices are usually perceived only as an inconvenience and not as an acute crisis 
means that whatever resources, financial, professional, or organizational, the market 
allocates to solving the problem, these resources will be far from a large percentage of the 
total resources the economy has available.  They may be enough for a gradual reform, but 
not for a radical restructuring.  Whatever benefits such changes may bring still lie far off 
in the future, and the flaws inherent in the regional monopoly paradigm would still take 
their toll on the quality of life in the nation for a long time, even with the regional 
monopolies themselves no longer being granted. 
Under such circumstances an Economic Rationalist might see the value of 
government intervention – not in any directly coercive directive, but rather through a 
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policy of rewards and deterrents.  The goal would be to break existing barriers to 
competition and the beneficial effects of the market by encouraging market forces to take 
effect and creating a market structure where the trend towards greater competition 
predicted by the great libertarian theorists are magnified, accelerated, and made more 
important in the priority structure by which the market allocates resources to various 
undertakings. 
For example, even the most ideological of Economic Rationalists won’t see the 
harm of a government introducing a massive tax reward for utilities that spilt their 
generative assets apart from their transmission and distribution assets, with a 
corresponding punishment of higher taxes for those utilities that fail to unbundle by a 
certain date.  A tax moratorium on those commercial producers of electric power that 
own less than 20% of the generating assets in a region, with those producers who own 
over 20% of these assets assigned to bear the tax burden the beneficiaries of the 
moratorium would otherwise have paid, could also be a temporary measure to encourage 
divestiture.  Provided such a measure is indeed temporary the Economic Rationalist 
would have no objection to a change in the tax structure intended to bring about greater 
economic freedom and competition. 
Neither would adherents of economic liberty be averse to a repeal of taxes on the 
sale of any microturbine, fuel cell, wind turbine, or photovoltaic panel equipment, nor 
would they be likely to oppose tax favors granted to banks that loan money to startups in 
the electric power sector, nor yet another moratorium on taxes from income that is 
derived from any such loans.  The government cannot, according to the Economic 
Rationalist, force a utility to divest, but it can create structure of rewards for those that do 
divest, and force those that do not to bear the burden of the taxes of which the divesters 
have been relieved. 
The end results of the process: increased competition, more reliable access to 
electric power, lower prices, and a new class of electric power entrepreneurs constantly 
on the lookout for improvement in generation, storage, and transmission and distribution 
technology – would certainly delight any libertarian’s heart.  Many Economic 
Rationalists today remain critical of modern corporations for seeking exemptions and 
favors from Washington, and relying on various forms of “corporate welfare” to make 
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their bottom line.  The replacement of an entire subclass of half-businesspeople-half-
bureaucrats, whose first solution to any crisis would be a meeting with a regulator board, 
with a sector full of aggressive, inventive, innovative go-getters would certainly be good 
for business, and it is just about the only way proponents of Economic Rationalism would 
argue that changes in the electric power sector can be good for the environment. 
After all, pollution is fundamentally inefficiency, and just because it so often 
imposed on the consumers as a market externality, does not mean that the consumers of 
electricity (who are also consumers of the air being polluted) would not be paying for it.  
Success at keeping emissions levels low and yet not raising the price of electric power 
serves a signal to the market that the company is well-run and so worth buying from (and 
investing in.)  Thus, any entrepreneur who can generate electric power without relying on 
polluting technology, and without raising the price, can count on winning a larger share 
of the market from all competitors, since many consumers would be all too aware of the 
damage polluting emissions do to human health and to the world’s climate.  In a 
competitive marketplace, reputation is more important than money in the bank – it 
represents money you can raise in the future. 
Because, in an unregulated electricity market, producing companies will wish to 
keep their reputation up, they are likely to pay a great deal more attention to 
environmental concerns than the utilities ever did during their undisputed reign.  No coal-
guzzlers like those currently plaguing the Rust Belt will be permitted in competitive 
conditions that would prevail after reform. 
Because of this, an Economic Rationalist could argue that not only would it be to 
the advantage of Economic Rationalism’s goals for the adherents of this philosophy to 
support distributed generation and the deregulation of the electric power sector that 
distributed generation implies, but it is to the advantage of the state governments and the 
federal government to carry the transition reforms out in a manner that accords best with 
the Economic Rationalist ideal – in other words, in a manner that does not actively seek 
to control the allocation of resources or the mode of production by direct degree, nor seek 
to determine the future developments of the industry through a master plan, but a manner 
that simply applies incentives and penalties to channel the natural fluctuations of supply 
and demand into the desired final state. 
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Such an approach to reform would result in many companies producing and 
selling electric power, none of them large enough to have an unchallenged monopoly, 
striving for ever-greater improvement of service and capacity in a competitive modern 
marketplace.  A more controlling approach would, on the other hand, run the danger of 
creating a system where generation is more distributed, but neither more efficient nor 
successful at providing a real measure of choice to the consumer.  The green generation 
technology for which distributed generation opens such an opportune window would 
languish under such a system, unable to sustain itself without subsidies drawn at the 
expense of the taxpayer and an artificial market for its output imposed by degree and so 
made unattractive to doubting investors.  The window of opportunity provided by the 
change in operating paradigms would be gone before green generating technology can 
become a significant part of the region’s portfolio of generating assets. 
In conclusion, Economic Rationalists would support distributed generation 
because it enables the transition to the Economic Rationalist utopia of a bustling 
marketplace in place of a regulated bureaucracy.  On the other hand, if this discourse is to 
commit fully to the reforms, its adherents must be assured that the path deregulation is to 
take would indeed result in greater economic freedom, and in a competition where none 
of the incumbents have the power to strangle newcomers in the cradle on the one hand, 
and yet aren’t being forcibly expropriated of their assets and market share on the other.  
Unlike the Administrative Rationalist and the Democratic Pragmatist, the Economic 
Rationalist must come to see that a specific kind of distributed generation is being 
introduced, and that a further set of conditions is being met than simply the distribution of 
generating assets across the geography. 
 
4.2.12 Ecological Modernizer 
To an Ecological Modernizer, flexibility is the key.  In order to make plans for an 
efficient, systematic arrangement, which maximizes consumer choice and green 
generation, and minimizes emission, waste, and price spikes, the range of options open to 
the would-be planner must be great enough to allow for an arrangement very different 
from that which exists at the moment.  Several other different arrangements are probably 
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necessary; each of them planned out to meet various contingencies that the others cannot.  
The contingencies can range from a rise – or maybe a sharp drop -- in the price of fossil 
fuels, to new obligations imposed by the higher tiers of government or by an international 
treaty, to a new technological discovery, to an unusually quick change in demand for 
electric power in regions A and B, or conversely, a drop in demand in region A, but a 
spike in the demand of industrial sector X.  The number of potential variations is myriad. 
But the entire premise of the regional monopoly paradigm is that no swift changes 
are to take place, ever, nor are they ever desirable.  All alterations in the normal 
operations of a utility, from the construction of additional capacity to the adjustment of 
rates to pay for installing new scrubbers on the plant smokestacks, have to be planned out 
in detail, cleared with the regulatory board, and then implemented according to schedule.  
The government can’t slack off in their vigilance: absent regulatory oversight the utility 
would be able to play with its captive market as shamelessly as the energy wholesalers 
played with California during its power crisis, although some governments have made it 
apparent they won’t let this happen again during deregulation by assuming very tight 
limitations.  The ponderousness of oversight and review is the price the utility – or, 
rather, the utility’s customer base – pays for the privilege of regional monopoly.  This 
makes a regional monopoly system very good at one thing -- signaling to consumers and 
shareholders precisely what they can expect in the coming couple of years in enough 
detail to provide a fair forewarning.  But it makes the same system unnecessarily 
ponderous and unwieldy when it comes time to re-organize in order to meet a suddenly 
necessary goal. 
From an Ecological Modernizer point of view, it makes the most sense to go 
straight to the root of the problem and change the old paradigm for one that allows all 
technological, economic, and social policy that might touch on the electric power sector 
to have the capacity of swiftly adapting for any new set of circumstances, the 
policymakers secure in the knowledge that the firms involved won’t get bogged down if 
their schedule is thrown out.  
In that respect, distributed generation offers the Ecological Modernizer a great 
advantage compared to any practicable form of centralization.  It can suit the changes in 
circumstances in the span of weeks or months, while a utility has to schedule its changes 
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in staggered succession that measures years. 
The flexibility distributed generation model brings to electric power stems from 
the fact that a smaller generating plant, which at its peak load only makes about .5 of 1% 
of a sector’s demand for power, is much easier to replace on the grid than a larger plant 
that makes 20% of it.  Any changes that the Ecological Modernizer might introduce that 
make it impossible for the giant plant to continue profitable operations are obviously not 
an option; on the other hand, a change that makes even five smaller producers of electric 
power go out of business is still acceptable, because the same changes may very well 
make it possible for other producers to enter the sector, taking their place.  At the same 
time, any one of these smaller enterprises might stop some, or even all, of its operations 
for a short time, in order to meet some technological requirement of the new plan, 
without leaving tens of thousands of people cold and in the dark.  The smaller firm will 
lose less money when stopped, and will cost its owners less to get started again.  In 
addition, whatever equipment the smaller firm will need for the change, it probably won’t 
take months to make and install.  The larger firm is likely to be better able to find the 
money for the new equipment, but with the greater losses it will take from any stoppage, 
the refurbishing might hurt its credit rating worse than the analogous process would hurt 
a smaller firm in such circumstances.  
Another factor to consider are the very small generation projects, such as co-
generational microturbines installed in private residences, single wind turbines or solar 
panels, or micro hydro projects using the local backyard creek falling off a great boulder.  
Although each micro generator is completely insignificant, they can prove extremely 
significant when added up together.  These do-it-yourself projects are likely to become 
more popular as the electric power sector grows increasingly more distributed, with the 
same crowd of enthusiasts that makes the DIY cable channel a profitable enterprise today 
running the smaller setups as a hobby, and perhaps a small source of extra income.  As 
the market for such micro projects expands, it will become increasingly cheaper and 
easier to acquire, install and service them, and so more people are likely to jump on the 
bandwagon – it is at least as much fun as other forms of home improvement, and can earn 
the hobbyist money into the bargain.  Eventually, up to 5%-10% of all electricity 
consumed in the region might come from such micro installations.  Incidentally, because 
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a great percentage of these households would use such weather-dependent means of 
generation as wind and solar energy, this would also mean a boom in energy storage 
devices, some of which would spill over even to people who do not, for one reason or 
another, own a home generator. 
This means that under distributed generation, the Ecological Modernizers can take 
comfort from knowing that they have a significant fraction of the region’s generation 
capacity serving as a useful amortizer, damping down any spike in prices that their 
reforms might cause.  Moreover, at least some of these micro generation hobbyists – in 
particular the subset with business and/or engineering aptitude -- might be motivated by 
the price spike to expand their operations, getting financing from banks and wholesaler 
firms, rising from micro to mini level of generation, and so forming the nuclei of new 
startups, which might soak up more of the excess demand.  These potential seeds of 
future firms would provide increased stability, their very presence serving to damp down 
such wild leaps in energy prices as those California had to endure in the winter of 2001.  
The development in energy storage that distributed generation would spur may very well 
translate into more responsible consumption of electricity on the demand side, which 
would also dampen the risk of runaway retail rates. 
Another advantage that a geographic and proprietary distribution of generative 
assets holds for the Ecological Modernizer worldview lies in the comparatively small size 
of producer firms in the restructured sector.  It is actually a very similar reason to that of 
the Administrative Rationalist, except that “vulnerability to regulation” must be 
substituted by “susceptibility to rewards and punishments”.  Small companies are usually 
less insulated from punishment and more responsive to rewards, for the simple reason 
that their store of capital is small enough that a loss that a larger corporation can shrug off 
can often mean bankruptcy for a smaller enterprise – that is the reason so few startups 
decide to compete directly with General Motors.  Conversely, for a small company facing 
cutthroat competition from larger ones, the rewards in loans, grants, or carbon credits that 
might accrue from meeting some reform measure’s stated goal can mean the difference 
between shutting down or being bought out, and staying open for another year. 
This means that not only will distributed generation make the electric power 
sector more flexible, and not only will it produce a subclass of small local producers to 
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amortize price shocks, but, whatever system of rewards and punishments the Ecological 
Modernizer will institute, the smaller producer companies will respond to them much 
faster than the onetime monopolies, so that the presence of such small companies will 
naturally accelerate the velocity at which the sector shifts its behavior in response to 
reform.  Of course it is likely that small companies will soon merge into generating 
conglomerates, possibly spread across many states, to counteract the threat of inadequate 
capital.  Nevertheless, with the market open, smaller startups will never be entirely absent 
from it, and a change in their behavior can serve as a catalyst that will turn around the 
rest of the market as it perceives the newcomers reaping the rewards proffered to them 
for their compliance.  Whatever the case, with competition between different producers, 
even large ones, the market would be more responsive to a reward-and-punishment 
arrangement than a central monopoly with a guaranteed income. 
To summarize, the Ecological Modernizer can have greater freedom of action 
under distributed generation, because, firstly, the greater ease of installing, maintaining, 
and bringing on-line a smaller generational facility will make for a greater range of 
options the Ecological Modernizers reforms can take, and secondly, the presence of the 
micro generator among the homeowners of the region on an income supplement/hobby 
level can, when taken in the aggregate, provide an amortizing effect on the swings in 
energy prices that the electric power sector might undergo during the transition period of 
whatever reform the Ecological Modernizer institutes.  The comparative ease with which 
the smaller companies can install new equipment, combined with their greater 
vulnerability to fiscal punishment and greater appreciation of fiscal incentives makes 
them the ideal leaders in the Ecological Modernizers reforms, providing an example for 
the rest of the sector to follow.  Simply put, given the basic paradigm of distributed 
generation, the Ecological Modernizer has more building parts to manipulate in the 
construction of whatever grand engine of future progress must be assembled in the name 
of the Earth, and some of these building parts, properly ignited, can put the engine into 
overdrive. 
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4.2.13 Green Romanticist 
The appeal of distributed generation to the Green Romanticist focuses on access.  
By the nature of this discourse, its adherents have difficulty gaining access to the board 
meetings of utilities where policy is being worked out.  People who work for a utility are 
naturally more concerned with meeting a complicated and vital operations schedule, and 
maintaining a sufficient level of output to supply increasing demand for energy over a 
grid struggling to process greater loads than it was built to handle.  Environmental impact 
is a concern indeed, but it is more a concern with meeting environmental goals set by the 
regulation board than an active concern over the effect the utility’s operations are having 
on the living Earth.  The utility would often prefer to seek exemptions from the 
enforcement of a law, claiming it would be unable to operate otherwise, than to make a 
determined effort to find an alternate way to operate.  The fact that when the utility clams 
that, very often it is telling the truth, is not a mitigating circumstance from the point of 
view of a Green Romanticist.  Under such circumstances, a paradigm of energy 
generation that did not depend on coal and so did not have an excuse to avoid emissions 
laws would be a very welcome change in itself.  In that respect, the Green Romanticist 
would be firmly allied to the Administrative Rationalist. 
 The communities and private citizens who decide to take advantage of 
distributed generation and generate their power locally are going to interact with 
pollution levels and emissions standards on a level far more personal than they did 
before.  A homeowner who accepted carbon emissions from the central coal-fired 
behemoth as a necessary condition of having the lights on at night (and something out of 
his or her hands anyway) would have no excuses when he or she is the owner of the 
generator.  A community that generates its own power also faces the same choice.  If the 
citizens at the town meeting vote to install a coal-burner, not only will they know that the 
responsibility for the greenhouse gases and heavy metal isotopes it puts into the air is 
now resting directly on their shoulders, but they will soon realize that the task of 
justifying these emissions before the EPA will soon rest there as well. 
Green Romanticist discourse speaks of the personal responsibility each individual 
bears for the impact of his or her actions upon the planet – but with the large central 
power plants, as well as other large corporations, to act as pollution intermediaries, it was 
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easy to fall into an attitude of “Well, such is life, if I boycotted electricity made from 
coal, others still would not.”  Under distributed generation, and the deregulated market it 
implies, it is possible for customers to exercise their buying power guided by conscience, 
and those new producers, whether hobbyists looking to save on tariff rates or 
entrepreneurs looking to sell energy as at the helm of a startup firm, would have to face 
the facts that they are now contributing to the issue of climate change on Earth, one way 
or another, in the most direct way possible. 
Even for those callous enough to remain uncaring under such conditions, the 
system of rewards for green producers and those consumers that buy electric power from 
them, which the government is likely to institute as part of its deregulation policy, would 
at least be a constant reminder of which actions, technologies, and power plant designs 
are and aren’t polluting, and to what degree.  Greater literacy in the issues involved is 
likely to breed greater concern: nobody likes the idea of an earth plagued by typhoons 
and droughts, with coastal cities battling to keep the rising sea levels at bay.  Acid rain is 
no decent human being’s idea of a picnic, either.  As customers grow more informed, the 
reputation of a firm as less polluting grows more valuable, and as firms compete for the 
title of “least polluting” firms with the best reputation seek to make it more valuable still 
by educating their potential consumers, creating a sort of virtuous cycle. 
Thus, for a Green Romanticist distributed generation is a godsend.  First, it 
promotes responsibility, both among persons and within communities.  Second, it creates 
a situation where both producers and buyers of electricity must educate themselves on the 
environmental consequences of any decision they make.  And as a corollary to that, it 
increases the value of a company’s good name among consumers, the way this value has 
increased in other competitive markets such as automobiles or fuels – and so promotes 
further education of both consumers and companies. 
It is very likely that distributed generation will result in a better-informed and 
more responsible population. Thus it is in the best interest of the adherents of the Green 
Romanticist discourse to promote it. 
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4.2.14 Conclusive Argumentation 
Distributed generation implies deregulation, since removing the economy of scale 
as a justification means that the chief obstacle to free customer choice between producers 
and suppliers of electric power falls away, and without it, none of the other obstacles are 
tenable.  This is not, however, a change to fear.  As long as transition between the two 
systems is implemented properly, the resulting system is more responsive to regulation, 
which should please the Administrative Rationalists, more empowering of communities 
and direct democracy, which should please the Democratic Pragmatists, producing 
cheaper, more reliable, and more efficient electric power, which should please Economic 
Rationalists.  From the Economic Rationalist point of view, the transition to distributed 
generation is more important than the paradigm itself, because it is the transition that will 
determine whether or not the outcome will result in competition and entrepreneurial 
activity or oligopoly, consumer apathy, and government subsidies attempting to promote 
a paradigm the market refuses to support. 
Any scheme intended to change the behavior of the producers through reward and 
punishment is likely to bear fruit faster and be amortized against price fluctuations that 
accompany the transition, which means an Ecological Modernizer should be pleased.  
Finally, a paradigm where generation is distributed among the population also distributes 
emissions literacy… and, at least sometimes, it also distributes an increased sense of 
personal responsibility among producers and consumers -- something Green Romanticists 
have been urging for decades!  In short, the new paradigm offers great promise to every 
one of the major discourses. 
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Appendix 1 
California Energy Crisis 
California was one of the most disappointing forms of deregulation. It caused a 
massive hurdle for advocates of deregulation in many other states. The reason we discuss 
it is because it is important to see what caused Massachusetts to deregulate the way it did. 
Also, comparing the policy in California and the policy in Massachusetts can give us an 
understanding of the discourses involved in California letting us make sure that those 
discourses do not appear as they did here. 
The case of California, with its leaps of over 250% in wholesale costs and the 
sight of power distribution companies left drained of all purchasing power and unable to 
meet their obligations to deliver electricity to the consumer, is often cited by opponents 
of deregulation as proof of the dangers inherent in the market.  Paradoxically, the case of 
California can be seen as the best example of the case against deregulation’s opponents:  
the crisis was likely due to the vulnerability of the industry at the time.  In short, it was an 
illustration of what happens when the government regulates deregulation too much.  
None of California’s pricing problems can be traced back to the fact, in and of itself, that 
electricity was now being sold as a commodity on a fluctuating market, but all of them 
can easily be traced to one or another of the constrictive regulations with which the new 
electric power market was hobbled. 
For example, we know that the wholesale prices for electricity exceeded retail 
prices, initiating a financial disaster for the distribution companies that used to be 
California’s utilities.  The distributors were paying more per kilowatt-hour to buy 
electricity than they were getting back from their customers, yet they were obligated to 
deliver the electricity to the end users.  This made them a captive market for the 
generating companies. 
Why, we may justly ask, would the producers of electric power not increase 
generation to take advantage of rising prices (and by so doing bring them lower again)?  
On examination, we find a number of reasons making such courses unlikely: 
1. The electric power industry was deregulated, but the oil refineries were not.  
Limited number of oil refineries created a bottleneck for generators. 
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2. Drought – no availability of hydroelectric power from the North.  What 
hydro-generated power was available was not sufficient to meet the unusually 
high demand of the year 2001. 
3. Rising prices of natural gas. 
4. Record heat in summer of 2000, record cold in winter of 2000/2001. 
California gets 1% of its electricity from coal, 46% from natural gas, and 22% 
from hydroelectric dams.  The balance is made of renewable fuel sources and oil.  Since 
hydroelectric power supplies could not be increased, neither could gas supplies (the rise 
in prices was due to a decreased supply, and production could not expand enough in a 
time frame that could have prevented the crisis), oil could have made the difference, 
allowing producers to increase generation and bring prices down.  Unfortunately, the 
limited number of oil refineries meant that it was useless to ship the oil in, since it could 
be made ready for use by the power plants only at a certain maximum rate, which had 
already been reached. 
Market Signals Failed 
As explained above in the description of California’s deregulation model, 
generating firms had to sell their power through the PX (Power Exchange) electronic 
market.  On the PX market, the highest-priced unit of energy determined the prices of all 
other units, therefore price signaling was distorted. 
Another distortion came from the retailers (the IOUs) being unable to make 
bilateral “futures” contracts directly with the generators: the PX system only allowed 
purchase up to 24 hours in advance.  The possibility of bilateral contracts would have 
allowed the IOUs to protect themselves from the risk of rising prices, while protecting the 
generating company from the risk of competition; by disallowing them, the state distorted 
the market once again. 
Finally, the public never felt the incentive to conserve power.  The rate freeze 
operating across most areas serviced by IOUs was intended to prevent the consumers 
from feeling the rate increase while the IOUs would have recovered the costs of 
constructing the power plants that they divested during deregulation.  In reality, what 
happened was that most Californians never felt the incentive to conserve power that an 
unregulated retail rate would have provided.  The IOUs did not have the option of 
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refusing service, nor of raising retail rates.  They had to buy ever-increasing amounts of 
power from the generators, no matter the cost: demand became uncoupled from supply.  
Once again we have a catastrophic distortion of the market’s price-signaling mechanism. 
Finally, because the hardware of generating power was still oriented towards large 
producers, and the construction of new power plants, transmission lines, fuel 
infrastructure to service the larger generators, it was extremely capital-intensive and 
slowed down by the state regulation of all additions to that infrastructure, the signals that 
an overheating market normally sends out, attracting new producers and thus increasing 
supply and decreasing the price level, were too weak. This feature is of the industry is 
only normal to industries being deregulated.  New investors did indeed enter the energy 
market, but their work was nowhere near fast enough to bring wholesale prices down in 
time to avoid the crisis, though by 2001, the state’s generation and distribution 
infrastructure was indeed more efficient than that of 2000. 
To summarize, the so-called “free” market of the deregulated California power 
sector was anything but free.  Under its “deregulated” conditions, it consistently failed to 
send out: 
1. Signals to match supply with demand with regard to prices of individual 
power units. 
2. Signals to match a supply of risk amelioration (in the form of bilateral long-
term contracts) with the demand for it on the part of the IOUs. 
3. Signals to let the customers know that energy conservation measures would be 
desirable, and to let the producers know that excessive gouging would result 
in a decrease of their customer base. 
4. Signals to attract new participants into the sectors are enough to prevent the 
spike in prices. 
If this is California’s idea of the free market, the state government is quite right in 
its complaints.  Such a market is indeed doomed to failure.  Its relation to the dictionary 
definition of the free market, however, lies purely in the no doubt accidental fact that the 
two concepts have identical-looking printed names.  Free markets do not improve 
production and distribution through the magic power of names: they do so by price 
signals, which California’s deregulated market utterly failed to send. 
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Price Gouging 
Energy providers on the wholesale market were frequently accused of playing the 
market, buying cheap electric energy from the original generators, selling it (sometimes 
over ten times) to each other or their own subsidiaries at ever-inflating prices, finally 
selling it to the retailers at an arbitrage of several hundred times the original value per 
kilowatt-hour.  This is price gouging – defined as selling at artificially inflated prices to 
someone who the seller knows has no option but to pay any price asked.  Of course the 
fact that price gouging took place is not up for dispute: the investigators looking into the 
matter afterwards found recordings of Enron Board Members’ voices discussing their 
plan to game the energy markets.  The question becomes: why did Enron and other such 
companies come to believe that this sort of collusion was the optimal way to maximize 
their bottom line? 
Under free market conditions, such collusions are undercut by the simple 
prisoner’s dilemma.  If any one of the firms involved lowers prices instead of raising 
them, that firm can capture the market share of all the others, making up in bulk 
payments what it gives up in rates.  Fearing this maneuver on the part of their 
competitors, all firms seek an equilibrium point, where the attraction of the lucre gained 
from price gouging is balanced by the risk of competitive undercutting. 
On the other hand, in California under the Gray Davis’ idea of deregulation, the 
wholesalers had themselves a captive market: the IOUs were unable to refuse to buy from 
them and unable to pass their costs on to the consumer.  This alone would decrease the 
probability that a wholesaler would see the option of lowering prices as a path to greater 
market share and presumably higher profits.  Even with a smaller market share, these 
wholesalers could still make all the money they wanted, by milking their captive buyers.  
On the other hand, increasing production and lowering prices was costly, constrained by 
licensing bottlenecks, and since everybody was aware that the situation could not last 
indefinitely, no wholesaler could afford to wait for years until the new generating 
installations would be ready to provide the cheap power.  The behavior of the wholesalers 
is predictable by simple economic principles: they chose the course most likely to boost 
their profit margin, and if they had not done so, other firms would have.  But it was the 
state of California, and the shortsighted policies of its government, which "optimized" the 
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market so that price gouging lead to highest possible profits, which made this behavior 
rewarding to the miscreants. 
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Appendix 2 
Subject 1 – Electricity Policy Employee 
Administrative Rationalist 
• Role of government in power generation: Better government action could be 
taken. Better leadership from the government in promoting more environmentally 
and economically sustainable energy and ensure that the policy that are already in 
place works.   
• Getting someone in government to have a clear message and speak on the “Bully 
Pulpit” about the importance of renewable energy 
• Systems Benefit Surcharge:  He gets paid by it 
• He managed the process to write the regulations for the Renewable Portfolio 
Standard  
• What he would have done differently in Massachusetts: If you get the existing 
utilities to sign a long term contract to purchase a certain amount of renewable 
energy then people would be more willing to invest. 
• He sights an example of a solar company that couldn’t raise the funds on its own 
to make efficient low cost solar cells.  They got a grant to supplement the cost 
from the federal government.  He says that that is an important partnership.   
Democratic Pragmatist   
• Frustrated about public support: people should do more 
• People need to make trade-offs to get renewable power generators in their back 
yard. 
• Costumer perception is one factor that drives companies to be more resourceful in 
achieving efficiency (The individual has an effect) 
Economic Rationalist 
• Some larger companies have found an interest in Wind generation because they 
appreciate that there aren’t large price fluctuations, unlike fossil fuels 
• Vertically integrated monopolies will to what they need to do in order to comply 
with regulations but they don’t have much incentive to go beyond that for the 
greater good.  But a company that is competing for retail costumers might have an 
incentive to do better to get more of a market share 
• The sighting process of developing new green power plants is getting dragged out 
a little too long. 
Ecological Modernizer 
• There needs to be a partnership between government and private sector when it 
comes to better energy sources 
• It is a mix between education and companies/consumers buying patterns when 
there are supply problems 
Green Romanticist 
• His career 
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• Was excited about the opportunities of deregulation prior to restructuring: People 
could vote with their purchasing power, but it has been slower then hoped 
Problems 
• Surveys about people saying that they would be willing to pay more for 
renewable energy:  easy to say it in a survey-harder actually getting them to sign 
up 
• With renewable energy they have to sell two things: their power, and their energy 
certificates.  There is a danger that the government will change their position and 
the market for renewable energy certificates will disappear. 
• Frustrated about public support 
• You have to work hard to find someone to sell renewable energy, it takes more 
work then most are willing to put into it 
• The renewable portfolio standard is struggling a little right now.  It is not working 
the way that it was envisioned.  b\c we don’t have government sighting policies to 
make it work.  It is getting bogged down in permitting and approvals processes. 
 
Subject 2 – College Professor 
Economic Rationalist 
• Part of the Libertarian Party: Which supports the privatization of government 
• Electric power companies in this country haven’t been very profitable 
• In California the highest bidder instead of the lowest: This was a major problem.   
• Saying that California deregulated is incorrect.  It was a different setup of 
regulations that was created to make some people a lot of money 
 
Subject 3 – Green Energy Project Coordinator 
Administrative Rationalist    
• She is funded threw a grant threw the Massachusetts Energy Collaborative which 
get their funding by Systems Benefit Surcharge.   
• She said that the Federal government doesn’t really have a stand and they should.  
They should support renewable energy through R&D and renewable energy 
generation.   
• The city should be more serious about energy conservation and should purchase a 
portion of their energy from renewable.   
• She thinks that the surcharge could be increased, not too much but it can be a little 
because at the moment it is very small. 
Democratic Pragmatist  
• She meets with majors, city council members, and people on the school 
committee.   
• They are offering to them the ability to buy clean energy certificates and have the 
money that they pay to come back to them to be used for education and solar 
panels  
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Economic Rationalist 
• She wants people to have choices on an electricity provider.  She thinks that green 
energy has a better chance under deregulation. 
• It is economically sound because renewable energy prices are stable. 
• A mandate for public schools wouldn’t be a good idea because it could stop a 
school from being built that really should be built.  Not so strict. 
• It is better to make clean energy marketable because the world runs on money. 
Ecological Modernizer 
• A partnership between government and the private sector 
Green Romanticist 
• Started working with green electricity at the end of 2004. She did her master 
thesis on the greenhouse gas emission in the city of Worcester: She thinks that the 
environment is important enough to do that much work 
• Schools are being offered the ability to buy clean energy certificates and have the 
money that they pay to come back to them to be used for education and solar 
panels.  
Problems 
• Companies don’t have an incentive to be one the least polluters.  Example: if a 
company is number 1 then they go down to 3 or 4 people will think that they 
aren’t doing as well.  It is better to stay in the middle.   
• Companies haven’t been responsible with natural resources  
 
Subject 4 – Electricity Policy Employee 
Administrative Rationalist 
• Has a management job in a state office dealing with environmental impact. 
• Refers to international treaties, such as the Kyoto protocol 
• Criticizes businesses as being susceptible to fuel prices, so that even great 
progress in green technology since R&D began in the 1970’s was not enough to 
make green technology acceptable after the oil prices plummeted in the late 
1980’s. 
• Expert of the sort Administrative Rationalism trusts with determining policy – 
degree in mechanical engineering, previous job as a college teacher.  Area of 
expertise is non-profit organizations and government policy. 
• Hesitant when asked for opinion on deregulation, as it is not his “area expertise”. 
• Mentioned how hard it was for developers of green power project to find long-
term contracts in a deregulated market.  In the old, less volatile days, they could 
just sign a contract with the utilities to supply them green energy for years in 
advance. 
Economic Rationalist 
• Wants more competition in the energy market. 
• Expresses disappointment at the dearth of competitive suppliers of electric power 
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in general and green energy in particular. 
• Stated his belief in inherent limitations of the government’s efficacy at solving the 
problem of green energy. 
• Stated that the “deregulated market is working”, although “newcomers are not 
coming in as aggressively as we’d like them to.” 
• Talked about increasing importance of environmental PR in the calculations of 
businesses.  Stated that PR was not as important as other considerations yet, but 
that it is becoming increasingly more important. 
Ecological Modernizer 
• Likes the idea of the requiring an investment of each energy provider in the 
Renewable Energy Portfolio, as it stimulates the market for green energy. 
• Despite his expressed desire for more competition, believes competition needs 
“enforcement” 
• Talked about the externality known as “tragedy of the commons”.  Stressed the 
need to educate the public. 
Problems 
• Companies fail to recognize green energy as something reliable and investment-
worthy today.  Still see all forms of green energy, even those as cost-effective as 
wind power, as expensive and experimental.  Banks are conservative, refuse to 
take the chance on a green power boom.  Expressed faith that this is turning 
around, as investors see oil prices rising and wind power. 
• Complained about vocal resistance to wind farm developments.  Residents of 
communities close to proposed sites complain about noise, death of birds, often 
exaggerate problems.  The arduous process scares off investors, imposes new 
costs on developments that the project must recoup – makes banks even more 
hesitant. 
 
Subject 5 – College Professor 
Administrative Rationalist 
• Not convinced that deregulation is the best idea in regard to electric power 
generation 
• He feels that in some industries government regulated monopolies are in the 
public’s best interest. (e.g. the Bell telephone monopoly served the greater good 
because of their massive effort in R&D through Bell Labs.)  He also includes 
power generation and transmission in this category. 
• A problem with deregulation:  It is making a necessary service into a commodity. 
Democratic Pragmatist 
• Information that would support this discourse is not contained within this 
interview 
Economic Rationalist 
• He mentions that states have learned from California’s mistakes, which suggests 
that he believes that deregulation can work 
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• Price drives companies to be more or less resourceful. 
Ecological Modernizer 
• He led a project which looked at the feasibility of electric powered vehicles which 
was partially funded by government grants to the educational community.  He 
also has a Hybrid vehicle in his household.  This suggests that he most likely 
believes in collaboration between industry and government when it comes to 
environmental R&D.  
Green Romanticist  
• He believes that educating the population is beneficial to society.  He not only 
worked as a professor in a college, but he also was involved in alternative fuel 
system transportation.   
Problems 
• The current system is too complicated for the common person to decode 
• He thinks that in some cases the breakup of monopolies isn’t the best course of 
action. 
 
Subject 6 – Transmission Engineer 
Administrative Rationalist 
• After deregulation the costs remained high 
• The only reason why National Grid went along with deregulation was because 
Massachusetts. Government mandated it.  Before, they could effectively 
compensate for distributed energy need by turning on/off power plants, now they 
don’t have as much control. 
Economic Rationalist 
• He argued that the British deregulation model was superior to that of the various 
US states (in particular Massachusetts) because the Brits did not try to prevent 
prices from spiking after deregulation.  In the end, argues Moser, the act of 
spiking brought in suppliers wishing to cash in on the high prices, and thus caused 
prices to stabilize at a lower level than prior to deregulation. 
• He also discussed the failure of the modern electric power market to signal the 
difference in prices between the peak and off-peak hours.  This creates patterns of 
use that reinforce the problem.  If peak hours were more expensive (i.e. as 
expensive as they really are), the customers would be more willing to peak 
alternative providers, or to invest in energy storage devices. 
• Discussed the two models of adding a new provider to the grid “common carrier” 
where anyone pays a simple fee and uses grid to transmit electricity, or the “costs 
of optimization model” where each new carrier has to pay the cost of re-
optimizing grid.  The first favors new providers, including green energy suppliers.  
The second favors companies already existing on grid.  Which is fair?  Suggested 
that a loan system to pay for grid re-optimization is possible, but bankers must be 
interested first. 
Problems 
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• As stated above, they had more control in preventing brown/black outs before 
deregulation.   
 
Subject 7 – Demand Side Management  
Administrative Rationalist 
• Made a statement the Pres. Bush got rid of all the incentive based energy 
programs 
• The government should invest in tech that is almost ready for prime time 
• The Systems Benefit surcharge is doing its job and it is working well. 
• Regulation has an effect on companies’ resourcefulness  
Democratic Pragmatist 
• In California demand was cut by individuals taking action.  Electric consumers 
are smart, if they are informed that there is a really serious situation they are able 
to make good decisions that make a big impact. 
Economic Rationalist 
• Consumer demand needs to be created to solve environmental problems. 
• Generation of electricity is much more subject to market forces now and that is 
probably a good thing 
• Large companies have benefited from restructuring 
• Has the opinion that restructuring in Massachusetts was done well. 
Ecological Modernizer 
• Collaborates with the MTC to get schools to invest in green alternatives 
Green Romanticist  
• Problems have already arisen and companies haven’t done anything.   
• Concentrates on overall conservation of electricity: demand side management 
Problems 
• Problems have already arisen and companies haven’t done anything 
• The payback for personal green generation takes a very long time. 
 
